COCHABAMBA CIVIC COMMITTEE ASKS FOR HELP

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001812 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL SUBJECT: COCHABAMBA CIVIC COMMITTEE ASKS FOR HELP Classified By: DCM Krishna Urs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On June 28, members of the Cochabamba civic committee met with the Ambassador and DCM to voice their fears over what they call the MAS' "anti-democratic" agenda. The committee's Cochabamba-specific concerns include GOB budget cuts, failure of the GOB to deliver on infrastructure projects, and what it sees as GOB complicity in the increase in narco-trafficking originating from the Chapare. Citing what he called the MAS' goal to perpetuate and concentrate its hold on power, the civic committee president explained that his group is now focusing on national issues, such as defending democracy -- more specifically the judiciary -- and stopping the MAS agenda both in and out of the constituent assembly. Arguing that the civic committee serves as a check on MAS power, the committee members asked for embassy assistance, noting the embassy was the first organization it had approached. The Ambassador responded that the USG shares many of the committee's concerns regarding the threats to Bolivia's fragile democracy, but that the USG cannot directly support a political group such as the committee. End Summary. -------------- The Committee's Perspective -------------- ¶2. (C) Cochabamba civic committee President Oscar Zurita opened the meeting by outlining the committee's main grievances against the GOB. He explained that the GOB has failed to provide Cochabamba 140 million bolivianos (USD 17.5 million) in budgeted funds, has not distributed the department's fair share of gas tax revenues (IDH),and not delivered on needed (and promised) educational resources. Zurita lamented the GOB's failure to deliver on several critical road projects and a gas pipeline that aims to link Cochabamba with the gas-rich eastern departments. He also blamed the GOB for the collapse of Lloyd Aero Boliviano (LAB),Bolivia's national air carrier. Finally, he argued the GOB was responsible for increases in narco-trafficking originating from the Chapare. Concerned with what he called the MAS' desire to perpetuate and concentrate its hold on power, the president explained that the civic committee is now expanding its focus to national politics, such as defending democracy -- more specifically the judiciary -- and stopping the MAS agenda both in and out of the constituent assembly. ¶3. (C) Civic committee member Jose Orellana explained that the January 8-11 conflict in Cochabamba demonstrated the MAS party's lack of respect for democratic institutions (in this case the democratically elected prefect). He added that since the opposition political parties are weak, committees like their own have an increasingly important role as a check on the MAS. Orellana argued that the civic committee needs to expand its work beyond the city of Cochabamba into rural areas where it is weak, but added that to execute such a strategy required more resources. He then asked for the embassy to support the committee's efforts. ¶4. (C) Retired Air Force General Freddy Vargas focused much of his discussion on Cochabamba's strategic importance. Unlike other departments which are clearly pro-MAS or pro-opposition, Vargas explained that Cochabamba hangs in the "balance" and that President Morales is committed to bringing the department firmly into the MAS camp. Vargas, showing his military roots, called Cochabamba the MAS' "theater of operations" and that the committee needs the embassy's "logistical support" to confront the MAS. -------------- Ambassador's Response -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador responded that the USG shares many of the committee's concerns regarding the threats to Bolivia's fragile democracy, but that the USG cannot provide direct support to a political group such as the committee. He explained that such support would feed into President Morales' (unfounded) claims of U.S. interference in Bolivia's domestic politics. Furthermore he contended that the president would use such a connection to discredit the committee's work. While rejecting direct support, the Ambassador mentioned that the USG does support democracy projects and stated that the committee was free to submit a written project proposal. The meeting closed with the group asking for USG assistance in the event that they found themselves under direct GOB threat. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) We share retired General Vargas' assessment of Cochabamba as a key department where pro- and anti-MAS forces are locked in a political (and at times physical) battle for control of the prefecture. The Cochabamba civic committee recognizes its weakness outside Cochabamba city, thus its rural outreach strategy. However, its fundraising tactic of looking first to the U.S. Embassy is unfortunately common in Bolivia. To paraphrase the retired General Vargas, "the committee needs help so the embassy is the first door we knocked on." The Cochabamba civic committee has understandable goals, but appears to lack creativity in their implementation. End Comment. GOLDBERG