AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH DORIA MEDINA AND UN PARTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000167 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH DORIA MEDINA AND UN PARTY LEADERSHIP REF: A. 2006 LA PAZ 3244 ¶B. LA PAZ 103 ¶C. LA PAZ 55 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On January 20, National Unity (UN) party leader Samuel Doria Medina and several UN party officials told the Ambassador, DCM, and Ecopol officers they believe cooperation among opposition political parties has improved, although obstacles remain to close coordination. Doria Medina claimed a recent Mori poll shows Morales, popularity dropping to an all-time low of 32 percent. (Note: Post has not seen the poll and is skeptical, given that other recent polls put the President's popularity in the high fifties. End note.) Doria Medina drew parallels between Morales, &revolution8 and the U.S. civil rights movement, stating that Bolivia,s indigenous are in their radical phase; he hopes they will see that violence is not the solution. The Ambassador noted bilateral difficulties but said the USG wants to continue working with the GOB toward common interests; Doria Medina called the Embassy,s low profile &smart8 and advised the Ambassador not to give Morales a chance to distract the population from growing domestic problems by &blaming big brother.8 Regarding the Constituent Assembly (CA),Doria Medina said his party has few representatives but makes up for what it lacks in numbers with its centrist position. In response to the Ambassador,s inquiry, Doria Medina said Venezuelan interference is not to blame for Bolivia,s problems but observed that Venezuela is playing on the GOB,s greatest weakness, its limited financial resources. End summary. -------------- CAN THE OPPOSITION WORK TOGETHER? -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 20, National Unity (UN) party leader and Constituent Assembly (CA) member Samuel Doria Medina and several UN party officials told the Ambassador, DCM, and Ecopol officers they believe cooperation among opposition political parties has improved, although obstacles remain to close coordination. The Ambassador expressed concern for Bolivian democracy and pointed to a number of events, including a midnight senate session in which the MAS manipulated senate rules (reftel A),as signs that the GOB may be moving towards a more authoritarian path. The Ambassador reiterated Assistant Secretary Shannon,s statement that a country,s ideology is less important than its commitment to democracy and its willingness to work with the United States. At this point in Bolivia, the Ambassador said, both factors are in doubt. ¶3. (C) Doria Medina responded by assuring the Ambassador that the UN,s cooperation with Podemos and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) has improved, citing the parties' late 2006 success in organizing nationwide protests and hunger strikes in support of a two-thirds vote in the CA. He said the MAS, midnight senate session was the catalyst for improved cooperation but implied the UN,s willingness to work with Podemos is complicated by resentment over Podemos, &dirty8 campaign tactics in December 2005. That aside, Doria Medina said the opposition is attempting to gain control of the senate presidency to balance the Morales government, noting that the UN (as well as the Santa Cruz department) understands what is required to counter Morales, well-organized political machine. (Note: The lower house re-elected Edmundo Novillo as its president on January 21; the senate remains deadlocked, with Podemos, the UN, and the MAS vying for the presidency. End note.) -------------- MORALES, DROPPING POPULARITY? -------------- ¶4. (C) Doria Medina told the Ambassador that according to a recent Mori poll, Morales, popularity has dropped to an all-time low of 32 percent. (Note: Post has not seen the poll and is skeptical, given that other recent polls put the President's popularity in the high fifties. End note.) He said mestizo and middle class Bolivians are starting to turn away from Morales, citing as an example the January 11 conflict in Cochabamba in which middle class indigenous women fought MAS cocaleros (reftel B). He also claimed MAS cocaleros are growing tired of being used by the GOB. Doria Medina argued that the MAS, radical faction wants to generate conflict in order to move toward a participatory democracy, as it believes the current democratic model has failed. Doria Medina claimed that private citizens are beginning to arm themselves and warned that if Morales continues with his current strategy of confrontation, there will be more deaths. He lamented that hardliners in Santa Cruz want to precipitate the GOB,s fall, stating that it is &easy to start violence but hard to stop it.8 ¶5. (C) Doria Medina also criticized the GOB,s management style, noting in particular its failure to make decisions. He said most GOB officials are reluctant to make decisions without Morales, approval and pointed out that executive branch chaos slows conflict resolution. He also criticized Morales, instigation of problems with the police and the press. Doria Medina joked that based on his contact with the press, Morales had succeeded in generating more &spirit8 in the press corps than in some political parties. Doria Medina said the GOB wants to govern alone, without opposition or prefects, but remarked that the administration must accept the political opposition. He added that given Morales, sagging popularity, the opposition should welcome a referendum on elected officials. Doria Medina believes that if a new election were held now, Morales would lose, or at least have to face a second round runoff. -------------- THE INDIGENOUS &REVOLUTION8 -------------- ¶6. (C) Doria Medina drew parallels between Morales, &revolution8 and the U.S. civil rights movement. He said the indigenous in Bolivia are in their radical phase, just as the civil rights movement passed through a similar stage in the United States. He hoped that the indigenous would realize that opportunity, hard work, and education are the solution, not violence, but admitted that improving equality without impinging on civil liberties is a great challenge for Bolivia. He said radical calls for the incorporation of community justice and other indigenous traditions into the Bolivian mainstream represent an indigenous protest at having been excluded from modernization. He said studies show that the majority of Bolivians do not want community justice; rather, they want a competent formal justice system. (Note: Our own studies confirm this. End note.). ¶7. (C) Doria Medina said contrary to popular belief (which was falsely bolstered by the poorly-worded 2000 census),the majority of Bolivians are mestizo, not indigenous. Doria Medina pointed to the example of Felipe Quispe, a radical indigenous leader who has made several unsuccessful runs at the presidency. He explained Morales, electoral success in part due to his choice of light-skinned Alvaro Garcia Linera as a running mate, quipping that Morales decided &coffee alone is not enough; it should be coffee with milk.8 -------------- BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted bilateral difficulties, particularly in the area of counternarcotics, but said the USG wants to continue working with the GOB toward common interests. He told Doria Medina that Bolivia had successfully ridden the shirttails of Peru and Colombia on ATPDEA but said Morales, anti-U.S. discourse from Brazil would not be helpful to the bilateral relationship, just as his attacks on Colombia and his strong position on selling gas to Brazil would complicate regional relations. ¶9. (C) Doria Medina responded that the GOB &has to make its own mistakes and is doing just that.8 He called the Embassy,s careful low profile &smart8 and advised the Ambassador not to give Morales a chance to &blame big brother8 and distract the population from growing domestic problems. Doria Medina called Morales, newly announced visa policy &absurd8 (reftel C) and damaging to Bolivia,s tourist industry. He said many Bolivians residing in the United States with Amcit children have already postponed travel to Bolivia due to the uncertainty of Morales, new policy. He added that the GOB is so self-absorbed that it will be surprised when the jewelry industry, among others, moves to Peru or Chile. -------------- THE UN IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY -------------- ¶10. (C) Doria Medina, the leader of his party in the Constituent Assembly, said the UN has few CA representatives but makes up for what it lacks in numbers with strength. His vision for the UN is centrist, offering an alternative to voters who dislike the polarizing politics of the MAS and Podemos. He said GOB disorganization is also apparent in the CA, as the MAS delegation is plagued by disorder and inexperience. Doria Medina remarked that his party has often reached consensus with MAS delegates, only to have senior level GOB officials pull the rug out from under them. He noted that on some issues, he has negotiated with as many as ten different high-level GOB officials, all of whom were afraid to make a decision without Morales, personal approval. -------------- VENEZUELAN INFLUENCE -------------- ¶11. (C) Doria Medina said Venezuelan interference is not to blame for Bolivia,s problems but observed that Venezuela is playing on the GOB,s greatest weakness, its limited financial resources. He told the Ambassador that Morales reportedly donates large sums of cash to small towns and said the cash could not come from the strapped Bolivian treasury. Doria Medina cited Venezuela,s donation of helicopters as a particularly effective measure, as they enable Morales to travel difficult Bolivian terrain to stay in touch with his political base. Doria Medina,s team suggested that the Bolivian opposition is not as weak as Venezuela's. One UN analyst pointed out that if the Bolivian opposition takes the senate presidency, it will have done in eight months what the Venezuelan political opposition failed to do in eight years. (Note: Despite a simple majority in the senate, in point of fact, the opposition has yet to succeed in voting a senate president; Doria Medina and Podemos head Tuto Quiroga remain locked in a bitter personal battle about which party should hold the presidency. End note.) -------------- GETTING TO KNOW DORIA MEDINA -------------- ¶12. (C) Doria Medina offered the Ambassador a brief overview of his political experience, beginning with his stint as economy minister in 1991-1993. Doria Medina's personal wealth made him an attractive target for the MRTA terrorist group which kidnapped him in 1995 for 45 days until he paid a USD 1.4 million ransom. (Note: Doria Medina said the MRTA used his ransom money to finance the taking of the Japanese embassy in Peru in 1995. End note.). In 1997, Jaime Paz of the MIR party invited Doria Medina to be his running mate in the presidential elections. They lost the bid, and growing differences with the MIR led Doria Medina to found the National Unity (UN) party in 2003. The UN had a respectable showing in the 2004 municipal and 2005 national elections, despite Doria Medina,s failed bid for the presidency, which he attributed to MNR and Podemos attacks. He said both opposition parties attacked him instead of the MAS hoping that UN supporters would vote for them; instead voters turned to Morales, MAS party. He also told the Ambassador the story of his against-all-odds survival of a 2005 plane crash. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) The UN is Bolivia's third-largest party after MAS and Podemos. Doria Medina is aware that to be effective, the UN must work with other parties. At the same time, the UN wary of associating too closely with any one party. Self-interests and personality differences have hindered the opposition's ability to work together, thus emboldening the MAS. The ongoing senate president election is a test of the opposition's willingness to put differences aside and form a united front against the MAS. So far, the opposition is failing this test. End comment. URS