IMPEACHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES: THE PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001664

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL
SUBJECT: IMPEACHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES: THE PROCESS
EXPLAINED

REF: A. LA PAZ 1386

B. LA PAZ 1467

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Krishna Urs
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) The GOB's impeachment case against four of five of
the constitutional tribunal justices (REFTEL A) will be a
protracted process. Nonetheless the Movement Towards
Socialism (MAS) is trying expedite the case. On June 12, two
MAS lower house deputies, who are members of a preliminary
investigatory committee, found sufficient evidence for the
impeachment charges to be sent to the lower house's
Constitution, Justice and Police Commission. On June 13, the
Constitution Commission rejected the investigatory
committee's findings citing irregularities and asked the
committee to correct its report. Though several steps remain
before the full lower house will review the case, the
MAS-controlled lower house is expected to approve the
charges, which by law means the justices will be suspended
until the senate reaches a final sentence. The impeachment
of the constitutional tribunal justices is part of the MAS'
larger strategy of discrediting and undermining the
judiciary, a branch of government it currently does not
control (REFTEL B). End Summary.

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Case Background
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2. (U) On May 15, President Morales presented to Congress
impeachment charges of judicial malpractice against four of
five constitutional tribunal justices. The charges stem
from the constitutional tribunal's ruling against President
Morales' December 2006 interim appointment of four Supreme
Court judges. The GOB argues the constitutional tribunal's
interpretation of Bolivian law is purposefully incorrect.
(Note: The constitutional tribunal is Bolivia's highest court
on constitutional matters; the supreme court is the highest
court of appeals for all other matters. End Note).
Paragraphs 3 to 6 explain the impeachment process according
to Bolivian law 2623, enacted in 2003, which is the law that
covers this case.

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Preliminary Investigation by Lower House
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3. (U) Under law 2623, the impeachment claim must first go
to the president of the lower house who forwards it to the
house's Constitution, Justice and Police Commission (CJPC).
The CJPC has three days to notify the Prosecutor and Police
Committee (PPC). The PPC then has fifteen days to perform a
preliminary investigation and present its findings to the
CJPC's president. (Note: This is the step that was completed
on June 12. End Note). The CJPC's president has three days
to call the full CJPC, which then has ten days to deliberate.
If it finds insufficient evidence the case is dropped.

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Formal Investigation by Lower House
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4. (U) If the CJPC finds sufficient evidence, then it can
vote by simple majority to approve a formal investigation.
The PPC then reconvenes for 90 days, with the possibility of
30 additional days, to conduct a formal investigation and
present its "Conclusion Report" to the CJPC president. The
CJPC president has three days in which to call the full
commission. The full CJPC has 10 days to reach a decision to
approve or reject the charges.

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Decision by Lower House
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5. (U) Assuming the CJPC finds sufficient evidence of guilt,
the charges are sent to the president of the lower house who
has three days to put the charges on the chamber's agenda.
The full chamber has ten days to reach a decision on the
accusation. A decision requires a majority (50% plus one) of
the members present to vote to approve or reject the charges.
If there is not a majority after the ten days the case is
dropped. Once the accusation is approved the judges will be
suspended. Alternate (suplente) judges under article 23 of
Law 2623 may serve as their replacements; but the
constitutional tribunal currently has no alternate judges.

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Senate: The Sentencing Tribunal
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6. (U) The senate serves as the sentencing body. The
president of the lower house has five days to send the
charges to the senate. Including weekends and holidays the
senate should receive the charges against the constitutional
tribunal judges by early to mid December. The senate then
must go into a "permanent session" to decide the fate of the
accused and cannot address any other issues while in this
permanent session. Two-thirds of the senate must vote to
convict the judges. If two-thirds of the senate cannot agree
to convict, the judges will be absolved. However, Law 2623
does not specify a fixed period of time for deliberation.
While the opposition has a one-seat majority in the senate,
the MAS will likely use stalling tactics to prevent a final
vote. The judges remain suspended until the senate reaches a
decision.

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Comment: Scenarios/Issues
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7. (C) The impeachment of the constitutional tribunal
justices is part of the MAS' larger strategy of discrediting
and undermine the judiciary, a branch of government the MAS
currently does not control (REFTEL B). (Note: The opposition
controls the senate by one seat, but the MAS' strong majority
(and control) over the lower house gives the MAS significant
sway over the legislative branch. End Note). This case is
the first test for Law 2623. Since it is constitutional
tribunal justices who face impeachment, Congress will likely
have to resolve questions regarding the law's interpretation.
As soon as the judges are suspended the constitutional
tribunal will in effect be paralyzed as only one judge will
still remain on the bench. The opposition is attempting to
negotiate with the MAS to have new (alternate) judges named
to the constitutional tribunal prior to the completion of the
lower house's impeachment deliberations. However, the MAS
can and potentially will stall all constitutional tribunal
appointments in Congress to allow President Morales (under
Constitutional Article 96, attribution 16) to appoint
alternate constitutional tribunal judges during the senate's
December recess. While a recess appointment may face
constitutional challenges, if Morales succeeds in stacking
the court, the challenges will fall on deaf ears. End
Comment.
URS