SCENESETTER FOR DAS COULTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 001213

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL MARR MASS MOPS PHUM BL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DAS COULTER

REF: A. LA PAZ 769

B. LA PAZ 1032

C. LA PAZ 1083

Classified By: Ecopol Counselor Andrew Erickson for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Embassy La Paz warmly welcomes Political-Military
Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Coulter to Bolivia
May 8-10. Your visit comes at a critical juncture in
Bolivian-American relations, with the GOB still defining its
role in Bolivia's "revolution." With indigenous coca leader
Evo Morales well into his second year as president, Bolivians
find themselves again facing the social unrest that has
plagued their country since 2003, but which had subsided
immediately after Morales took office. While we support
Morales' stated goal of social inclusion, serious questions
exist about his commitment to democracy and to the rule of
law--our top priorities here-- particularly given his
demonstrated impatience with compromise. Cuban and
Venezuelan advice, interference, and assistance are an
additional area of concern.


2. (C) Summary continued: Morales brings long-held
suspicions of the armed forces to the presidency. His
attempts to find officers who were more supportive of his
vision by skipping over several classes of military
commanders for promotions left some officers disgruntled.
Embassy La Paz's Milgroup continues to support the Bolivian
armed forces via programs totaling approximately USD 7.5
million. We are monitoring the Bolivian military's
cooperation with civilian authorities in legal cases
involving human rights violations, and are encouraging the
Armed Forces to cooperate and to update us on their progress
for purposes of Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) funding.
Another concern has been securing a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA),or when that failed, renewing the exchange
of diplomatic notes which provides protections to U.S.
military personnel engaged in humanitarian activities in
Bolivia, so that a July 2007 New Horizons exercise can move
forward. Overall, your visit provides an opportunity to
continue to strengthen mil-mil relations as an important
pillar in the bilateral relationship, and to inquire about
the defense minister's goals for his June visit to the United
States as well as the GOB's commitment to peacekeeping
operations. End summary.

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BOLIVIA: BACKGROUND NOTES
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3. (SBU) Landlocked Bolivia is the highest and most isolated
of the Latin American republics. Once over 780,000 square
miles, Bolivia lost large chunks of its land to Chile and
Paraguay, leaving it with some 424,000 square miles, roughly
three times the size of Nevada. Aymara indigenous groups
dominate La Paz and the highlands; the Quechuas populate the
cities of Sucre and Cochabamba and surrounding areas. The
rich lowlands, known as the "half-moon" states, tend to be
less influenced by indigenous cultures. The government
recognizes 38 different indigenous groups and over 60 percent
of Bolivians identify themselves as indigenous, making
Bolivia the most indigenous country in Latin America.
Bolivia is a country of contrast, with a small prosperous
minority of its population immersed in modern business and
technology and the overwhelming poor majority still mired in
poverty and living relatively unchanged by progress.


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4. (SBU) Rapidly urbanizing Bolivia is the second poorest
country in Latin America, with poverty afflicting two-thirds
of its population. In 2005, its GDP was approximately USD
8.5 billion. Agriculture accounts for roughly 14.5 percent
of Bolivia's GDP, and soybeans grown in eastern Bolivia are
the major cash crop. Extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons
make up an estimated 10 percent of GDP, with manufacturing
accounting for another 12 percent. Lack of economic
opportunities has fueled mass migration to Argentina, Brazil,
Spain, and the United States, as well as rural-to-urban and
western-to-eastern migration within the country.

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SOCIAL UNREST
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5. (SBU) With indigenous coca leader Evo Morales well into
his second year as president, Bolivians find themselves again
facing the social unrest that has plagued their country since
2003, but which had subsided immediately after Morales took
office. The fourth president in as many years, Morales rose
to power promising a "revolution" that would deliver a more
inclusive society, a new constitution, nationalization of
natural resources, and land reform. A sharp political
strategist, Morales has delivered on some of his promises,
and has maintained high popularity rates. However, Morales
has had to come to terms with the difficulties of governing
Bolivia. He has exacerbated the challenge by condoning
street protests against those who oppose him. A cocalero
ambush of Bolivian anti-drug forces in the Chapare, a mining
clash in Huanuni, a 500,000-person strong demonstration in
favor of regional autonomy in eastern Bolivia, January riots
in Cochabamba, and a February 7 protest by miners in La Paz
have presented Morales with serious challenges. Nonetheless,
he remains the most popular president in Bolivia's recent
history, and is on track to possibly become its
longest-governing recent leader.

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DEFENDING DEMOCRACY
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6. (SBU) While we support Morales' stated goal of social
inclusion, serious questions exist about his commitment to
democracy and to the rule of law-- our top priorities here--
particularly given his demonstrated impatience with
democratic rules and compromise. Bolivia convened a
constitutional convention in August 2006, which to date has
failed to make any progress, largely due to executive branch
interference and Morales' opposition to Bolivian
constitutional norms and traditions. In addition, Morales
has packed the Supreme Court using recess appointments,
instructed his party to pass a questionable land reform law
and a military treaty with Venezuela in a late-night senate
session November 28, and permitted violence against
opposition hunger strikers, as well as the kidnapping of an
opposition prefect. Most recently, the GOB is widely thought
to have instigated the January protests in Cochabamba aimed
at sacking an opposition prefect. (Despite GOB denials,
evidence exists that the administration paid, transported and
fed armed cocaleros who were bussed to Cochabamba to riot
against an opposition-led local government). In addition to
frequent public attacks on the opposition, Morales also has
targeted Bolivia's prefects (governors),eastern Bolivia
(because it seeks regional autonomy),the judiciary, and the
press. Most recently, evidence suggests the GOB trucked in
dynamite-wielding miners to attack the Constitutional
Tribunal in Sucre to protest a decision the GOB and certain
miners opposed.

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ONE PLACE WHERE WE'RE NOT BIG BROTHER
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7. (SBU) Cuban and Venezuelan advice, interference, and
assistance continue to be a serious growing concern. Cuban
doctors and newly-inaugurated hospitals bring medical care to
isolated communities. Venezuela has agreed to purchase
Bolivian soy, has provided micro credit financing to small
businesses, has donated tractors to Bolivian farmers, and has
funded community radio stations to broadcast the GOB's
messages. Most recently, the Venezuelan government has
agreed to buy essentially all of Bolivia's tainted beef,
otherwise quarantined by an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth
disease, as well as its industrialized coca. These Venezuelan
programs are popular with Bolivia's poor. Venezuela has also
offered its military schools to Bolivian military officials.
(Note: Because Venezuela is only funding the costs of the
schools and not transportation/lodging, Bolivian officials
will not likely be able to take advantage of this offer. End
note.) On the other hand, middle class Bolivians resent
Venezuela's growing presence and influence, and have balked
at the Bolivian military singing the Venezuelan national
anthem and depending on Venezuelan-donated helicopters to
transport their president. Regionally, Bolivia has
strengthened ties with Chile, but has alienated Brazil and
Argentina at various points over the past year, largely
because of its nationalistic but incoherent hydrocarbons
policy.

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MIL-MIL RELATIONSHIP
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8. (C) Evo Morales brings long-held suspicions of the armed
forces to the presidency, which were augmented by former
President Rodriguez's administration's transfer of the GOB's
stock of MANPADs to the United States for destruction in
October 2005. Morales' administration is pursuing criminal
charges against Rodriguez and others for the transfer,
although the required congressional approval to move the case
forward is pending. Likewise, the Embassy's decertification
of the Bolivian military's counterrorrism (F-10) Unit caused
another bump in the mil-to-mil relationship in March 2006,
which was ultimately resolved via a joint custody arrangement
for the unit's equipment. Attempting to find officers who
were likely to be more supportive of his vision, Morales
skipped over three generations of military leadership in
naming the current military commanders. In the aftermath of
those promotions, many Armed Forces members believed they
would be rewarded for toeing the GOB's line; instead, a year
and a half later, some have become disgruntled.


9. (SBU) Embassy La Paz's Milgroup's top priorities are
humanitarian assistance, modernization/ transformation,
counter narcotics-terrorism, and peacekeeping operations,
with programs totalling approximately USD 7.5 million. The
Milgroup continues to support the Bolivian armed forces via
Traditional Commander Activities ($3.7m),Humanitarian
Assistance Programs ($2.1m),Section 1004-Counter Drug
assistance ($500k),Latin American Cooperation ($34k),
Counter Terrorism Fellowship Programs ($50k),Center for
Hemisphere Defense Studies ($24k),Joint Chief of Staff
Exercises ($320k),and State Partnership Program ($58k).
Additionally, thanks to the release of IMET funding, the
Milgroup will manage over $800k in FY07 and $188k in FY08 for
training and the establishment of English language lab
equipment.


10. (C) We continue to closely monitor the Bolivian
military's cooperation with civilian authorities in legal
cases involving alleged human rights violations. Several
active NGO's have alleged that the Bolivian military has
failed to cooperate with civilian authorities. We continue
to urge the Armed Forces to cooperate and to update us on
their progress for purposes of Andean Counterdrug Initiative

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(ACI) funding. Our military group continues to provide
extensive training and support to the Bolivian Armed Forces
on human rights.


11. (C) Another concern has been securing a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA),or when that failed (reftels),renewing the
exchange of diplomatic notes which has provided protections
to U.S. military personnel engaged in humanitarian activities
in Bolivia since 1997. We are currently waiting for
instructions from Washington about how to proceed with
negotiations, and with each passing day, risk a New Horizons
exercise planned for July 2007, which will build a health
center and a community center in flood-ravaged areas of
eastern Bolivia, as well as refurbish three military bases.


12. (C) Positive signs of strong mil-to-mil relations include
the following acts on the part of the Bolivian military: it
provided office space in its joint staff and Army
headquarters to American officers; it granted Milgroup
personnel Bolivian military identification cards and vehicle
passes; it has offered excellent access to senior leadership
including the MOD, the CHOD and service commanders; it has
provided unrestricted access to special operations units; it
has actively participated in joint exercises, including human
rights and training programs; and it has adopted U.S.
military doctrine as its own.


COMMENT
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16. (SBU) Increased mil-mil cooperation is an important
pillar in the overall bilateral relationship, and your visit
presents an opportunity to further our strategy of engagement
with the GOB by strengthening mil-mil ties. During your
visit, you should inquire about the MOD's goals for his June
trip to Washington, share USG security goals, particularly
regarding terrorism, and inquire about the GOB's intent to
continue to support Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) in Haiti
and the Congo. In your external meetings, you should express
our appreciation of the Bolivian Armed Forces' willingness to
continue to foster an open relationship with us, as well as
for their collaboration on CN issues. End comment.
GOLDBERG