NIGERIA: ITSEKIRI TAKE UP ARMS; MILITANTS SEEK TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000769 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA, DS/IP/AF, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/OSAC OSLO FOR HELENA SCHRADER DOE FOR GPERSON, CAROLYN GAY TREASURY FOR ASEVERENS, SRENENDER, DFIELDS COMMERCE FOR KBURRESS STATE PASS USTR FOR ASST USTR FLISER STATE PASS TRANSPORTATION FOR MARAD STATE PASS OPIC FOR ZHAN AND MSTUCKART STATE PASS TDA FOR NCABOT STATE PASS EXIM FOR JRICHTER STATE PASS USAID FOR GWEYNAND AND SLAWAETZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ITSEKIRI TAKE UP ARMS; MILITANTS SEEK TO DESTABILIZE POLO REF: LAGOS 759 Classified By: Consul General Donna Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Itsekiri in Delta State have created the Niger Delta Survival Front, a militant body through which they reportedly hope to exert pressure on Chevron; however, an Ijaw contact believes this body will remain weak due to limited resources and the small geographic territory inhabited by the Itsekiri. Delta State Governor Uduaghan needs to focus more attention on communities, otherwise militancy will continue in the state. Politicians finance efforts to destabilize Tom Polo's power because his willingness to negotiate threatens their ability to skim from naira granted by the government to pacify militants. End Summary. -------------- Itsekiri Realize Arms Equal Power -------------- ¶2. (C) Chevron's recognition of Ijaw militant interests over the past year has attracted the Itsekiri's attention, who have threatened to take up arms against the company. The Niger Delta Survival Front (NDSF) (reftel) threatened to cripple Chevron operations near Warri, Delta State on November 25 due to the company's failure to implement a Memorandum of Understanding. Sheriff Mulade, President of the Ijaw Gbaramatu Youth Council (GYC),told Poloff November 29 he is familiar with NDSF leadership and asked them not to use violence to achieve their aims. The November 25 incident did not result in violence thanks to Governor Uduaghan's intervention, Mulade said. ¶3. (C) Mulade speculated the NDSF would remain weak because the Itsekiri have "no resources" and a "low capacity and little manpower" to effect change, unlike the Ijaw who are spread throughout the Niger Delta. (Note: Itsekiri are primarily located in Warri, Delta State. End Note.) The NDSF would only be able to challenge Chevron's terminal, he said. That said, the Itsekiri have small arms, some of which they �0A;purchased from Tom Polo, and can hire Ijaw "boys" to confront Chevron. Mulade said Polo also sells arms to Bayelsa state militants. -------------- - Uduaghan Relates to Militants, Not Communities -------------- - ¶4. (C) Government peace talks took place exclusively with Ijaw militants, Mulade said, because the Ijaw are solely responsible for causing and therefore for solving the unrest. For example, the Niger Delta Waterway Committee created by Delta State government currently only benefits the Ijaw. However, Governor Uduaghan, an Itsekiri, will now give his tribe recognition and seek to draw the NDSF into the peace process. (Comment: Mulade's comment may suggest the Governor had not included the peaceful Itsekiri in peace negotiations for fear of appearing to favor his people. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) Mulade hoped security operatives would advise the Governor to place more focus on communities, rather than militant groups. He reasoned that if government continues to recognize and negotiate with militants, other individuals will continue to join militant groups for profit and to gain political bargaining chips. Currently, Delta State government has poor relations with communities and little community support, Mulade said. However, if government engaged communities, militants would have no place to hide and no populations from which to draw members, he posited. LAGOS 00000769 002 OF 002 Unfortunately, Mulade feared, Uduaghan's decision to deal with militants was his "only philosophy." -------------- Bayelsa Militants Seek to Destabilize Polo; Ijaw-Itsekiri Relations Are Good -------------- ¶6. (C) Mulade said relations between the Ijaw and Itsekiri of Warri, where there were violent ethnic clashes in 2003, are good. Despite this, some Itsekiri and other Ijaw groups have tried to "frustrate" Polo's control over the region; the GYC requested Polo to not react to efforts to destabilize his power. Mulade said he recently had a conversation with militants from Bayelsa who did not know who he was. Assuming he was one of them, they discussed the interests of their "sponsors" (federal and state politicians) in destabilizing Polo, whose willingness to negotiate threatens their ability to pocket government-granted naira to pacify militants. Mulade commented that many Niger Delta youths involved in militant activity are ignorant of the Ijaw struggle. -------------- Mapping Militants -------------- ¶7. (C) Mulade said the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) is almost entirely based in Gbaramatu (Polo's territory) as was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) until it incorporated other militant groups. He described the group as roughly divided into MEND West (made up of Delta, Edo and Ondo),MEND Central (made up of Bayelsa),and MEND East (made up of Port Harcourt, Rivers State). However, MEND in Edo and Ondo have very different interests from other MEND groups, Mulade averred, because they are most interested in "making naira and getting power," such as gaining access to politicians. He said there are currently seven different groups within MEND. ¶8. (C) Comment: This was the most detail Mulade has provided on Bayelsa-based militant groups and shows the sensitive relationships and power struggles between Polo and other groups throughout the Niger Delta. Clearly, Polo as a force for peace threatens those who see the violence in the Niger Delta as in their own financial interest. End Comment. ¶9. (U) This cable has been coordinated with Embassy Abuja. BLAIR