NIGER DELTA:"STATE OF INSURRECTION" PART II

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 000064 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W (SILSKI) STATE FOR INR/AA USDOC FOR BUREAU OF THE CENSUS: OFFICE OF AFRICA - NIGERIA DESK CIUDAD JUAREZ FOR DONNA BLAIR ISTANBUL FOR TASHAWNA SMITH SAO PAULO FOR ANDREW WITHERSPOON E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI SUBJECT: NIGER DELTA:"STATE OF INSURRECTION" PART II REF: A: 07 LAGOS 20 LAGOS 00000064 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for reasons 1.4 (b an d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a January 21 conversation with the Consul General, Bayelsa State Secretary Godknows Igali stressed that the activity of militant groups in the Niger Delta was approximating a "state of insurrection." Amending previous estimates of aggregate militant strength, Igali asserted the number of armed Ijaw youth had swelled to over 10,000. Complicating matters, smaller bands of a more virulent militancy have begun to splinter from the more established groups. There is a strong political component to militant demands. They want increased Ijaw representation in mainstream politics and Delta State-based militant leader Tom Polo has threatened significant action unless they get it. Across the board, groups view the continued detention of militant leader Dokubo Asari as a symbol of GON animus toward the Ijaws and will continue to cite Asari as justification for the unrest they cause. End summary. -------------- -------------- Militia More Numerous, Becoming Institutionalized -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) During a late January conversation with the Consul General, Bayelsa SSG Godknows Igali contended the region was lurching toward a state ofinsurrection notwithstanding his state's best efforts to calm militant ardor. Militant numbers were increasing, as was the geographic breadth of their informal writ. Their demands were steadily becoming less pecuniary and more political. In prior conversations, he had estimated total militant numbers at a few thousand. This time, he gauged that aggregate militant strength had irrupted to over 10,000 in the three core Delta states. ¶3. (C) Igali warned that membership in the groups was an increasingly attractive life for many Ijaw youth. The groups themselves were becoming part of local lore. Joining a militia was now a badge of honor for not only unemployed Ijaw youth but also for young professionals and university students. Thus the groups are not just attracting recruits from the remote creeks but also youth from the cities. Igali said he was amazed at the influx of people he saw when he visited militant camps. Moreover, he noticed a general improvement in the regimen of these camps. In most of the camps, heavy emphasis was placed on weapons training and physical fitness, he recounted. He added that, while each group had a core of members who permanently resided at the camp, most members cycled in and out of the camps, receiving training and a small stipend when they were there. ¶4. (S) To support their tumescent growth, groups are extorting higher ransoms for hostages and also higher fees for more petty forms of extortion being exacted mostly from foreign companies. Igali, involved in negotiating the release of Italian Agip hostages, said he presented N 500,000 for "fees" to help facilitate the hostages' release. Joshua McGuyver, the militant leader responsible for the kidnapping, scoffed at the amount as being mere "drink money" for the growing number of militants under his charge. McGuyver admitted to Igali that he needed to make money to keep his followers fed and the group intact. With basically no avenue for legitimate revenue, McGuyver professed that kidnapping was the only means available to procure funds sufficient to maintain his operation. Thus, his ransom demands were high. According to Igali, AGIP paid McGuyver 165,000 million naira (USD 1.3 million) for what amounted to be the release of only one hostage. -------------- Political Demands Drive Militant Activity -------------- ¶5. (C) The groups are becoming increasingly political, observed Igali. Across the board, all groups wanted the release of Ijaw militant leader Dokubo Asari, in federal custody for treason. The January 20 kidnapping of six LAGOS 00000064 002.2 OF 003 Filippino oil workers by Tom Polo's militant group coincided with two events, said Igali. First, it was rumored that Asari would be freed on January 19. Second, January 19-20 marked the anniversary of Polo's first kidnapping. When this date came and went without Asari's release, Polo decided to act. ¶6. (C) While Asari has little direct hold over the militant groups, he has come to symbolize the unfair treatment of Ijaws, Igali noted. Illustrating this, Igali said he was close to securing the release of the Italian hostages when news was broadcasted that Gani Adams, leader of the militant pan-Yoruba Oodua People's Congress, had been released from federal custody. Ijaw militants flashed angry that Asari remained on the wrong side of the stockade while Adams, facing similar charges, was freed. They attributed this to ethnic bias. Adams is of the same ethnic group as President Obasanjo and the Attorney General. Since Asari's ethnicity has no cachet with President Obasanjo, Asari still languished in confinement, the militants concluded. Perceiving ethnic discrimination, the militants seized the Asari cudgel more firmly. As a result, the near-agreement for the release of the Italian hostages was shelved. Only one was freed, and then only for a prince's ransom, Igali explained. ¶7. (C) Igali expressed frustration on the Asari issue. He has talked with President Obasanjo, during which Obasanjo promised Asari's release. Each time, however, Obasanjo retreated from the promise, Igali groused. Igali's failure to deliver has caused him to lose face with Ijaw militants and the Ijaw community, he admitted. Igali was also concerned that this failure, should it continue, would erode his ability to influence militant leaders. These leaders often warn Igali in advance of their intended misdeeds,which affords Igali an opportunity to dissuade them. Often, he has. Most recently, he claimed to have discouraged a splinter group of FNDIC from kidnapping several expatriates. Nevertheless, Igali lamented his dialogues with militant leaders have become strained because he has been unable to deliver Asari. -------------- -------------- Political Disenfranchisement May Result in Broadening Violence -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Polo confirmed he kidnapped the six Filippinos, Igali affirmed. Until this act, Polo's group had been dormant, hoping their good behavior would encourage the government's delivery on promises of development and access to mainstream politics. However, when Ijaws were denied key nominations in the PDP primaries in Delta State, Polo's patience ran out. ¶9. (C) Expressing his growing frustration, Polo threatened to take more hostages and attack oil facilities, Igali warned. While Delta is not included in Igali's official brief, he is in contact with Delta officials and the PDP in the hopes of mediating a potentially explosive situation. To soothe tensions, Igali had been trying to secure key government appointments for Ijaws, such as Delta Secretary. -------------- --- Igali's Political Future Promising But Uncertain -------------- --- ¶10. (C) With Bayelsa Governor Goodluck Jonathan now the People's Democratic Party (PDP) vice-presidential candidate, Igali's name has been bandied as a possible successor. Upon receiving the PDP VP nomination, Jonathan first engineered in Chief Francis Doukpola as his successor on the PDP gubernatorial ticket. However, Doukpola is poorly regarded by most PDP figures in Bayelsa. Doukpola twice ran for governor and lost. Each time, he filed improbable lawsuits which subsequently reached the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding entreaties from tribal elders to accept defeat graciously, Doukpola pressed his case beyond the bounds of acceptable local political manners. As a result, Doukpola has the reputation of being an unrealistically stubborn loser with little personal charm, offered Igali. LAGOS 00000064 003.2 OF 003 ¶11. (C) Obasanjo answered the discontent by fingering Igali as his favorite to replace Jonathan. While Ijaw, Igali has spent little time in Bayelsa and only one and a half years in his present position. As a result, many politicians see him as a Johnny-come-lately. In addition, Igali hails from the same area as former Governor Alamieyeseigha. Veteran politician from other areas of the state cried foul, Igali revealed. To resolve the impasse, President Obasanjo formed a committee to designate a consensus candidate. One of the rules the committee has decreed is that the candidate should be someone who ran in the primaries. This verdict effectively sidelined Igali, who, at the time, did not run since his boss, Jonathan, was in the race. ¶12. (C) Igali said he would be content to forego the gubernatorial nomination if that would ensure peace for both the PDP and Bayelsa State. Igali said Jonathan had also offered him the position of Chief of Staff, should Jonathan become Vice-President. According to Igali, this was a sign that Jonathan did not know the political inner workings at the federal level. Igali, who hails from the same state and ethnic group as Jonathan, would not be an acceptable choice for Chief of Staff. This key position would have to go to someone from another area in order to maintain the ethnic and geographic balance necessary for ruling Nigeria. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Comment: If accurate, Igali's estimate reveals far greater numbers of militants than previously. Unless the government engages in serious diplomacy, militancy will continue; the scale and damage of their actions will increase. Igali said that he would like to reach out to the UN and other organizations with experience in demobilization of irregular combatants after a civil insurgency. While he will likely meet stiff opposition from within the GON from those who view the militants as only criminals, Igali's idea seems like a prudent one from our vantage point. End comment. BROWNE