Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07LAGOS256
2007-04-11 12:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lagos
Cable title:  

NOBEL LAUREATE SEES ELECTION TROUBLES, DELAYED

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM NI 
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VZCZCXRO1309
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHOS #0256/01 1011202
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111202Z APR 07
FM AMCONSUL LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8736
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 8562
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0266
RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ 0246
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0245
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0247
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 000256 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS


STATE FOR AF/W
STATE FOR INR/AA
WARSAW FOR LISA PIASCIK
CIUDAD JUAREZ FOR DONNA BLAIR
ISTANBUL FOR TASHAWNA SMITH
SAO PAULO FOR ANDREW WITHERSPOON
DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NOBEL LAUREATE SEES ELECTION TROUBLES, DELAYED
ELECTIONS


LAGOS 00000256 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 000256

SIPDIS

SIPDIS


STATE FOR AF/W
STATE FOR INR/AA
WARSAW FOR LISA PIASCIK
CIUDAD JUAREZ FOR DONNA BLAIR
ISTANBUL FOR TASHAWNA SMITH
SAO PAULO FOR ANDREW WITHERSPOON
DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NOBEL LAUREATE SEES ELECTION TROUBLES, DELAYED
ELECTIONS


LAGOS 00000256 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: In a discussion with the Consul General,
political activist Wole Soyinka and leading democracy
advocate Dr. Joe Okei-Odumakin said a group of opposition
parties, coupled with civic organizations, had planned to
publicly protest the Independent National Electoral
Commission's (INEC) lack of preparedness for the upcoming
elections. Soyinka said Obasanjo had become disenchanted with
Umaru Yar'Adua as presidential candidate and was exploring
the possibility of replacing him with Ibrahim Babangida.
Obasanjo was facing increased opposition from spurned
governors in the South as well as National Assembly members
and Senators, thereby reducing his options for postponing the
elections. End summary.


2. (C) In a March 21 discussion with the Consul General,
writer and political activist Wole Soyinka and democracy
advocate Dr. Joe Okei-Odumakin described the activities of a
political opposition group. Soyinka said he attended a March
20 meeting of the Coalition of Nigerian Political Parties
(CNPP) in Abuja, in which the group decided to move forward
on two initiatives. First, senators from the All Nigeria
Peoples Party (ANPP) agreed to advance a motion for the
impeachment of President Obasanjo and Vice-President Atiku.
Second, the member parties of the CNPP would start mass
action against the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC). The parties planned protests to pressure INEC to step
up its preparations for the elections. (Comment:The dual
impeachment strategy was scuttled when the Senate
unexpectedly recessed in the wake of the Petroleum Technology
Development Fund (PTDF) imbroglio. End Comment.)


3. (C) The INEC protests were required, said Soyinka, because
INEC had proven unable to demonstrate a degree of
preparedness for the elections. The CNPP had systematically
reviewed each of INEC's statutory requirements for the

elections schedule and concluded INEC was tardy and
unprepared on all counts, Soyinka stated. Logistically, INEC
was similarly unprepared; even ballots had not yet been
printed at this late date, he bemoaned.

--------------
Soyinka Explores Possible Scenarios
--------------


4. (C) Soyinka had been heavily involved in discussions
regarding the elections, he recounted. The best-case scenario
was one in which INEC carries on with elections as scheduled.
However, even in this case there would be a hitch. There was
no possibility that INEC would be sufficiently prepared to
conduct credible elections on the April election dates, he
reasoned. Whatever happened in April would fall far short of
a commendable exercise, Soyinka concluded.


5. (C) Some observers thought President Obasanjo and INEC
Commissioner Maurice Iwu would delay the election, arguing
that, constitutionally, it was within INEC's purview to
establish an alternate date given that INEC was unprepared to
hold elections as scheduled. In so doing, Obasanjo might be
tempted to reverse the order of the gubernatorial and
presidential elections. President Obasanjo was likely
apprehensive about Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governors
in the south. These governors, such as Peter Odili from
Rivers State and Cross River State Governor Donald Duke, were
embittered by Obasanjo's handling of the PDP presidential
nomination when they were cast aside for Katsina Governor
Yar'Adua.


6. (C) In recent conversation, Soyinka said Duke confided he
no longer held President Obasanjo in high esteem. Duke, who
had been a favorite of Obasanjo and felt he was being groomed
for higher office, said he always felt Obasanjo held the good
of Nigeria at heart. After the PDP nomination and the events
of the past few months, Duke's vision of President Obasanjo
had transmogrified into the image of a selfish,

LAGOS 00000256 002.2 OF 003


megalomaniacal finagler who only did that which served his
own interest. Soyinka observed that, were he given the
opportunity, Duke would give Obasanjo a taste of his own
medicine -- at the last second withdrawing his support from
Obasanjo's candidate. (Comment: It is telling that someone
like Duke, who has been careful to cultivate a good
relationship with Obasanjo and definitely not cross the
President, said this to one of Obasanjo's most vocal critics.
This reveals the extent to which Duke feels aggrieved. Though
he had not met him, Soyinka placed Odili in the same category
as Duke. End Comment.)


7. (C) President Obasanjo was maneuvering to remain in office
a bit longer, said Soyinka. But he had made a key mistake in
alienating the National Assembly (NASS) and the Senate. In an
overreaction to his third term defeat, Obasanjo had destroyed
the reelection chances of many of the legislators who even
supported the third term. But Obasanjo would need NASS and
Senate support to extend his tenure in the event that
elections were not held as scheduled, Soyinka explained. The
CNPP interpreted the constitution to say that only the
National Assembly could extend the president's tenure by
declaring a state of emergency. According to Soyinka,
President Obasanjo, having made enemies of much of the
National Assembly, would face a difficult time remaining in
office constitutionally.

--------------
Presidential Candidates Evaluated
--------------


8. (C) As a result, Soyinka continued, the National Assembly
should be the focal point of CNPP's activities regarding the
elections. The CNPP was engaged in persuading key people in
the NASS and Senate to resist potential presidential pressure
to declare a state of emergency, should that situation come
to pass. Soyinka said President Obasanjo was devising a new
set of carrots and sticks to use at his discretion, should
the need arise.


9. (C) Discussing Buhari, Soyinka said he felt nostalgia was
impeding Nigerians from recalling Buhari's marred tenure as
head of state. Buhari had somehow managed to recreate himself
as an upright person. However, accused Soyinka, Buhari's
government had carried out summary executions, engaged in
favoritism toward the north, while Buhari averted his eyes
from the corruption of those close to him. Buhari had also
funneled money to the north at the expense of the south when
he was head of the Petroleum Trust Fund, Soyinka said.


10. (C) Though he stood little chance in the election, Vice
President Atiku was corrupt but not evil, Soyinka continued.
Yar'Adua was a nobody who should be disqualified based on the
manner in which he was anointed, Soyinka noted.

-------------- --------------
Yar'Adua Falls Out Of Favor, IBB Is A Possibility
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Nevertheless, President Obasanjo was getting
increasingly uncomfortable with PDP presidential candidate
Yar'Adua, Soyinka said. This had nothing to do with
Yar'Adua's health. Rather, Obasanjo was the recipient of
rumors that Yar'Adua was not as loyal to Obasanjo as he
originally thought. Obasanjo was beginning to believe these
rumors. As a result, President Obasanjo recently asked
northern emirs to pressure Yar'Adua to drop out of the race,
revealed Soyinka. The emirs, irked at not being consulted in
the choice of presidential candidate in the first instance,
gave Obasanjo the cold shoulder, said Soyinka. The emirs told
the President if he wanted to remove Yar'adua, he would have
to do it himself, according to Soyinka.


12. (C) Obasanjo might be thinking about getting rid of
Yar'Adua, mused Soyinka, but there was no telling who would
replace him. However, Obasanjo and former military ruler

LAGOS 00000256 003.4 OF 003


Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) had been speaking often, Soyinka
noted. They had been engaged in discussions to the extent
that Obasanjo invited IBB's wife, Miriam, to Aso Rock, to ask
her to deliver the message to her husband that Obasanjo
favored IBB as the replacement PDP presidential candidate.
While IBB was probably interested in this proposition, said
Soyinka, IBB was wary of Obasanjo's intentions. Obasanjo had
played so many games that IBB thought this was simply one
more tactic to sow confusion and delay the elections,
suggested Soyinka. If IBB were able to shed the past, he
possessed the ability and sense of history to be the best of
an otherwise questionable lot of presidential candidates,
Soyinka offered suprisingly.


13. (C) If the election does take place as scheduled, Soyinka
noted the smartest thing would be for the PDP to allow
opposition parties to win the gubernatorial races in some
states. This would allow the PDP to win the presidential race
and a majority of the gubernatorial seats. However, if the
PDP should attempt to steal Lagos, Kano, or Abia State, the
PDP's victory in the other races would be heavily disputed.

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (C) Much of what Soyinka stated was second-hand
information that he thought was credible. As with most
members of the Nigerian intelligentsia, Soyinka is not
enamored with any of the major candidates. For a long time,
he has been less than thrilled with his old hunting partner:
President Obasanjo. However, Soyinka has not boarded the
opposition bandwagon to the extent that he would rather see
anyone in office but Obasanjo. Soyinka probably has equal if
not more reservations about Buhari. At the end of the day,
the prized author does not predict much of any election and
he would not be surprised to see some shell game being played
where, at the end of the day, either Obasanjo or IBB will
head an interim arrangement after May 29. End comment.






BROWNE