APRIL ELECTIONS UNLIKELY, SAYS PROMINENT ECONOMIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 000168

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STATE FOR AF/W
STATE FOR INR/AA
WARSAW FOR LISA PIASCIK
CIUDAD JUAREZ FOR DONNA BLAIR
ISTANBUL FOR TASHAWNA SMITH
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: APRIL ELECTIONS UNLIKELY, SAYS PROMINENT ECONOMIST


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Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: In a February 22 conversation with the Consul
General, Financial Derivatives Managing Director Bismarck
Rewane said the brinkmanship between President Obasanjo and
Vice President Atiku was approaching its climax, with Atiku
sure to go to court to enjoin Obasanjo and the Electoral
Commission from disinviting him to the presidential election.
Not only Atiku's fate but the fate and timing of the
elections wait in the wings. Additionally, the President was
beginning to worry he might not be able to retain as much
power as he would like once he leaves office. This
realization will turn the president more desperate as we pass
the ides of March and as April approaches. End summary.


2. (C) In a February 22 conversation with the Consul General,
Financial Derivatives Managing Director Bismarck Rewane
predicted elections would not hold in April. Political
contacts in Abuja have stated President Obasanjo was
circulating the idea of postponing elections until October,
asserted Rewane. These same insiders claim that, should this
cat's paw turn into a formal proposal to the National
Assembly, sufficient numbers of assembly members are angry
enough to respond by calling for the President's impeachment.


3. (C) Obasanjo has offended many assembly members by
extinguishing their reelection plans due to the failure of
his third term attempt, so many would like to use the eve of
their departure to exact a similar revenge on Obasanjo,
explained Rewane. In short, Rewane asserted that President
Obasanjo remained unconvinced that he has to relinquish
power. Second, Obasanjo was apopleptic concerning Vice
President Atiku. Not only did he hate Atiku, Obasanjo was
also wary of allowing the Vice President to be on the loose.
Atiku knows all the tricks of the trade of election rigging
and has ample resources and supporters, according to Rewane.
Obasanjo is afraid that Atiku could outmaneuver his attempts
to influence election day. Thus, Obasanjo has initiated a
series of lawsuits to deracinate Atiku's electoral ambitions.
However, Obsanjo has thus far lost each suit. With each legal
setback, Obasanjo is diminished while Atiku scores a public
relations victory in addition to his legal one.


4. (C) Now that Obasanjo has lost his previous court battles,
his last legal stand is that Atiku is ineligible because he
has been indicted by an administration panel. Atiku surely
will sue to enjoin INEC from keeping his name off the ballot.
Not only will Atiku sue, scores of other politicians
similarly indicted will join him, forecasted Rewane. In a
strange way, this plays to Obasanjo's hand. These suits might
take so long to resolve that INEC would be forced to postpone
the election pending their resolution, surmised Rewane.

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Extension: Obasanjo Veers Closer To Crisis
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5. (C) Obasanjo was also keeping alive options other than the
legal tangle in which he has enmeshed Atiku and other
opponents, mused Rewane. Obasanjo has sought to hold the
Niger Delta right near its boiling point in case he needs a
crisis to prolong his tenure. In such an instance, he could
quickly steer the Delta toward a tenure-extending state of
emergency, Rewane believed. For instance, Obasanjo was
allowing Delta State to creep toward an ethnic rupture by not
vetoeing Governor Ibori's endorsement of his cousin as the
PDP gubernatorial candidate. The candidate, Emmanuel
Uduaghan, of the minority Itsekiri ethnic group, is strongly
opposed by the Ijaw community. Violence is possible around
the city of Warri. Should Delta descend into violence as it
did in 2003, and a few other hotspots boil over, Obasanjo
could declare a state of emergency, thereby extending his
tenure.


6. (C) Rewane saw these tactics replicated in Rivers State
and in parts of the southeast as well. These considerations
were leading the country down a path strewn with traps and
pratfalls, warned Rewane. Postponing the election, whether

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via petition to the NA or through emergency rule, would be
dangerous. Both scenarios were ill-defined. The extent of
presidential authority during emergency rule would be unclear
as would be the roles of other elected officials, Rewane
observed. Similarly, no clear path existed for the
reorganization of postponed elections. In fact, argued
Rewane, an extension of one day would effectively be akin to
an indefinite extension. Such action would set a precedent
for extra-constitutional retention of power.


7. (C) Extension of President Obasanjo's tenure would likely
precipitate Ijaw secession, and thus a battle between Ijaw
militants and the GON over the on-shore oil fields, Rewane
predicted. Militant groups have amassed enough arms for such
action, he stated. Describing this scenario, Rewane reasoned
that Ijaw secession would initiate a domino effect, wherein
other southern groups might copy the Ijaw secession
declaration.


8. (C) While much of the rest of the Nigeria was concerned
about the nation's political stability, Obasanjo was busy
creating a political dynasty, according to Rewane. Not only
was Obasanjo pressuring INEC to disqualify candidates, he was
also encouraging his daughter to become President of the
Senate, while himself assuming the role of lifetime Chairman
of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) Board of Trustees upon
leaving office.

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Elections Scenarios
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9. (C) All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) presidential
candidate Muhammadu Buhari was favored in the north and
misunderstood in the south, summed Rewane. Buhari was widely
perceived in the south as a fanatic, said Rewane. Southern
governors in Obasanjo's camp, loathe to retain Obasanjo yet
fearful of Buhari, were hedging their bets by funding Atiku's
campaign. These governors saw Buhari as a martinet candidate
who would not tolerate their sybaritic ways; Buhari might be
more likely to prosecute them than even Obasanjo was.
(Comment: Rewane intimated that Obasanjo wants to chase Atiku
out of the race so that formerly pro-Atiku PDP governors have
no other option but to stay with the PDP -- if the choice is
only between PDP and Buhari, this is effectively no choice at
all for them. End comment.)


10. (C) In a fair election among the leading three
candidates, Atiku would carry the south, asserted Rewane.
However, should Atiku be barred from running, supporting
Buhari would likely mean supporting a losing candidate, as
Buhari holds scant appeal in the south. If Atiku is barred
from contesting, the south would go for Yar'Adua heavily, and
that would enable him to win the election, concluded Rewane.


11. (C) Buhari faced a number of difficulties in the south,
Rewane noted. An ex-military leader, he was still associated
with the country's dictatorial past. Furthermore, Buhari's
choice of running mate put him at a disadvantage, stated
Rewane. Buhari's partner is veteran Igbo politician Chief
Edwin Ume-Ezeoke, who is old, lackluster; perhaps worst of
all, Ume-Ezeoke also lacks money. Their ticket represents the
old guard to many people. Instead a Buhari-Pat Utomi (of the
African Democratic Congress) ticket would have been strong,
opined Rewane, as Utomi has widespread appeal in the south
among educated Nigerians and among the youth.


12. (C) Each of the main presidential contenders, all
northern Fulani, once in office would dismantle the economic
elite created by Obasanjo and would place Fulanis in key
positions, argued Rewane. Fear of this fueled Obasanjo's
efforts to retain control of key offices upon leaving the
presidency. However, said Rewane, in an environment of
constantly-shifting alliances, no amount of political
legerdemain could guarantee Obasanjo permanent control of
government.

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INEC Is A Vehicle For Fraud
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13. (C) Rewane described INEC as a vehicle for money-making.
His sources in the electoral commission told him they were
benefiting from the proliferation of small parties.
Illustrating his point, Rewane said INEC gives each party a
stipend once its registration has been approved. An INEC
official told him that he had been generous in registerring
parties with the understanding the official would get a
certain percentage of the funds the party received from INEC.
Also, an INEC official told him that politicians from all
parties were busy giving money to INEC officials just to
build goodwill. That official said he recently received a
gift of two million naira (17,000 USD) from a leading figure
in the Action Congress (AC).

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Comment
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14. (C) Comment: Rewane is a farily keen observer of the
Nigeria political scene. What he says is generally
representative of the businessman who is not wedded to any
particular political party nor is overly dependent on
government for his daily bread. Increasingly, the election is
boiling down to a test of whether President Obasanjo has the
strength to impose his will in order to stay in office, or,
will he have to make room for a successor. If Obasanjo seeks
to impose a successor, Rewane sees rough times but sees this
as probably acceptable to most Nigerians as long as Obasanjo
leaves his office on time. However, should Obasanjo try to
delay his exit, Rewane foresees political convulsions that
could disturb the underpinnings of Nigeria's democratic
system. On this point, Rewane may be more Cassandra-like than
most of his peers. Yet, a growing number of people are
beginning to utter similar portents. End comment.


BROWNE