Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07LAGOS11
2007-01-08 15:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lagos
Cable title:
LAGOS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS: A POLITICAL
VZCZCXRO2088 PP RUEHPA DE RUEHOS #0011/01 0081537 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 081537Z JAN 07 FM AMCONSUL LAGOS TO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 8176 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0064 RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ PRIORITY 0038 RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0045 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8339
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000011
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/W
STATE FOR INR/AA
CIUDAD JUAREZ FOR DONNA BLAIR
ISTANBUL FOR TASHAWNA SMITH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: LAGOS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS: A POLITICAL
MAELSTROM
LAGOS 00000011 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000011
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/W
STATE FOR INR/AA
CIUDAD JUAREZ FOR DONNA BLAIR
ISTANBUL FOR TASHAWNA SMITH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: LAGOS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS: A POLITICAL
MAELSTROM
LAGOS 00000011 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
1. (C) Summary: Gubernatorial elections in Lagos are shaping
up to be a tough fight. Govrnor Tinubu's AC has been shaken
by internal dissent and several key defections due to his
attempt to impose his loyal but unpopular chief of staff as
the party's gubernatorial candidate. Meanwhile, the PDP has
selected Senator Obanikoro, a former close ally of Tinubu, as
its candidate. Hovering over the scene is President
Obasanjo's desire to capture Lagos, the only predominantly
Yoruba state that escaped the 2003 PDP electoral onslaught.
Also to keep his status as the Yoruba's most important
political figure, he figures he must reduce Tinubu's clout.
There is no better way to do this than to win Lagos State.
End summary.
--------------
Tinubu And The AC A Bit Rumpled
--------------
2. (C) Six months can be a lifetime in the world of a
politician. Much can change within that period. Six months
ago, savoring the defeat of President Obasanjo's third term
bid, Lagos Governor Tinubu stood atop a crest of popularity.
He had been among those who held visibly and firmly against
the Obasanjo gambit and had won. Buoyed by this feat, Tinubu
set to put his own political house in order for the 2007
elections. Ironically, the very issue he wanted Obasanjo to
face -- the selection of a successor -- was the very thing
that has most damaged Tinubu in Lagos.
3. (C) With Tinubu a two-term governor, his party had to pick
a successor. Flush with victory over Obasanjo, Tinubu sought
to arrogate himself what would have been better left to the
party nomination process. He tried to unilaterally appoint
his Chief of Staff as his successor, basically presenting the
decision to the rest of the party as a fait accompli. The
blowback was more intense than Tinubu anticipated.
4. (C) With dozens of his political allies from the AC vying
for the party nomination, the best tack for Tinubu would have
been to stay above the fray and not dip into the maelstrom by
being partial to any contender. The eventual party nominee,
even in an open and fair competition, would owe him a certain
loyalty due to his role as governor and the prime financial
mover in the AC. However, Tinubu entered the fray by
signaling his preference for this Chief of Staff, Babatunde
Fashola, to succeed him.
5. (C) This was a bitter pill for the other AC gubernatorial
contenders to swallow. Heretofore, Fashola had been an able
lawyer and an effective chief of staff, although the
all-too-proud owner of a grating personality that often
rubbed the wrong side of people. Moreover, the chief of staff
had come into the party relatively late and did not have an
independent political base upon which to stand. Conversely,
the other contenders were veteran AC politicians who have
gotten the dirt of local politics under their fingernails and
who had braved the ramparts of battle to help Tinubu win two
successive elections against tough PDP competition. These
wily veterans had not risked their political lives twice only
to step aside for someone who never partook in their earlier
sacrifices. Although he was Tinubu's man, Fashola was seen as
an outsider. To them, he might as well have been from another
country. Given Tinubu's strongarm tactics in picking this
relative outsider and political lightweight, a significant
group within the AC has rebelled. Those rebelling are
numerous and serious enough to have caused an embarassing,
eviscerating rupture within the AC in Lagos State. Strident
press conferences were held and defections to the archrival
PDP and other parties, particularly the DPP, have taken
place.
6. (C) Even before the fallout over Fashola an additional
complicating factor has been the shift of the Tinubu machine
from the AD to the AC. The shift was intended to give its
players better inroads into national politics and as a
vehicle for Tinubu to perhaps realize his post-2007 national
ambitions in tandem with VP Atiku. While this migration might
have moved the Tinubu camp more into the mainstream of
national political opposition, it has weakened Tinubu and his
machine in Lagos. Not all of the AD migrated to the AC with
him. Anti-Tinubu elements and die-hard Yoruba political
LAGOS 00000011 002.2 OF 002
chauvinists remain with the AD, thus diluting the AC's cachet
in Lagos. Further, a number of voters will be confused, not
knowing the real difference between the AC and AD and who
exactly is in which party. Many of these voters will stick to
the AD out of habit.
--------------
Comment
--------------
7. (C) Comment: Because of the handling of the gubernatorial
nomination the AC is wounded in Lagos, the only state the new
party currently controls. Diplomacy will be needed to stop
additional injury to the party. If this fracture is not
treated with care, the Tinubu-led AC stands a real chance of
losing control of Lagos to the PDP.
BROWNE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/W
STATE FOR INR/AA
CIUDAD JUAREZ FOR DONNA BLAIR
ISTANBUL FOR TASHAWNA SMITH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: LAGOS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS: A POLITICAL
MAELSTROM
LAGOS 00000011 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
1. (C) Summary: Gubernatorial elections in Lagos are shaping
up to be a tough fight. Govrnor Tinubu's AC has been shaken
by internal dissent and several key defections due to his
attempt to impose his loyal but unpopular chief of staff as
the party's gubernatorial candidate. Meanwhile, the PDP has
selected Senator Obanikoro, a former close ally of Tinubu, as
its candidate. Hovering over the scene is President
Obasanjo's desire to capture Lagos, the only predominantly
Yoruba state that escaped the 2003 PDP electoral onslaught.
Also to keep his status as the Yoruba's most important
political figure, he figures he must reduce Tinubu's clout.
There is no better way to do this than to win Lagos State.
End summary.
--------------
Tinubu And The AC A Bit Rumpled
--------------
2. (C) Six months can be a lifetime in the world of a
politician. Much can change within that period. Six months
ago, savoring the defeat of President Obasanjo's third term
bid, Lagos Governor Tinubu stood atop a crest of popularity.
He had been among those who held visibly and firmly against
the Obasanjo gambit and had won. Buoyed by this feat, Tinubu
set to put his own political house in order for the 2007
elections. Ironically, the very issue he wanted Obasanjo to
face -- the selection of a successor -- was the very thing
that has most damaged Tinubu in Lagos.
3. (C) With Tinubu a two-term governor, his party had to pick
a successor. Flush with victory over Obasanjo, Tinubu sought
to arrogate himself what would have been better left to the
party nomination process. He tried to unilaterally appoint
his Chief of Staff as his successor, basically presenting the
decision to the rest of the party as a fait accompli. The
blowback was more intense than Tinubu anticipated.
4. (C) With dozens of his political allies from the AC vying
for the party nomination, the best tack for Tinubu would have
been to stay above the fray and not dip into the maelstrom by
being partial to any contender. The eventual party nominee,
even in an open and fair competition, would owe him a certain
loyalty due to his role as governor and the prime financial
mover in the AC. However, Tinubu entered the fray by
signaling his preference for this Chief of Staff, Babatunde
Fashola, to succeed him.
5. (C) This was a bitter pill for the other AC gubernatorial
contenders to swallow. Heretofore, Fashola had been an able
lawyer and an effective chief of staff, although the
all-too-proud owner of a grating personality that often
rubbed the wrong side of people. Moreover, the chief of staff
had come into the party relatively late and did not have an
independent political base upon which to stand. Conversely,
the other contenders were veteran AC politicians who have
gotten the dirt of local politics under their fingernails and
who had braved the ramparts of battle to help Tinubu win two
successive elections against tough PDP competition. These
wily veterans had not risked their political lives twice only
to step aside for someone who never partook in their earlier
sacrifices. Although he was Tinubu's man, Fashola was seen as
an outsider. To them, he might as well have been from another
country. Given Tinubu's strongarm tactics in picking this
relative outsider and political lightweight, a significant
group within the AC has rebelled. Those rebelling are
numerous and serious enough to have caused an embarassing,
eviscerating rupture within the AC in Lagos State. Strident
press conferences were held and defections to the archrival
PDP and other parties, particularly the DPP, have taken
place.
6. (C) Even before the fallout over Fashola an additional
complicating factor has been the shift of the Tinubu machine
from the AD to the AC. The shift was intended to give its
players better inroads into national politics and as a
vehicle for Tinubu to perhaps realize his post-2007 national
ambitions in tandem with VP Atiku. While this migration might
have moved the Tinubu camp more into the mainstream of
national political opposition, it has weakened Tinubu and his
machine in Lagos. Not all of the AD migrated to the AC with
him. Anti-Tinubu elements and die-hard Yoruba political
LAGOS 00000011 002.2 OF 002
chauvinists remain with the AD, thus diluting the AC's cachet
in Lagos. Further, a number of voters will be confused, not
knowing the real difference between the AC and AD and who
exactly is in which party. Many of these voters will stick to
the AD out of habit.
--------------
Comment
--------------
7. (C) Comment: Because of the handling of the gubernatorial
nomination the AC is wounded in Lagos, the only state the new
party currently controls. Diplomacy will be needed to stop
additional injury to the party. If this fracture is not
treated with care, the Tinubu-led AC stands a real chance of
losing control of Lagos to the PDP.
BROWNE