UKRAINE: YANUKOVYCH, YUSHCHENKO SEEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000841 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: YANUKOVYCH, YUSHCHENKO SEEKING COMPROMISE, BUT NO ROLE FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassador's separate conversations with Prime Minister Yanukovych and President Yushchenko on April 9 and 10, respectively, indicated both sides expressed preference for resolving the current crisis via a political compromise instead of a Constitutional Court (CC) ruling or going straight to the polls, but neither side was fully ready to yield on key points. Yanukovych requested international mediators, including Ambassador, become involved while Yushchenko rejected the idea. Both were concerned about how to handle any possible Russian role, with 20 Russian Duma MPs reportedly heading for Kyiv April 11. Both underscored that they believed there was a legislative/legal solution to this crisis--new and better laws that had wide backing could pull Ukraine out of this mess. ¶2. (C) Yanukovych said that if Yushchenko suspended the decree disbanding the Rada, they could agree on what the coalition should look like, limit the flow of MPs between factions, and work on constitutional and legislative fixes for the current political imbalances. He added, however, that if Yushchenko pushed forward with demands for elections now, he would insist on waiting for a CC ruling, which he was confident would be in his favor, and/or concurrent early parliamentary and presidential elections. In turn, Yushchenko said he would be willing to suspend his decree if they could agree on early elections, restore the coalition to its former size, declare illegal all Rada and CabMin decisions made after the latest wave of opposition MPs started to join the majority in late March, and put an end to street protests. Both PM and President agreed the window for compromise was closing. ¶3. (C) Comment. Time appears to be on Yanukovych's side. The Constitutional Court is poised to open hearings on an appeal of Yushchenko's decree. Initially announced for April 11, the hearing was pushed back until April 17, perhaps to give more time for negotiation, or to delay the inevitable; one judge told us April 9 that 12 of 18 judges are prepared to rule against Yushchenko. It is a positive sign that both Yushchenko and Yanukovych are looking for political compromise and that both think legislation is the best way to resolve the lack of clarity in the 2004 political reforms that have led to this fight for power. The two leaders are meeting daily, but there are still large gaps to be bridged, starting with Yushchenko's insistence on early elections and rejection of all offers for mediation and Yanukovych's refusal to consider early Rada elections absent early presidential elections. Finally, the Tymoshenko factor remains a wildcard; Yushchenko appears concerned that any broader settlement or even coalition, such as Yanukovych's team has advocated, would not be acceptable to the opposition. With Yushchenko refusing outside facilitation, we will continue our usual pulsing of all parties to the conflict, urging compromise for the sake of Ukraine's interests. End summary and comment. Yanukovych Wants International Mediation -------------- ¶4. (C) At an April 9 meeting, Prime Minister Yanukovych requested Ambassador mediate the political crisis between the PM and President. Yanukovych saw two possible resolutions to the current situation--either wait for the Constitutional Court to rule on Yushchenko's dismissal of the Rada or find a negotiated political solution. In his view, the first option would result in a ruling against Yushchenko, which would significantly weaken the President. He had told Yushchenko on April 6 that the second option was the far better for both sides, but he stressed a number of times that time was running out for Yushchenko to agree to a political decision, warning the situation would soon reverse itself: Yushchenko would be coming to Yanukovych with requests, and it would be too late for Yushchenko to get anything. ¶5. (C) Yanukovych's initial proposal for mediation was for a large group of international observers, including Ambassador, and Ukrainian political and legal forces that could work out all the details of a compromise: the Austrian Chancellor; EU and Polish politicians; Yushchenko; himself; Speaker Moroz; the leaders of all Rada factions, and lawyers from the Presidential Secretariat, Cabinet, and Rada. In response to Ambassador's suggestions, Yanukovych agreed that a small, Kyiv-based group of negotiators and only a few Ukrainian participants from the President's and PM's teams would make the process go faster and more smoothly. He also agreed that this process should be low-key and out of the public eye. (Note: Yanukovych's Chief of Staff Lyovochkin suggested to Ambassador April 10 that the group be kept at three: Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Ambassador, perhaps also the KYIV 00000841 002 OF 002 German Ambassador to represent the EU Presidency. End note.) The PM was less comfortable with the suggestion that the Russians be kept in the loop and Ambassador's offer to brief Ambassador Chernomyrdin. Yushchenko: No Outside Help, We Will Find Compromise -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) At an April 10 meeting, President Yushchenko thanked Ambassador for the offer of assistance, but declined it, stressing he did not see any format in which international participation would help. There was a Russian problem--Putin had offered to mediate in an April 9 phone conversation, but given the Duma's recent resolution supporting the Rada, the impending arrival of 20 Duma MPs April 11, and the certainty of press attention to the Russian presence, it would be hard for the Russians to play a constructive role. This was a parliamentary crisis--not one between the PM and President--and it should be resolved as such. He had met Yanukovych April 9 and 10 and would meet the PM daily if necessary, but the Rada was corrupt, and the possibility of fixing it lessened every day. Moreover, increasing attention, and with it pressure, was shifting to the Constitutional Court and Central Election Commission. The latter was prevented from working by four commissioners calling in sick, denying it a quorum. This was unacceptable. What Yanukovych Wants -------------- ¶7. (C) In terms of demands for a compromise, Yanukovych argued that Yushchenko's suspension of the decree must happen immediately; it was almost a prerequisite for talks, but if negotiations progressed quickly enough, there could be an agreement by end of the week. After that, the President could cancel his decree and Regions MPs would withdraw their CC petition. It was his position that although a constitutional commission could work on improving the constitution, the bulk of work should be done in the Rada by amending legislation and passing new laws. ¶8. (C) Yanukovych agreed that the key points for an agreement between Yanukovych and Yushchenko were: there should be no more MPs going back and forth between factions; a constitutional commission should be created to make changes in the constitution and other laws; and some of the Universal should be made into law. However, if Yushchenko insisted on discussion of new elections in 2007 as part of negotiations, then Yanukovych would insist on waiting for a Constitutional Court ruling or concurrent Rada and presidential elections. He also argued that Ukraine could not have early elections until a legislative basis was prepared, including a new election law and making the CEC conform to the CEC law. He also would request that the CC rule on imperative mandate, noting that the Venice Commission has already indicated that imperative mandate did not comply with European standards. What Yushchenko Wants -------------- ¶9. (C) Yushchenko offered to suspend his decree if the two parties came to agreement on other key points. First, the issue of the majority coalition's format needed to be resolved; every decision made by the Rada and CabMin after March 22 should be considered illegal and reversed. (Note: Kinakh's MPs left OU and joined the majority on March 23. End note.) Yushchenko also required a return to March 2006 faction sizes, a mechanism for preventing pressure on the CC and CEC, and a moratorium on calling people into the streets. Legal decisions, not protests, should decide this conflict. If the Rada agreed to conditions, including passing laws on imperative mandate and the opposition, as well as fixing the Rada rules, if Yushchenko and Yanukovych agreed on a way to monitor whether the Rada was meeting those obligations, and if all sides agreed on conducting early elections at some point, he would leave the decree suspended. If within 2 weeks, these tasks were not met, he would bring the decree back into force. Yushchenko said he had discussed 15 points with Yanukovych and the two were in agreement on about half of them; his first demand, early elections, remained a stumbling block. ¶10. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor