UKRAINE: POWER MINISTERS GIVE ASSURANCES THAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000824

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM MOPS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: POWER MINISTERS GIVE ASSURANCES THAT
TROOPS/PERSONNEL UNDER CONTROL

Classified By: DCM Sheila Gwaltney, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with Defense Minister
Hrytsenko, Minister of Interior Tsushko, and acting head of
the Security Service (SBU) Nalyvaichenko April 6 to discuss
the security situation during the ongoing political crisis.
Hrytsenko was the most optimistic of the three, giving
assurances that all power ministry and law enforcement agency
heads were in close coordination to keep the security
situation calm; Tsushko and Nalyvaichenko confirmed this.
However, Hrytsenko also stated that the main political actors
realized the need to avoid provocations and seek a political
compromise, regardless of their public rhetoric, and that
there were no real "war camps" on either side. Socialist
Tsushko was more pessimistic, warning of the danger that both

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sides could bring large numbers of supporters into the
streets starting April 10 if a political compromise were not
reached by then. Nalyvaichenko's comments are reported in
other channels.


2. (C) Comment: Hrytsenko's characterizations were
reassuring but not entirely convincing, particularly when
taken together with concerns expressed by Tsushko and
Nalyvaichenko. Tsushko in general is a less confident person
than Hrytsenko, and his usual nervousness may be exacerbated
by the political reality that his Socialist party would have
slim to no chance of crossing the three percent threshold and
returning to the Rada if elections are held. Both Hrytsenko
and Tsushko appealed to Ambassador to play an active role in
engaging the principals in the ongoing political crisis. We
will continue to stress to all actors and parties the need to
avoid provocative acts or responding to provocations, as well
as to seek compromise in a peaceful and legal manner. End
Summary and Comment.

Hrytsenko/Tsushko: responsible people acting responsibly
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3. (C) Chain-smoking Minister of Defense Hrytsenko told
Ambassador April 6 that all Ukrainian power
ministries/agencies were coordinating daily and sought to
avoid provocations or allowing the situation getting out of
hand. There were two mechanisms, one under Yushchenko run by
National Security and Defense Council Chair Haiduk, and the
other out of the Cabinet run by deputy PM Radchenko,
involving the MOD, General Staff, MOI, and SBU. Radchenko
chaired meetings at 1700 where troop placements and other
issues were discussed. Radchenko and Haiduk talked several
times a day. Both Tsushko and Nalyvaichenko separately
confirmed this close cooperation. Tsushko added that, due to
past instances of the abuse of use of interior troops, he had
agreed with Yushchenko and Yanukovych not to deploy them in
Kyiv to maintain public order and to suspend the normal right
of the head of Kyiv police to call on interior troop backup
automatically.


4. (C) Instead of internal troops, Tsushko explained, 1,165
special police personnel, including 200 from Crimea, had
arrived in Kyiv March 29 from other provinces, to serve as
Tsushko,s personal police reserve prepared to respond to

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protect the Cabinet of Ministers, Rada, Supreme Court,
Presidential Secretariat, and Central Election Commission.
He had informed the National Security and Defense Council
(NSDC) of this deployment at the April 5 NSDC meeting. As a
Ukrainian citizen, Tsushko did not want to see "blood on the
streets" or civil unrest. His security forces would do their
best to avoid such an outcome. As a politician from the
coalition, he wanted to be above board and demonstrate that
he was upholding the law.


5. (C) Hrytsenko characterized his comments made at the
emergency middle of the night Cabinet meeting April 2 after
Yushchenko had announced the dissolution of the Rada and new
elections as reassurances of legality on the part of the
military, but also as a cold shower to potential adventurism.
He had stated clearly that troops would stay in the
barracks, act in the framework of the law, and only follow
orders of the Commander in Chief. He had added also as a
one-time warning, not to be repeated, that if MOI
police/troops could not or would not stop potential
bloodshed, or became part of the problem, the armed forces
were available as a stabilizing force for calm and to prevent
bloodshed. Hrytsenko said his statement was similar to
then-ground forces commander Petruk,s call to Interior
Minister troop commander Popkov Nov. 27, 2004 to ensure
Popkov did not send troops and APCs to clear the Maidan.
Such warnings and showdowns would not be repeated, and did
not need to be. All currently commanding troops/forces were
on the same wavelength.

Hrytsenko: cautiously optimistic of a negotiated solution

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6. (C) Hrytsenko was, however, notably more optimistic than
Nalyvaichenko and Tsushko regarding the stability of the
situation and low likelihood of a flash point, claiming no
one wanted bloodshed or conflict, and denying that there were
war camps within both Yushchenko and Yanukovych's entourage.
Yushchenko and Yanukovych were talking daily, he stressed.
Both realized that a negotiated settlement was the only way
out for the sake of the country; key Regions' figure Akhmetov
agreed; Hrytsenko was in close contact with Yanukovych,
Akhmetov, and Regions' faction leader Bohatyreva. (Note:
Akhmetov briefly visited the embassy later April 6,
confirming that he supports a negotiated settlement).


7. (C) Hrytsenko thought an agreement would be reached in
the next 10 days-two weeks. Yushchenko was ready to
compromise on timing of elections. A political agreement
could allow pushing back the timeframe. with elections
perhaps in July-September. Hrytsenko did not think
Yushchenko would accept an offer to stop the coalition short
of 300, because that would not be enough to rebalance the
political system.


8. (C) Hrytsenko explained that Yushchenko had signed the
decree because Yanukovych and Regions had overreached in
their power grab, breaking the hoped-for political model that
proportional representation-formed parties representing
society in the Rada could agree on a way forward for the
country on the basis of compromise. Regions' actions since
returning to power in August had stripped the system of
checks and balances. Apart from Moroz, defection last
summer, which was manageable, the second factor was the
post-Soviet winner takes all psychology shared by Yanukovych
and Tymoshenko. Ukraine still lacked a western, European
tradition to be responsible to national interests and
responsive to public views. Some other figures in Regions
still did not see the need to compromise, because they felt
close to winning everything.


9. (C) Hrytsenko argued there needed to be a political deal
because the 1996 constitution and subsequent legislation were
the product of an elite which did not have the right culture
and tradition of respect for the rule of law. Legal experts
would always find problems with any solution. A Venice
Commission seal of approval was irrelevant; the elite would
ignore it. What was important was to get the elites to play
by an agreed set of rules and to change elite psychology.
The 2004 election crisis, a force majeure requiring a
political agreement, was fixed outside the Constitution. The
current crisis was a similar moment needing a similar
political fix, he argued.


10. (C) At the NSDC meeting April 5, Yushchenko had laid out
a serious of specific developments since August which had
moved events beyond those allowed in the constitution,
including repeated announcements by Moroz and deputy speaker
Martinyuk from the Rada podium announcing various expansions
of the coalition by certain numbers of deputies. At the NSDC
session, Moroz had no argument in response (note: at the end
of the NSDC April 5 session, the vote to direct the
government to fund new elections passed 13-2, with FM Azarov
and Tsushko voting against. Moroz and Prosecutor General
Medvedko were also opposed but did not vote. Yanukovych had
left the session prior to the vote.)


11. (C) Hrytsenko maintained that elections could be a
positive development. The Socialists and communists could be
removed from the political picture. There was general
consensus between the three main political forces -- Regions,
BYuT, OU -- on issues like private ownership of land,
European choice, changes in tax structure, energy issues,
court system etc. Thus, a political agreement should cover
not only how to get to and conduct elections, but the future
development of the country sixteen years after independence.
Tymoshenko was the weak link, particularly if a deal were
struck only between Yushchenko and Yanukovych. Hrytsenko
personally favored bringing her in as a third leg to any deal
to help it stick and also to improve systemic checks and
balances. Let Yanukovych remain PM; allow her to be Speaker,
and have a couple of allies in executive agencies, he
counseled. Concentration of power in one set of hands, no
matter whose hands, was dangerous.

Tsushko: April 10 a worrisome date

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12. (C) Minister of Interior Tsushko proved less sanguine
about the path forward than Hrytsenko. Tsushko said he was
concerned Yushchenko and Yanukovych could lose control of the
situation, particularly because of the presence of "radical

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elements." Any provocation or escalation by either side
could be dangerous. Politicians needed to find a solution
before April 10, he claimed, because he had information that
both the coalition and the opposition were planning mass
demonstrations, possibly involving 10,000 or more people.
The necessary restrictions on police behavior and avoidance
of the use of force could lead to an inadequate response if
the demonstrations turned violent (note: there were upwards
of 100,000 total protesters only 200 meters apart in downtown
Kyiv on March 31 in two separate rallies, which took place
peacefully without any incidents).


13. (C) In addition, Tsushko understood that trade unions
from "industrial regions" were planning a nation-wide strike
(note: called by Communist leader Petro Symonenko. end note)
that could paralyze the entire country; Tsushko alleged this
could include its gas transit systems. In such a case, the
Ukrainian domestic crisis would become a regional issue.
Threats against officials was further evidence of a
deteriorating situation. He had ordered personal protection
to Deputy Prime Minister Kluyev and to the former head of the
Pechersk Regional Court Kolesnichenko, the latter dismissed
by Yushchenko, in response to their complaints of receiving
threatening telephone calls.


14. (C) In contrast to Hrytsenko, who said a political deal
was key to resolving the crisis, Tsushko claimed a
Constitutional Court ruling on the legality of Yushchenko's
decree was required. Even if the Constitutional Court
decided the Presidential decree was constitutional, however,
Tsushko did not see how the physical preparations for an

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election could be completed by May 27. Based on his
experience and involvement in elections in 1994, 1998, and
2004, falsification of voter lists could mean that the
election would not be honest or support a peaceful outcome.



15. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor