Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KYIV779
2007-04-02 15:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:
UKRAINE: MISSILE DEFENSE QUESTIONS FOR U.S.;
VZCZCXRO2039 PP RUEHDBU DE RUEHKV #0779 0921506 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 021506Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY KYIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1789 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000779
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP PINR RS EZ PL US UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MISSILE DEFENSE QUESTIONS FOR U.S.;
CONSULTATIONS WITH RUSSIAN/POLISH COUNTERPARTS
REF: A. KYIV 705
B. KYIV 668
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor George Kent for reasons 1.4 (
b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000779
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP PINR RS EZ PL US UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MISSILE DEFENSE QUESTIONS FOR U.S.;
CONSULTATIONS WITH RUSSIAN/POLISH COUNTERPARTS
REF: A. KYIV 705
B. KYIV 668
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor George Kent for reasons 1.4 (
b,d).
1. (U) This is an action request for missile defense related
information. See para 5.
2. (SBU) We met with MFA Arms Control and Military Technical
Cooperation Department Director General Volodymyr Belashov at
his request March 30. Belashov expressed his appreciation
for Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Lt Gen Obering's
visit to Kyiv (ref B) and his briefings. He said the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) had asked him, however, to follow
up regarding several questions that were raised during the
visit.
-- MOD would appreciate further details of U.S. calculations
about the size of debris resulting from an interceptor strike
of a ballistic missile and the likelihood that such debris
would fall on Ukrainian territory.
-- MOD also inquired about the danger to Ukraine arising from
an interceptor strike of a missile armed with a nuclear,
chemical, or biological warhead or a "dirty" bomb.
-- Finally, MOD wanted to verify that the U.S. would be
willing to have Russian and Ukrainian military personnel
visit or be stationed at the planned facilities in Poland and
the Czech Republic.
3. (C) Belashov said he and Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy
Veselovsky had returned earlier the morning of March 30 from
a quick visit to Moscow for missile defense consultations
with Russian counterparts, including Russian DFM Sergei
Kislyak. He and Veselovsky had tried to ascertain the
reasons for Russian opposition to U.S. missile defense plans,
but had not received clear or satisfactory answers. The
Russians, however, seemed either not to understand or to be
completely unconvinced by some of the U.S. explanations.
Belashov had wanted to inquire why the Russians had not taken
up the U.S. invitation to visit missile defense facilities in
Alaska, but Kislyak seemed unaware of the offer. Kislyak was
pleased President Bush had reached out to Putin on missile
defense with his telephone call. Belashov said Kislyak, whom
he had known since the 1980s, had been candid with the
Ukrainian officials during their meeting.
4. (C) Belashov said Ukraine and Poland had a regularly
scheduled bilateral meeting March 26 led on the Ukrainian
side by DFM Veselovsky and on the Polish side by Veselovsky's
Deputy Foreign Minister counterpart. Since the Polish
delegation included Belashov's counterpart, Polish MFA
Security Department Director Robert Kupecki, Veselovsky had
called in Belashov for a quick discussion of missile defense.
The Ukrainians and Poles decided to hold a more extended
meeting on the topic, which might take place in Warsaw during
the week of April 2. Noting that Ukraine was interested in
gathering information from all sides, Belashov also referred
vaguely to the possibility of Ukraine hosting a multilateral
discussion on missile defense that could involve Poland, the
Czech Republic, Germany, France, and perhaps NATO and the EU
as organizations.
5. (SBU) Action Request: We request Dept coordinate with MDA
to obtain information relevant to the Ukrainian questions in
para 2. While MDA Director Lt Gen Obering already provided
general answers to the questions, the Ukrainian MOD appears
to be seeking a more detailed and "official" reply. (Note:
When Ambassador briefed fellow NATO country ambassadors in
mid-March on the Obering visit, several of his colleagues
asked at what altitude an interceptor launched from Poland
would strike a missile in its glide phase, if the missile
were launched from Iran. We would also appreciate any
information responsive to this question.)
6. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP PINR RS EZ PL US UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MISSILE DEFENSE QUESTIONS FOR U.S.;
CONSULTATIONS WITH RUSSIAN/POLISH COUNTERPARTS
REF: A. KYIV 705
B. KYIV 668
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor George Kent for reasons 1.4 (
b,d).
1. (U) This is an action request for missile defense related
information. See para 5.
2. (SBU) We met with MFA Arms Control and Military Technical
Cooperation Department Director General Volodymyr Belashov at
his request March 30. Belashov expressed his appreciation
for Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Lt Gen Obering's
visit to Kyiv (ref B) and his briefings. He said the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) had asked him, however, to follow
up regarding several questions that were raised during the
visit.
-- MOD would appreciate further details of U.S. calculations
about the size of debris resulting from an interceptor strike
of a ballistic missile and the likelihood that such debris
would fall on Ukrainian territory.
-- MOD also inquired about the danger to Ukraine arising from
an interceptor strike of a missile armed with a nuclear,
chemical, or biological warhead or a "dirty" bomb.
-- Finally, MOD wanted to verify that the U.S. would be
willing to have Russian and Ukrainian military personnel
visit or be stationed at the planned facilities in Poland and
the Czech Republic.
3. (C) Belashov said he and Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy
Veselovsky had returned earlier the morning of March 30 from
a quick visit to Moscow for missile defense consultations
with Russian counterparts, including Russian DFM Sergei
Kislyak. He and Veselovsky had tried to ascertain the
reasons for Russian opposition to U.S. missile defense plans,
but had not received clear or satisfactory answers. The
Russians, however, seemed either not to understand or to be
completely unconvinced by some of the U.S. explanations.
Belashov had wanted to inquire why the Russians had not taken
up the U.S. invitation to visit missile defense facilities in
Alaska, but Kislyak seemed unaware of the offer. Kislyak was
pleased President Bush had reached out to Putin on missile
defense with his telephone call. Belashov said Kislyak, whom
he had known since the 1980s, had been candid with the
Ukrainian officials during their meeting.
4. (C) Belashov said Ukraine and Poland had a regularly
scheduled bilateral meeting March 26 led on the Ukrainian
side by DFM Veselovsky and on the Polish side by Veselovsky's
Deputy Foreign Minister counterpart. Since the Polish
delegation included Belashov's counterpart, Polish MFA
Security Department Director Robert Kupecki, Veselovsky had
called in Belashov for a quick discussion of missile defense.
The Ukrainians and Poles decided to hold a more extended
meeting on the topic, which might take place in Warsaw during
the week of April 2. Noting that Ukraine was interested in
gathering information from all sides, Belashov also referred
vaguely to the possibility of Ukraine hosting a multilateral
discussion on missile defense that could involve Poland, the
Czech Republic, Germany, France, and perhaps NATO and the EU
as organizations.
5. (SBU) Action Request: We request Dept coordinate with MDA
to obtain information relevant to the Ukrainian questions in
para 2. While MDA Director Lt Gen Obering already provided
general answers to the questions, the Ukrainian MOD appears
to be seeking a more detailed and "official" reply. (Note:
When Ambassador briefed fellow NATO country ambassadors in
mid-March on the Obering visit, several of his colleagues
asked at what altitude an interceptor launched from Poland
would strike a missile in its glide phase, if the missile
were launched from Iran. We would also appreciate any
information responsive to this question.)
6. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor