UKRAINE: PRESIDENT-PM NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000757 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PRESIDENT-PM NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE; RALLIES ON THE STREETS BEGIN REF: KYIV 746 Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary. President Yushchenko and PM Yanukovych's late-night March 29 meeting ended without agreement, with the PM's team pushing for a "gentleman's agreement" and the President's advisors arguing for a written, negotiated "rules of the game" to resolve the political conflict over the coalition's push to gain a 300-vote "supermajority" in the Rada (reftel). Discussions between DPM Kluyev, as the PM's negotiator, and Presidential Administration officials Chaliy and Vasenyuk continued through March 30 without success. Opposition leaders Tymoshenko, Lutsenko and OU faction leader Kyrylenko met with Yushchenko March 30 to urge new elections, but by all indications, Yushchenko still has not made up his mind. Yushchenko has called a meeting with the Prime Minister, Speaker and the heads of all Rada factions for the afternoon of April 2, a constitutionally-required step prior to issuing a decree to dissolve the parliament, but the meeting has not yet been confirmed. Activity on Kyiv's streets is heating up, with a Party of Regions-organized rally in European Square attracting 10,000 people. Less street activity so far from the Orange camp, who continue to call for people to come out to the Maidan at 5 pm on March 31 to show their support for new elections. The government coalition will also hold rallies around Kyiv on March 31. End summary. PM's Team - Let's settle this with a Gentleman's Agreement -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) PM Yanukovych's top foreign policy advisor Konstantin Gryshchenko told the Ambassador that Yanukovych and Yushchenko met into the wee hours on March 29 (until 1 am),but did not reach agreement. According to Gryshchenko, the PM's view is that the President cannot be both the leader of the country as well as the top opposition leader. Yanukovych believed that after the meeting, he and Yushchenko had agreed to meet again April 2 at 2 pm, but Gryshchenko said that Tymoshenko had again gotten involved and the meeting was up in the air. Echoing the sentiments expressed by the PM and his other top advisors in previous meetings, Gryshchenko stated that he simply did not understand the hold that Tymoshenko seemed to have over Yushchenko -- a "mesmerizing effect." ¶3. (C) Gryshchenko opined that Yushchenko simply does not know what to do. He is worried that if he doesn't agree to dissolve the Rada and call new elections, then Our Ukraine would split and Tymoshenko would take her supporters on to the streets. According to the PM's count, there are only about 50 "radical" BYuT and Our Ukraine members left in the Rada who are pushing Yushchenko to call for new elections. And in Gryshchenko's view, Yushchenko's argument that the constitutional court could "introduce" an imperative mandate system for the Rada was impossible. ¶4. (C) The PM's approach is to find a political solution to the conflict -- avoid confrontation and reach a gentleman's agreement. As Gryshchenko described the deal, this would be an "armistice." The PM would not move to get the 300 votes in the Rada, Yushchenko would receive some undefined "blocking powers," and he would get to keep his Our Ukraine deputies in his camp. Even more specifically, if Yushchenko agreed to use his veto sparingly, then the PM would agree not to move ahead with legislation giving Russian the status of a second official language. ¶5. (C) Gryshchenko concluded by noting that the PM "wants the President on the team. He is a valued asset, but not a necessity." Recalling 2004, Gryshchenko noted that "last time, one side was on the streets and the other side wasn't." This time would be different, he vowed. "If they have people in the streets, then we will have more." View from the President's Office - a Negotiated Solution -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) During a March 30 meeting with the Ambassador, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Oleksandr Chaliy restated the terms of the "deal" described above by Gryshchenko; in short, the PM had promised the President "undefined powers" as part of a gentleman's agreement that would be personally made between the two Viktors. Chaliy acknowledged that Yanukovych had proposed a "moratorium" on the shifting of parties by Rada deputies to end the crisis that would stop the coalition from gaining 300 votes. However, in his view, "no one could trust Yanukovych to keep his word." ¶7. (C) Chaliy said that what the President's team wanted was a written-down, legitimate agreement -- the "rules of the KYIV 00000757 002 OF 003 road" -- that would guide the relationship further -- rather than a verbal gentleman's agreement that could break down. According to Chaliy, the President's demands have not changed. He wants: agreement on imperative mandate to keep deputies from straying from their factions; Rada agreement on and passage of a package of laws on the Presidency, CabMin and the Opposition; establishment of a working group on constitutional reform, approval of Our Ukraine candidates to be Minister of Interior (not a position included in the presidential prerogatives listed in the constitution) and the Prosecutor General, an agreement on intra-governmental work procedures. ¶8. (C) According to Chaliy, Yanukovych's chief negotiator, DPM Andriy Kluyev, was more flexible in today's meetings than in yesterday's and was ready for compromise if the constitution could be changed. In Chaliy's view, there was no need to change the constitution. The problem is that the constitution refers to "withdrawal" rather than "expulsion" of deputies and that point needed to be clarified. It was important that the constitutional court approve the legitimacy of an imperative mandate law -- so that it would be retroactively applied to all those deputies who had already strayed from their factions. According to Chaliy, a new law passed by the Rada approving imperative mandate would be less effective, since it would only apply from the date of passage to Rada deputies in the future who decided to leave their factions. The March 2006 election results were clear and agreed -- what Chaliy and the President want is the right to kick the defectors out of the Rada and replace these deputies with their loyalists from their party lists, restoring a balance of 248 to 202. Any western democratic country, he argued, who saw 50 legislators suddenly switch parties would see something fishy and undemocratic in the move -- they just wanted elected officials to represent the interests of the voters who supported them. ¶9. (C) Chaliy summed up by saying that Regions wants a political handshake now; the President and Secretariat want fixed rules of the game. He had met with Lutsenko, Tymoshenko, and Kyrylenko and told them of Yushchenko's offer of compromise to Yanukovych, which Tymoshenko outright rejected. The three were pushing Yushchenko hard to dismiss the Rada. The President had not made up his mind yet, but probably would by late Monday. In the end, Chaliy saw three scenarios. One was that Yushchenko would get his imperative mandate. The second was that Yushchenko would issue the decree and call new elections--at the latest, new elections would be 3-4 months from now. A third option would be for Yanukovych to see the inevitability of new elections and agree to help organize them, removing the contentiousness and problems that would arise from Yushchenko calling for elections unilaterally. Chaliy said that Yushchenko's final words to Yanukovych on parting ways at 1 am summed up the presidential position. "As President, I want nothing from you as Prime Minister. As President, I have a constitutional duty to keep the balance between the coalition and the opposition and guarantee rights for everyone, including the opposition. Please do everything possible to achieve imperative mandate and fix the system that brought us to this situation. That is my only request." Taking it to the Streets -------------- 10, (SBU) As closed-door negotiations continued between presidential and prime ministerial advisors, both sides began to organize their supporters for rallies in Kyiv. The government coalition struck first, holding a March 30 rally in Kyiv's European Square. "Stability and unity" was the theme of the rally. The crowd of about 10,000 appeared relaxed; with the audience giving the speakers from the Party of Regions, Socialists, Communists, and defectors from the Our Ukraine, no more than polite applause. There were about 300 police scattered around the periphery. The speakers, including newly appointed Economy Minister Anatoliy Kinakh, Communist Martynyuk, Rada Regions faction leader Raisa Bohatyryova, and Emergencies Minister Nestor Shufrych - whose appearance drew laughter from a group of young men standing near observing poloffs. Speakers stressed their concern for the well-being of all Ukrainians, their willingness to work with the President, and argued that they are ready for dialogue while the oppos ition wants confrontation. PM Yanukovych addressed the meeting near the end, calling for the crisis to be resolved legally and peacefully. ¶11. (SBU) Many of the participants carried flags from their various political parties and forces; interestingly unlike 2004, there were many in the crowd carrying Ukrainian flags. Some of the younger attendees seemed to have been paid for KYIV 00000757 003 OF 003 their efforts; such as the young man carrying a sign that said 'Ternopil' who cast a puzzled glance at his placard when asked if he was from that city. Many of the older audience members said that they did not want Ukraine to incur the expense and uncertainty of another election which they said would accomplish little. One audience member voiced sympathy for Yushchenko, while another seemed particularly critical of Tymoshenko. Several members of the audience were circulating a petition that asked the president not to hold elections and to cooperate with the government. ¶12. (C) The "orange" team and former Interior Minister Lutsenko's "Self-Defense Movement" are holding their fire for a large concert/demonstration on the Maidan scheduled for 5 pm on March 31. Speaking to the press late in the afternoon of March 30, opposition leader Tymoshenko, Lutsenko and OU faction leader Kyrylenko announced that the President now has more grounds to dissolve the parliament, with Lutsenko boldly stating that "the President has heard them." Tymoshenko said that "if the President loves Ukraine and respects Ukrainians, he will either dissolve the parliament or lose the remaining support in society." They called on all Ukrainians to come out to the Maidan on March 31 to support them. (Note: Ambassador will meet Tymoshenko late in the evening of March 30. End note.) The Regions-led ruling coalition has announced that they will be holding their own rallies at numerous sites around Kyiv the afternoon of March 31 as well. (Note: Embassy officers and the RSO will have observers around the city to watch and report on the rallies. End note.) ¶13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor