UKRAINE: PM YANUKOVYCH DECRIES OPPOSITION'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000687 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PM YANUKOVYCH DECRIES OPPOSITION'S INFLUENCE ON YUSHCHENKO, BUT IS STILL READY TO COOPERATE Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Although disappointed by President Yushchenko's continued rebuffs to his invitations to work together, PM Yanukovych told visiting EUR DAS David Kramer, NSC Director Adam Sterling and the Ambassador that he remained open to a broad coalition in parliament and cooperation. Yanukovych expressed concern about what he saw as negative influence on Yushchenko from opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko and the presidential administration that made cooperation difficult. Yanukovych said that Tymoshenko was focused on becoming president in 2009 -- and he would have no choice but to accept his party's inevitable call to oppose her and ensure that she was defeated. Even better would be adoption of the Party of Regions initiative to have the President elected from within the Rada, obviating the need for presidential elections in 2009. This might be the only way Viktor Yushchenko would be reelected, according to Yanukovych. Regarding the conflict over the foreign minister, Yanukovych said that the candidate was not the problem -- the coalition would support any qualified individual -- but that the process was key. If the President refused to consult with the PM and the Rada leadership before he nominated a candidate, then he could not expect Government or coalition support. DAS Kramer urged Yanukovych to stick with cooperation and stressed the importance of reaching agreement on an FM ASAP. End summary. ¶2. (C) Comment. This March 19 meeting took place just after an inconclusive roundtable called by the President to discuss the "crisis" in parliament with the PM, Rada Speaker and faction heads, and several days prior to the successful Rada approval of Arseniy Yatsenyuk as the President's nominee to be Foreign Minister. At that moment, Yanukovych appeared to be pessimistic about chances for cooperation, even as his counterparts were undoubtedly engaged with the President's team on finding a way out of the foreign minister impasse. In the meeting, Yanukovych was frank and minced no words in his blistering attack on Yuliya Tymoshenko and the presidential administration. And Yanukovych was clear in his commitment to be a candidate in the 2009 presidential election, unless his party succeeded in amending the constitution to have the president elected by the Rada. End comment. Yushchenko Needs to Get on Board -------------- ¶3. (C) PM Yanukovych spent 45 minutes at the top of the meeting outlining the economic successes of his government before noting that he needed to turn to the "other side of the coin." According to Yanukovych, the Government, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Rada were all operating well, professionally promoting the development of the country and doing their jobs. He claimed that outside of Kyiv, nearly 80 percent of local officials were non-political actors who simply wanted stability and development. Unfortunately, the opposition in the center was out of touch and was advocating non-peaceful solutions to the ongoing conflict within the Government - pushing for new elections, holding rallies and planning a march on Kyiv (references to Tymoshenko and Lutsenko). Yanukovych argued that these solutions were not supported by the people and that Yushchenko was making a mistake by cooperating with the opposition, whose political views were increasingly isolated from "real life". ¶4. (C) Yanukovych noted that he had urged Yushchenko to participate in the Regions-led "process of developing the country," but the problem with Yushchenko was that he was tied up in talk of power and authority. According to Yanukovych, "people do not understand what he means. It would have been better to join with us; better for him and better for the country." Yanukovych said that it was hard to understand the President; "when we talk he seems to agree with me, but then he talks to his team and entourage and this changes." In Yanukovych's view, Yushchenko was "past his low point" and now had the chance to make qualitative changes in his approach. However, Yanukovych was uncertain that Yushchenko would make the right choice: "I asked the President to take the lead; the least he can do now is not stand in the way." He went on to note that "if Yushchenko opposes us economically, it will hurt him politically. He will lose standing in society. We miss his participation. If he led the process, we'd have 100 percent participation in the process." ¶5. (C) Continuing his theme of the importance of cooperation, Yanukovych said that it was "not becoming for a president to always look like an offended person." In short, Yanukovych claimed that he always offers cooperation with Yushchenko, but to no avail and this was hurting Yushchenko's KYIV 00000687 002 OF 003 popularity: "the longer it takes for us to find understanding, the harder it will be for him to keep his place. One day he will find himself on the sidelines of the political processes in the country." The Foreign Minister Mess -------------- ¶6. (C) Yushchenko's unwillingness to cooperate had been demonstrated in the problems regarding the nominations of candidates to be the Foreign Minister and head of the SBU, according to Yanukovych. Yushchenko had chosen to send the names by "slow mail." There had been no phone calls, no discussions about the nominations. Yanukovych said that this was not how it should be done; it would be better to bring together the President, PM and Speaker, and then to discuss and decide. The PM suggested that some observers of the process believed that the President had never been serious about these nominations: "if he had really wanted them to be appointed, then he would have taken practical steps to do just that." Per the constitution, the Rada was not obligated to approve the nominations, and in Yanukovych's opinion, the process had been unsuccessful from the start. ¶7. (C) Yanukovych suggested that the opposition had contributed to spoiling the situation as well. Only last week, acording to Yanukovych, the President had appealed to the PM and Speaker to save Ohryzko's nomination as FM. While lobbying Rada members to support the nomination, Yanukovych had been stunned to see the head of the presidential administration (Viktor Baloha) appearing on television with the leader of the opposition to state that the Rada would have to approve the nomination "because the opposition demanded it." Once that happened, the nomination was doomed. In Yanukovych's mind, from that moment on it was impossible for the coalition to support Ohryzkho's candidacy. ¶8. (C) According to the PM, it was important to stop seeing every situation as a win-lose event: "if we fail to reach compromise, then we all lose." The only way out of the current FM impasse was for Orhyzhko to step down and for the President to discuss possible candidates with the PM and the Speaker. Yanukovych said that he could support any of the candidates that had been discussed in the press, or any former deputy foreign ministers who had the requisite experience. When DAS Kramer asked whether the PM would support the nomination of his own foreign policy advisor Konstantin Gryshchenko as a candidate, Yanukovych laughed, noting that he wouldn't stand in his way, but that he liked having him on his team. The PM reiterated that what was important was prior discussion and agreement on a candidate. (Embassy Note: Something that apparently took place with the snap announcement and successful confirmation of Arseniy Yatsenyuk as Foreign Minister on March 21. End Note.) Tymoshenko the Terminator -------------- ¶9. (C) Yanukovych said that he was pessimistic about cooperation with Yushchenko after the conclusion of the March 20 roundtable called by the President with the parliamentary faction heads. In his view, at the meeting, it looked like Yushchenko was the spokesman and Tymoshenko was calling the shots. Yanukovych was vicious in his characterization of the former PM, noting that their interests clashed at every level. He said that she was dedicated to "destabilization, destruction and disruption" and that people did not support her approach. Yanukovych argued that people were "tired of her; she offered nothing constructive and she was unpredictable -- a real threat to Yushchenko. It was inconceivable to Yanukovych that Yushchenko did not understand that any increase in her support would have to come from Yushchenko's supporters. ¶10. (C) Turning to the presidential elections scheduled for 2009, Yanukovych said that "she is focused on being the next president, but she will never win." The PM quipped: "In that case, I will have to take part - my party will demand it. Referring to a Party of Regions initiative to change the constitution so that the next president would be elected from within the Rada (instead of direct elections),Yanukovych said that unless the constitution is amended, Yushchenko won't be elected a second time. If the opposition's goal is a new early election, they will also be disappointed. One Way Out - A Broad Coalition -------------- ¶11. (C) Summing up, Yanukovych said that the only way out of the current impasse for the President was to form a broad coalition with the PM's coalition in the Rada. Yushchenko's current strategy of cooperating with the opposition was weak and not sustainable; he needs to make a decision soon and the KYIV 00000687 003 OF 003 PM was confident that he would make the right choice. Yanukovych suggested to DAS Kramer that "what he (Yushchenko) says is not what he believes. It appears to us that he is merely the spokesman and Tymoshenko is making the decisions. If he remains silent, it is the same thing as saying that he agrees." ¶12. (C) Yanukovych argued that Yushchenko could not afford not to take a position. In the PM's opinion, Yushchenko had enjoyed two years of nearly unlimited power and had done nothing with it. The President needed to lead and that it was ridiculous for the president to be part of the opposition; by definition he was part of the authority. Tymoshenko was not the right ally, according to Yanukovych, and he did not understand why she continued to have so much influence. ¶13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor