UKRAINE: PM YANUKOVYCH LOBBIES EUROPE VIA BERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000540 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017 TAGS: PREL ECIN ETRD ENRG EUN GM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PM YANUKOVYCH LOBBIES EUROPE VIA BERLIN REF: KYIV 332 Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Seeking to gain public support from Germany for his government's goal of promoting Ukraine's integration with Europe, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych made a one-day working visit February 28 to Berlin, meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and addressing a group of German businessman. Although Yanukovych said Merkel had indicated that the "EU door" was "open for Ukraine," our German Embassy contacts in Kyiv confided that Merkel had said no such thing, but that she had refrained from directly contradicting her guest. In addition, although Yanukovych said that he and Merkel had discussed the possibility of forming an energy "consortium," the word was not used during the meeting. The energy relationship, however, had been an important topic. Merkel urged Yanukovych to drop grain export quotas, and Yanukovych indicated that the problem would be solved by March 20. The next high-level contact between the two countries will likely occur with the German Minister of Economy's visit to Kyiv in May. Although Ukrainian parliamentary speaker Moroz hoped to visit in March, the German Embassy notes that the visit might very well be postponed. ¶2. (C) Comment: Yanukovych successfully used this visit to Germany to push his Government's priority of enhancing Ukraine's relationship with the EU. In public and private statements both at home and abroad, Yanukovych consistently reiterates his governemnt's commitment to Europe. Most recently, in a letter of greetings to the March 2 "New Ukraine in a New Europe" conference in Kyiv, Yanukovych stated clearly that European integration was Ukraine,s top priority and furthermore claimed there was both government/elite and social consensus on this policy (implicitly implying that such a consensus did not exist on NATO). Within the domestic political context, Yanukovych is using working visits such as this one to Germany to enhance public perceptions of his status as a foreign policy player alongside Ukrainian President Yushchenko as another tactic in their struggle for governmental control. At the same time, however, these visits give Yanukovych the opportunity to hear directly from his Western interlocutors what steps they want him to take -- a valuable tool in encouraging Yanukovych and his government to make the right policy choices for Ukraine's European future. End summary/comment. The EU Door Ajar? -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ukrainian media generated a flurry of reporting on the joint press conference that Yanukovych and Merkel held after their lunch, with attention on Yanukovych's remarks that Merkel gave him "a signal that the door to the European Union is open for Ukraine and this will be expressed in a new agreement covering the next 10 years" (as quoted in Interfax). During a March 2 meeting, German Embassy First Secretary Manuel Mueller said that Merkel had been flummoxed SIPDIS by the misstatement, since she had made no such remarks, but could not directly contradict her guest before media representatives. In the press conference transcript that Mueller provided us, Merkel avoided directly refuting Yanukovych, noting that Yanukovych had indeed raised Ukraine's EU aspirations but that Germany preferred to concentrate on EU consolidation after the most recent round of expansion. ¶4. (C) Consulting what appeared to be an official report from Berlin, Mueller said that, in his meeting with Merkel, Yanukovych had pressed for inclusion of an EU membership possibility in the EU-Ukraine "New Enhanced Agreement," but that Merkel had demurred, arguing that Ukraine instead should realize that the new agreement offered substantial and real benefits to Ukraine, going beyond the EU's agreement with Russia. For the time being, the EU preferred for political expediency to remain silent on the question of Ukraine's possible membership. ¶5. (SBU) Mueller noted that New Enhanced Agreement would incorporate an EU-Ukraine free trade agreement. In response to our question, Mueller said the EU's mandate had authorized negotiation on a document that was titled "New Enhanced Agreement," but he did not rule out the possibility of some other title being hammered out in the end. In any event, the EU had definitely ruled out Ukraine's proposal to call the new document an "Association Agreement," since "association" had, in EU parlance, a precise legal definition derived from Turkey and Croatia's status. The first negotiations on the new enhanced agreement would take place on a working level KYIV 00000540 002 OF 003 March 5 in Brussels. First Impressions -------------- ¶6. (C) Mueller further commented that Yanukovych's visit had been held in "a good atmosphere," with a frank exchange of positions. (He later observed that Merkel and Yanukovych had met for the first time.) The major topics discussed had been Ukrainian domestic politics and the EU-Ukraine bilateral energy relationship. On the political topic, Merkel had focused on Yanukovych's relationship with the presidency and the political opposition. Yanukovych had presented himself in a statesmanlike way, avoiding criticism of either Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko or opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko. Yanukovych told Merkel that minor irritants existed between himself and Yushchenko, but that both agreed on Ukraine's strategic direction. Energy, Trade, and NATO -------------- ¶7. (C) On energy, Yanukovych stressed that Ukraine would remain an important transit country between Russia and the EU, but, in this role, it was committed not to create any problems. He urged Germany to focus on investing to expand Ukraine's gas transit capacity and not devote resources to construction of a new pipeline under the Baltic Sea. Regarding oil transport, he argued the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline could result in greater deliveries to Ukraine for transit further west. Mueller stressed that, although subsequent media reports suggested an energy consortium had been discussed, the word had not been uttered during the Yanukovych-Merkel meeting. Merkel suggested that Yanukovych raise energy-related proposals in detail during his meeting with the private sector, since the German government could not play a role in business investment decisions. The issues would also be discussed in further detail during the German Minister of Economy's May visit to Kyiv. ¶8. (C) Mueller commented that Ukrainian quotas on grain exports had been a key topic, taking up about 20 minutes of discussion. Merkel had been very clear that they needed to be removed, causing Yanukovych to become somewhat defensive. He said the export controls had been implemented at the beginning of his tenure and needed to be reduced in a step-by-step fashion. While Yanukovych did not make a clear statement, he implied the quotas would be completely abolished by March 20. ¶9. (C) Merkel also pressed Yanukovych to implement an information campaign to inform the Ukrainian public about NATO. Yanukovych noted that funding had been allocated for this purpose. Future Bilateral Contacts -------------- ¶10. (C) Mueller noted that Yanukovych's visit had not been too different in tone or substance from Ukrainian President Yushchenko's February 8-10 visit to Berlin, but the German government felt now that it needed to touch base with both the President and Prime Minister to gauge the Ukrainian government position accurately. In addition to the German Minister of Economy's May visit mentioned above, Mueller said parliament (Verkhovna Rada) speaker Oleksandr Moroz had planned also to travel to Germany in March, but Berlin would probably suggest a later timeframe so as to space out the visits of high-ranking Ukrainian officials. Merkel herself planned to visit Kyiv in the second half of 2007 although an exact date had not yet been set. The visit had originally been scheduled for 2006, but had been postponed because of the protracted delay in forming a new government. Gryshchenko's Addendum, Tarasyuk's Rebuttal -------------- ¶11. (U) In public comments at the March 2 "New Ukraine in a New Europe" symposium, PM foreign policy adviser Kostyantin Gryshchenko, who had accompanied Yanukovych to Germany, expressed often held Ukrainian frustration with the EU when he said Ukraine desired to join the EU, but "the EU was not ready for this prospect." He toed the Party of Regions party line that Ukraine would join NATO only after the Ukrainian public had signaled its readiness in a national referendum, citing the precedent of other European countries where referenda were held on important national questions. Although his presentation (perhaps deliberately) was vague and contradictory at times, Gryshchenko suggested that while European integration, with partnership and economic KYIV 00000540 003 OF 003 integration with the EU, was a priority, concrete programs and cooperation in the field of security, rather than a NATO membership that would irritate Russia, made sense for Ukraine at the moment. ¶12. (U) Former Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, speaking immediately after Gryshchenko (also a former Ukrainian FM) strongly rebutted Gryshchenko's comments about NATO. Tarasyuk stressed the logic of the two recent waves of countries involved in EU expansion having gone through NATO membership first. Tarasyuk also criticized the PM,s team for not delivering on Yanukovych,s Sept 14 promises at NATO to fund and run a public information campaign. Former Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S. Yuri Shcherbak also implicitly criticized Gryshchenko and others associated with Yanukovych when he contrasted the elite consensus in the 1990s that Ukraine's western-oriented future lay with both the EU and the NATO with the newfound doubt on part of the political elite since the 2004 presidential election cycle about the Euro-Atlantic half of the equation. The audience warmly clapped after Tarasyuk and Shcherbak finished, while applause after Gryshchenko had been sparse and polite. ¶13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor