UKRAINE: THINKING OF ENGAGING BELARUS PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000478

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MNUC PINR BO UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: THINKING OF ENGAGING BELARUS PRESIDENT
LUKASHENKO

REF: A. 2/17/2007 GEE/GWALTNEY E-MAIL


B. 06 KYIV 4647

Classified By: DCM Sheila Gwaltney for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: On February 16, the Ukrainians floated a
proposal to extend an overture to Belarusan President
Lukashenko in the hope of obtaining progress on
Ukraine-Belarus border issues and cooperation in forming a
united front against Russian on energy issues. The initial
proposal included the prospect of Lukashenko joining a small
February 24 birthday celebration for Ukrainian President
Yushchenko with Polish President Kaczynski and Lithuanian
President Adamkus at Yushchenko's mountain dacha, followed by
Lukashenko making an official visit to Kyiv. Ambassador
argued strongly and successfully against the proposal with
members of the Foreign Ministry and Presidential Secretariat.
While the Ukrainians are still pursuing possible ways to
restructure their initiative to make it more palatable to
Western friends, they abandoned the initial proposal, will
consult with Warsaw and Vilnius, and will lay down conditions
for a Lukashenko visit to Kyiv that will occur no earlier
than March 5.


2. (C) Comment: The immediate crisis was averted due to our
clear objections and the united stance provided by Poland,
Lithuania, and others. We will, however, need to continue
insisting that Ukraine must push for genuine steps from
Lukashenko, starting with the release of nine political
prisoners, and not just the appearance of reform, to justify
a bilateral summit. Based on past history, Lukashenko is
unlikely to take the necessary steps and will scuttle
Ukrainian efforts on his own. End summary/comment.

Giving Luka a meeting in exchange for agreements?
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3. (SBU) On February 16, Presidential Secretariat Deputy Head
for Foreign Policy Oleksandr Chaliy asked Ambassador for a
U.S. reaction to meetings with Belarusan President Lukashenko
that the Secretariat hoped would improve bilateral
Ukraine-Belarus relations. Chaliy said the Secretariat was
considering an invitation to Lukashenko to celebrate
Yushchenko's February 24 birthday along with the Lithuanian
and Polish presidents at Yushchenko's dacha in the
Carpathians. The event would be followed by a one-day
official visit to Kyiv by Lukashenko, during which Ukraine
and Belarus would sign five agreements.


4. (SBU) Chaliy noted the five agreements would include the
two most desired by Kyiv for years: official demarcation of
the Ukraine-Belarus border and simplified transit procedures
between Slavutych and Chornobyl across a strip of Belarusan
territory (Note: Minsk's refusal to endorse these requests
have scuttled previous efforts dating back to October 2005 to
arrange a meeting. End note). The other agreements would
involve energy and consular/legal issues. Chaliy said
Ukrainian officials would use the visit to press Lukashenko
to implement steps to lighten the climate of repression in
Belarus and implement democratic reforms. He also appealed
for U.S. assistance to obtain Polish and Lithuanian agreement
to include Lukashenko in the birthday celebration.


5. (SBU) Ambassador immediately argued against the proposal,
noting that Lukashenko found himself in a weak position,
without support from either East or West. The visit would
only serve to confer legitimacy on Lukashenko. In order to
even consider supporting such a visit, the U.S. would need to
see Lukashenko immediately take significant steps on the
democracy front. He argued that Ukraine's hoped-for
deliverables, Lukashenko's agreement to allow the EU to open
an office in Minsk and to support Polish minorities in
eastern Belarus, were incommensurate with the enhanced
stature that Ukraine would provide Lukashenko. In a later
telephone call, Ambassador suggested that release of all
political prisoners could constitute a significant step;
Chaliy objected that the suggestion would be too radical for
Lukashenko.

MFA: Worth it for bilateral and geopolitical reasons
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6. (C) In a follow-up February 19 meeting with acting Foreign
Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko, Ambassador used ref A talking
points to argue further against the Ukrainian proposal. He
noted that, outside of meetings in a Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) context, the U.S. was aware of only
three bilateral meetings that Lukashenko had had with heads
of state -- with Zimbabwean President Mugabe, Iranian
President Ahmadinejad, and Venezuelan President Chavez. Did
Yushchenko want to be included in such company, Ambassador

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asked rhetorically?


7. (C) While Ohryzko admitted that prospect was not
appealing, he claimed that Ukraine, in addition to the
border-related agreements, hoped to obtain Lukashenko's
buy-in on forming a working group of energy-transit countries
that could work as a group to counter Russian pressure.
Although Lukashenko was weak now, he would not change
overnight; the Ukrainians hoped to work with Lukashenko to
persuade him that he had options other than Russia. Since
nothing would happen, positive or negative, without
Lukashenko's assent, Ukraine needed to engage him to obtain
progress on bilateral issues. Ambassador reiterated that
Lukashenko needed to take a significant step in advance of
the meeting such as releasing all political prisoners; in the
absence of such a step, the U.S. would not hesitate to
publicly criticize a Ukraine-Belarus summit meeting.

Presidential Secretariat backs down, changes tack
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8. (C) Presidential Secretariat Head Viktor Baloha informed
Ambassador February 20 that the Ukrainians had reconsidered
their proposal and would set conditions for a Lukashenko
visit to Kyiv. Minsk's latest proposal was for a potential
meeting which would occur no earlier than March 5. In the
meantime, Chaliy would first travel to Warsaw and Vilnius to
consult with Polish and Lithuanian counterparts before
traveling to Minsk to discuss conditionality. In Minsk,
Chaliy would relay Ukraine's conditions for a Lukashenko
visit; if the Belarusans balked, then the visit would not
take place.


9. (C) Baloha repeated Chaliy's point that the Belarusans
were feeling pressure both from Russia and the West and
viewed Ukraine as offering one of the few avenues potentially
to relieve the pressure. Ambassador again stressed that the
U.S. and EU held the common view that high-ranking officials
should not meet Lukashenko until he took appropriate steps
forward on democratic reforms and protection of human rights,
such as the release of political prisoners. Were Ukraine to
proceed with such a meeting without securing the release of
Belarus' nine political prisoners, the U.S. would publicly
criticize the move. Reddening, Baloha said he understood and
would inform Yushchenko of the U.S. position.


10. (SBU) Ambassador called Chaliy February 22 and reiterated
that the initiative and his trip to Minsk would not be a
success unless he was able to secure the release of the
political prisoners. Chaliy told Ambassador February 23 that
he had a "small measure of optimism" that the initiative
might succeed.


11. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor