UKRAINE: RADA REJECTS FM/SBU NOMINEES IN ANOTHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000452 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: RADA REJECTS FM/SBU NOMINEES IN ANOTHER SLIGHT OF YUSHCHENKO REF: A. KYIV 296 ¶B. KYIV 223 Classified By: DCM Sheila Gwaltney for reasons 1.4(a,b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Party of Regions-led Rada majority on February 22 rejected presidential nominees for Foreign Minister and Security Service (SBU) Chief in what appears to be the latest skirmish between the President and Prime Minister in the long-running struggle for power. Presidential Secretariat head Viktor Baloha claimed to Ambassador February 20 that Yanukovych had in fact agreed to Volodymyr Ohryzko's candidacy prior to the nomination, but admitted there had been no consultation on Viktor Korol for the SBU slot. Yushchenko, visiting Crimea February 22, told journalists that he would conduct further consultations but would insist on the two candidacies, suggesting that he may renominate both Ohryzko and Korol. In a later live interview, he stressed the need for cooperation rather than confrontation. ¶2. (C) Comment: The explanations given by members of the Rada majority during voting on FM-designate Ohryzko--that he was professional but too anti-Russian--seemed to be weak pretexts. It is clear that Regions decided between the January 30 resignation of Tarasyuk and Yanukovych's public signals February 15 to back away from what Baloha describes as Yanukovych's initial agreement to Ohryzko's candidacy. Baloha himself was at a loss to explain to Ambassador February 20 what a negative vote portended, beyond Yanukovych not delivering on his initial word. The most likely explanation is another tactical move to further reduce Yushchenko's authority in favor of the Cabinet and Rada coalition majority. The Constitution is clear that nomination of the FM is the President's prerogative. While a nomination does need to achieve 226 votes in favor, in effect requiring majority support, there is nothing that says the Cabinet or coalition has a formal role in the nomination and confirmation process for the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, the SBU chief, and several other agency heads, or that the President needs to pre-clear the nomination with the coalition. Despite Yushchenko's initial reaction in Crimea that he would insist on both candidates, many are presuming that deputy Presidential Secretariat head Oleksandr Chaliy, the previous front-runner to replace former FM Tarasyuk, may end up as FM (ref B). End summary and comment. Explanation One--No Consultations -------------- ¶3. (C) Acting Foreign Minister Ohryzko's nomination to become FM failed February 22, receiving only 196 votes from Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko Bloc out of a needed 226 (the three coalition parties--Regions, Socialists, Communists--did not cast a vote). When Yushchenko nominated Ohryzko on February 5 (ref A),there was much discussion that Ohryzko was much like his predecessor Borys Tarasyuk in terms of outspoken pro-NATO and EU views and alleged strong dislike of Russia, but that the coalition would consider him because he was the President's choice. Presidential Secretariat Head Viktor Baloha told Ambassador February 20 that Yushchenko had raised Ohryzko,s candidacy with PM Yanukovych and Rada Speaker Moroz prior to Tarasyuk,s resignation and making the nomination public. According to Baloha, Yanukovych had not expressed opposition to Ohryzko at the time, agreed that Ohryzko was suitable, and said Ohryzko would receive the necessary support. ¶4. (SBU) However, on February 15, Yanukovych publicly warned that the coalition would probably not support Ohryzko because Yushchenko had not sought Cabinet approval of the nomination. During the discussion before the February 22 vote, a Regions MP also complained that Ohryzko had not met with Regions MPs prior to the vote. Ohryzko responded that he had made several attempts to set up a meeting with the Regions faction, but the faction refused to meet him. Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Shybko, a Socialist, said that most deputies on the committee praised Ohryzko's professional and personal qualities, but Regions MPs Kozhara and Chornovil had blocked the committee from making a final recommendation on the nomination, claiming the candidacy should be supported by factions, not committees. ¶5. (SBU) Regions MP Hanna Herman claimed to us after the vote that nominations failed because Yushchenko refused to introduce his candidates himself; instead, Presidential representative to the Rada Roman Zvarych had presented the candidates. She acknowledged that Regions did not meet with Ohryzko, but argued that: "if Ohryzko wanted to convince us that he was the right candidate, he should have met with all members of our faction individually." KYIV 00000452 002 OF 002 Explanation Two--Too Anti-Russian -------------- ¶6. (SBU) A number of representatives of the Anti-Crisis Coalition criticized Ohryzko for his "evident anti-Russian bias." In particular, his has repeatedly been chastised in the press and in the Rada for refusing to speak Russian at a conference in Crimea hosted by the CIS Institute (whose leaders, Konstantin Zatulin and Kiril Frolov, are now on Ukraine's black list for their anti-Ukrainian agitation in Crimea). One Communist MP called Ohryzko a lackey of the U.S. Senate for failing to criticize a resolution by Senator Lugar to offer support to Ukraine and Georgia in joining NATO. However, many acknowledged that he was very professional. Korol Gets Rejected Too -------------- ¶7. (C) Yushchenko's nomination of Viktor Korol to lead the SBU failed a short time later, garnering only 190 votes. The discussion before the vote on Korol's candidacy was much shorter than the one on Ohryzko, and the rejection was expected. Regions has been lukewarm at best on Korol since Yushchenko announced his nomination on February 5; Baloha admitted that Yushchenko had nominated Korol without any prior consultation with Yanukovych. Our Ukraine MP Serhiy Bychkov told us after the vote that he thinks Yushchenko will renominate Korol, suggesting that Korol will be approved the second time. Internal Politics is Likeliest Motivator -------------- ¶8. (C) Comment: It is possible Regions would have rejected Yushchenko's first FM nominee, no matter who he was, simply to demonstrate that they had the power to do so. The comments from Regions members in the Rada and Cabinet underscore that they believed they had the right to clear Yushchenko's nominees, regardless of constitutional mandate. Moreover, after the vote MP Chornovil reminded the press that under the new, controversial CabMin law, the President has to name a new candidate within 15 days or the coalition will pick the FM itself. Although Yushchenko appealed the law to the Constitutional Court, for now the law is in force, and the time limit stands. Chornovil suggested both Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat Chaliy and PM foreign policy adviser Hryshchenko as more acceptable nominees. Regions also could be hoping to extract concessions out of Yushchenko, both in terms of who is nominated and in terms of what Yushchenko might offer Regions in exchange. For example, Den newspaper suggested that Regions would support the President's nominations in exchange for the latter withdrawing his constitutional appeal of the CabMin law. ¶9. (C) In turn, Yushchenko may be trying to demonstrate that it is his right alone to name the FM and SBU Chief or he may be taking a harder line in hopes of gaining concessions from Regions. Yushchenko announced at a press conference in Simferopol after the vote that he will insist on both candidates and conduct another round of consultations. However, given the consensus, including Chaliy himself, in January that Chaliy would be the next FM, Yushchenko may be open to compromise. Herman argued this last point to us, saying the Presidential Secretariat was playing games when everyone knows that Chaliy will be appointed FM. End comment. ¶10. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor