UKRAINE: SHAPING OUR MESSAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 003157

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: SHAPING OUR MESSAGE


Classified By: Charge a.i. Jim Pettit for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary and Comment. Prime Minister Tymoshenko's
government has begun delineating its internal setup/workflow
and the structures and processes for interacting with the
President's team and parliamentary opposition. In turn,
President Yushchenko is pushing forward his own initiatives
aimed at maintaining leverage in his dealings with
Tymoshenko, such as his attendance at Cabinet meetings and a
newly-instituted weekly meeting between the President, PM,
and Rada Speaker. The Ambassador's meetings over the past
week with the PM, DPM Nemyria, Rada Speaker Yatsenyuk,
Presidential Chief of Staff Baloha, and others, have
underlined that the public commitment from both camps to
cooperate is tempered by continued personal skepticism
regarding the trustworthiness of their coalition partner --
especially as related to the upcoming 2009/2010 presidential
elections. Comments from Baloha indicate that the President
feels he now has the upper hand, while Tymoshenko is
proceeding cautiously in her public comments on the President
and his decisions, and is more accommodating in their private
meetings -- a change in behavior several presidential allies
commented upon to us.


2. (C) We recommend a strong and consistent core message to
all our Ukrainian interlocutors: PM and President need to
support each other in their respective areas of
responsibility; and any return to the infighting of 2005 will
be disastrous and PM and President will share responsibility.
Whether the coalition survives and can govern effectively
will depend on the personal commitment by leaders to an
initial political accommodation for the good of the country.
End Summary and Comment.

Baloha: We'll Monitor Carefully
--------------


3. (C) The wait-and-see attitude of the President's camp was
underlined by Presidential Chief of Staff Baloha at a meeting
with the Ambassador on December 26. After stating that
Yushchenko wanted to work with Tymoshenko and avoid any
misunderstandings, Baloha indicated that they still did not
trust the PM and would evaluate her actions over the next few
months to see whether she was launching an overt campaign for
the 2009 presidential race. Baloha, when pressed, further
defined their evaluation as dependent on how Tymoshenko
presented her successes -- as either "hers" or "theirs." If
they believed she had launched her campaign they would
respond immediately and forcefully (he provided no
specifics). In addition, he noted that the President was now
in a stronger position, as he "controlled" new Rada Speaker
Yatsenyuk and no longer faced intense opposition from PM
Yanukovych.


4. (C) The President is extending his oversight of Cabinet
and Rada activities. Baloha indicated that it had been his
idea for Yushchenko to meet every Monday morning with
Yatsenyuk and Tymoshenko. (Note. Interestingly, this idea
could backfire on Baloha -- Party of Regions shadow FM
Gryshchenko argued to the Ambassador December 25 that these
weekly meetings could erode Baloha's position as Yushchenko's
main channel of information. End note.) In addition, the
President has announced that he will begin to attend the
weekly Cabinet of Ministers (CabMin) meetings and intends to
hold daily telcons with the PM and Speaker. The surprise
appointment on December 26 by Yushchenko of Regions deputy
faction head Raisa Bohatyreva as National Security and
Defense Council (NSDC) Secretary has been seen as another way
for the President to counterbalance Tymoshenko -- in this
case by reaching out to Regions through Bohatyreva (see
septel for details). In addition, new Defense Minister
Yekhanurov told the Ambassador December 25 that Yushchenko
had named him "dean of the Corps of Ministers, " a position
designed to give Yekhanurov influence over other ministers by
making him the senior minister in the Cabinet. Yekhanurov
said he was already involved in helping other ministers
select their deputies. (Comment. This is not a position we
are familiar with, and it seems odd that the President should
have the right to make the selection given that the PM is
elected by the Rada, not the President, but it gives
Yushchenko another oversight mechanism in the government.
End comment.)


5. (C) Presidential foreign policy advisor Oleksandr Chaliy,
who also met with the Ambassador December 25, had a slightly
more upbeat assessment than Baloha and said that Yushchenko
sincerely wanted to work together with Tymoshenko. However,
he also put forward a "strategic 7-year plan" that would have
Tymoshenko support Yushchenko's reelection in 2009/2010 and
then succeed him five years later. He indicated that he was
already working with DPM Nemyria on the PM's foreign travel
schedule and that they would determine visits based on whose
portfolio tracked the key bilateral issues most closely. He
also noted an initial problem had arisen with Tymoshenko's
invitation to the Davos Economic Forum, which was causing
heartburn for Yushchenko as he had not received an
invitation. Chaliy said that Yushchenko would like a
reversal, with Tymoshenko disinvited and the President
participating at Davos.


6. (C) Comment. Yushchenko's initiatives signal his intention
to engage closely with Tymoshenko, increasing his ability to
monitor/control her activities, but also tying himself
publicly to her policies. This increased level of
interaction between the President, PM, and Speaker could
potentially enhance cooperation and deliver a smoother
political process, but could also come to an abrupt end if
the President's team perceives the first hint of Tymoshenko
launching a presidential campaign. In addition, the fragile
Rada majority has so far pushed Tymoshenko to seek
compromise, but the ambitious and headstrong PM may
eventually buck at all the constraints and monitoring being
thrown at her by the President. End Comment.

Tymoshenko's Wiring Diagram
--------------


7. (C) Tymoshenko has forged ahead with organizing her
Cabinet and with efforts to shape the wider political playing
field, recently announcing her intention to introduce a law
specifying the rights/responsibilities of the opposition
early in the new year. (Note: Tymoshenko and Yanukovych
agreed on December 25 to form a working group to finalize the
law; it is unclear if they will be using as a starting point
the draft law adopted in its first reading in January 2007.
End Note). New DPM for Eurointegration (and Tymoshenko
foreign policy advisor) Hryhoriy Nemyria on December 21
provided some insights into how the PM's team will organize
itself and an in-depth overview of his new role. Ministers
will report directly to Tymoshenko, but be required to keep
at least one of three DPMs in the loop on ministry
activities. In contrast, under PM Yanukovych there were six
DPMs, each of whom had greater direct management authority
over ministries.


8. (C) As DPM for Eurointegration, Nemyria sees his
responsibility as coordinating ministry activities that
affect Ukraine's efforts - principally MFA, Ministry of
Justice and Ministry of Economy, and to a lesser extent
Ministry of Energy. He intends to increase the CabMin's EU
integration staff from its current 24 to 39, a large plus-up
given that there were only 15 staff in this unit in 2005.
Nemyria underlined that he would focus on internal aspects of
EU preparation, while the MFA would handle all interactions
with foreigners, but also noted that the MFA is already
viewing his position with a degree of suspicion.


9. (C) Comment. Tymoshenko has to date refrained from any
open conflicts with the President, focusing on domestic
policy issues (the budget, re-privatization, repayment of
lost Soviet bank deposits, audits of ministries, etc),and
remaining publicly neutral even on Yushchenko's appointment
of Bohatyreva to the NSDC slot. Her approach has been noted
at Bankova, with Chaliy characterizing her as a "different
person", quieter and more agreeable since being appointed PM.
Yekhanurov echoed this sentiment, saying she was acting in a
very tolerant manner and seeking agreement out of necessity
of getting things done. However, by providing First DPM
Turchynov with a security portfolio (in addition to handling
economic reforms) and allowing Nemyria to strengthen his
CabMin EU staff, Tymoshenko risks a clash with the
President's team, given that the Constitution places foreign
policy and security issues in the President's purview.
Control over security policy was also a major problem between
Yushchenko and Yanukovych. Whether these potential frictions
are allowed to take hold will depend on the tone set by the
PM and President. We should encourage both sides to continue
their current constructive approach. End Comment.


10. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Pettit