UKRAINE: SHAPING OUR MESSAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 003157 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: SHAPING OUR MESSAGE Classified By: Charge a.i. Jim Pettit for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment. Prime Minister Tymoshenko's government has begun delineating its internal setup/workflow and the structures and processes for interacting with the President's team and parliamentary opposition. In turn, President Yushchenko is pushing forward his own initiatives aimed at maintaining leverage in his dealings with Tymoshenko, such as his attendance at Cabinet meetings and a newly-instituted weekly meeting between the President, PM, and Rada Speaker. The Ambassador's meetings over the past week with the PM, DPM Nemyria, Rada Speaker Yatsenyuk, Presidential Chief of Staff Baloha, and others, have underlined that the public commitment from both camps to cooperate is tempered by continued personal skepticism regarding the trustworthiness of their coalition partner -- especially as related to the upcoming 2009/2010 presidential elections. Comments from Baloha indicate that the President feels he now has the upper hand, while Tymoshenko is proceeding cautiously in her public comments on the President and his decisions, and is more accommodating in their private meetings -- a change in behavior several presidential allies commented upon to us. ¶2. (C) We recommend a strong and consistent core message to all our Ukrainian interlocutors: PM and President need to support each other in their respective areas of responsibility; and any return to the infighting of 2005 will be disastrous and PM and President will share responsibility. Whether the coalition survives and can govern effectively will depend on the personal commitment by leaders to an initial political accommodation for the good of the country. End Summary and Comment. Baloha: We'll Monitor Carefully -------------- ¶3. (C) The wait-and-see attitude of the President's camp was underlined by Presidential Chief of Staff Baloha at a meeting with the Ambassador on December 26. After stating that Yushchenko wanted to work with Tymoshenko and avoid any misunderstandings, Baloha indicated that they still did not trust the PM and would evaluate her actions over the next few months to see whether she was launching an overt campaign for the 2009 presidential race. Baloha, when pressed, further defined their evaluation as dependent on how Tymoshenko presented her successes -- as either "hers" or "theirs." If 
they believed she had launched her campaign they would respond immediately and forcefully (he provided no specifics). In addition, he noted that the President was now in a stronger position, as he "controlled" new Rada Speaker Yatsenyuk and no longer faced intense opposition from PM Yanukovych. ¶4. (C) The President is extending his oversight of Cabinet and Rada activities. Baloha indicated that it had been his idea for Yushchenko to meet every Monday morning with Yatsenyuk and Tymoshenko. (Note. Interestingly, this idea could backfire on Baloha -- Party of Regions shadow FM Gryshchenko argued to the Ambassador December 25 that these weekly meetings could erode Baloha's position as Yushchenko's main channel of information. End note.) In addition, the President has announced that he will begin to attend the weekly Cabinet of Ministers (CabMin) meetings and intends to hold daily telcons with the PM and Speaker. The surprise appointment on December 26 by Yushchenko of Regions deputy faction head Raisa Bohatyreva as National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) Secretary has been seen as another way for the President to counterbalance Tymoshenko -- in this case by reaching out to Regions through Bohatyreva (see septel for details). In addition, new Defense Minister Yekhanurov told the Ambassador December 25 that Yushchenko had named him "dean of the Corps of Ministers, " a position designed to give Yekhanurov influence over other ministers by making him the senior minister in the Cabinet. Yekhanurov said he was already involved in helping other ministers select their deputies. (Comment. This is not a position we are familiar with, and it seems odd that the President should have the right to make the selection given that the PM is elected by the Rada, not the President, but it gives Yushchenko another oversight mechanism in the government. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Presidential foreign policy advisor Oleksandr Chaliy, who also met with the Ambassador December 25, had a slightly more upbeat assessment than Baloha and said that Yushchenko sincerely wanted to work together with Tymoshenko. However, he also put forward a "strategic 7-year plan" that would have Tymoshenko support Yushchenko's reelection in 2009/2010 and then succeed him five years later. He indicated that he was already working with DPM Nemyria on the PM's foreign travel schedule and that they would determine visits based on whose portfolio tracked the key bilateral issues most closely. He also noted an initial problem had arisen with Tymoshenko's invitation to the Davos Economic Forum, which was causing heartburn for Yushchenko as he had not received an invitation. Chaliy said that Yushchenko would like a reversal, with Tymoshenko disinvited and the President participating at Davos. ¶6. (C) Comment. Yushchenko's initiatives signal his intention to engage closely with Tymoshenko, increasing his ability to monitor/control her activities, but also tying himself publicly to her policies. This increased level of interaction between the President, PM, and Speaker could potentially enhance cooperation and deliver a smoother political process, but could also come to an abrupt end if the President's team perceives the first hint of Tymoshenko launching a presidential campaign. In addition, the fragile Rada majority has so far pushed Tymoshenko to seek compromise, but the ambitious and headstrong PM may eventually buck at all the constraints and monitoring being thrown at her by the President. End Comment. Tymoshenko's Wiring Diagram -------------- ¶7. (C) Tymoshenko has forged ahead with organizing her Cabinet and with efforts to shape the wider political playing field, recently announcing her intention to introduce a law specifying the rights/responsibilities of the opposition early in the new year. (Note: Tymoshenko and Yanukovych agreed on December 25 to form a working group to finalize the law; it is unclear if they will be using as a starting point the draft law adopted in its first reading in January 2007. End Note). New DPM for Eurointegration (and Tymoshenko foreign policy advisor) Hryhoriy Nemyria on December 21 provided some insights into how the PM's team will organize itself and an in-depth overview of his new role. Ministers will report directly to Tymoshenko, but be required to keep at least one of three DPMs in the loop on ministry activities. In contrast, under PM Yanukovych there were six DPMs, each of whom had greater direct management authority over ministries. ¶8. (C) As DPM for Eurointegration, Nemyria sees his responsibility as coordinating ministry activities that affect Ukraine's efforts - principally MFA, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Economy, and to a lesser extent Ministry of Energy. He intends to increase the CabMin's EU integration staff from its current 24 to 39, a large plus-up given that there were only 15 staff in this unit in 2005. Nemyria underlined that he would focus on internal aspects of EU preparation, while the MFA would handle all interactions with foreigners, but also noted that the MFA is already viewing his position with a degree of suspicion. ¶9. (C) Comment. Tymoshenko has to date refrained from any open conflicts with the President, focusing on domestic policy issues (the budget, re-privatization, repayment of lost Soviet bank deposits, audits of ministries, etc),and remaining publicly neutral even on Yushchenko's appointment of Bohatyreva to the NSDC slot. Her approach has been noted at Bankova, with Chaliy characterizing her as a "different person", quieter and more agreeable since being appointed PM. Yekhanurov echoed this sentiment, saying she was acting in a very tolerant manner and seeking agreement out of necessity of getting things done. However, by providing First DPM Turchynov with a security portfolio (in addition to handling economic reforms) and allowing Nemyria to strengthen his CabMin EU staff, Tymoshenko risks a clash with the President's team, given that the Constitution places foreign policy and security issues in the President's purview. Control over security policy was also a major problem between Yushchenko and Yanukovych. Whether these potential frictions are allowed to take hold will depend on the tone set by the PM and President. We should encourage both sides to continue their current constructive approach. End Comment. ¶10. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Pettit