UKRAINE: PREPARING FOR THE NATO BUCHAREST SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002858

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PREPARING FOR THE NATO BUCHAREST SUMMIT

REF: A. A: KYIV 2713 B: KYIV-STATE 9/20 E-MAIL

B. C: RPM-KYIV 11/13 E-MAIL

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. We need to engage now with Ukraine to craft
a role for this important partner at the April 2008 NATO
Summit in Bucharest even as Ukrainian political forces are
focused on building a coalition and forming a new government.
While President Yushchenko, FM Yatsenyuk, and Minister of
Defense Hrytsenko favor a request for a MAP, the politics of
government formation will prevent an early decision. There
is much more to the NATO-Ukraine relationship than just MAP.
While such a request could emerge, we should prepare now for
a broader discussion at Bucharest - one that could include
MAP, but would not be held hostage to it.


2. (C) We believe an effective approach would include the
following: 1) an early decision to agree to Ukraine's request
to hold a NUC in Bucharest and to extend an invitation to
President Yushchenko to attend the Summit, 2) acknowledgment
at the Summit, through a statement, of Ukraine's extensive
and positive cooperation with NATO, 3) capturing in the
statement areas in which NATO and Ukraine can continue to
deepen their relationship (e.g., air defense cooperation,
airlift (including a possible helicopter initiative),and
NATO support for the Euro 2012 soccer championships to be
held in Ukraine and Poland),and 4) continued discussion in
Kyiv and Brussels on the topic of MAP. We understand that
Ukraine may announce its intention at the December 7 NUC in
Brussels to qualify a unit for inclusion in NATO's Reaction
Force -- which would merit special acknowledgement at
Bucharest. Consideration could also be given to the evolving
strategic dialogue with Ukraine that encompasses issues such
as missile defense, CFE, terrorism and cyberdefense. This
approach, which could be introduced at the December 7 NUC,
would reaffirm and strengthen the NATO-Ukraine relationship,
irrespective of when a new government is formed in Kyiv, and
without precluding this new government's ability to make a
decision on requesting a MAP prior to Bucharest. With
November 23 finally set as the opening date for the Rada we
anticipate progress in finalizing a coalition, selecting a
PM, and determining a forward course on NATO by the end of
the year. End Summary.

MAP Paralysis: Moving Ahead
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3. (C) Over the past several years, consideration of
when/whether Ukraine would request a MAP has dominated any
discussion of Ukraine's relationship with NATO. The
agressive pursuit of NATO membership under the first Orange
coalition and FM Tarasyuk was followed in 2006 by the
disappointment of Ukraine's low profile at the Riga Summit
(where many had initially hoped that the Alliance would
welcome a Ukrainian request for a MAP) and by PM Yanukovych's
go-slow statement during his Brussels visit in September

2006. The whiplash effect was felt both in Allied capitals
and Kyiv, with current discussion stalled at "the door is
open, Ukraine needs to take the next step." This may be true
regarding the issue of MAP, but it has also brought a certain
perception that there is stagnation in the broader
NATO-Ukraine relationship -- detracting from current
cooperation and the potential future wide range of additional
areas in which NATO-Ukraine interaction could take place. We
believe the relationship could be reinvigorated at Bucharest
by engaging Ukraine, regardless of whether or not Ukraine
decides to request a MAP.

Early Invitation for Yushchenko
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4. (C) Instead of waiting for resolution of the internal
political debates regarding MAP in Kyiv and Brussels, we
should send a strong signal about the importance of the
Ukrainian-NATO relationship by accepting the Ukrainian
request for a NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) meeting in
Bucharest accompanied by an invitation to President
Yushchenko. Foreign Minister Yatsenyuk forwarded on October
17 a request to the Secretary General for a NUC meeting at
the highest level at Bucharest. An early, positive response
to the invitation would strengthen the hand of pro-NATO
forces within Ministries and in the Presidential
Administration, and generate pressure for timely completion
of the 2008 Annual Target Plan. More importantly, it would
put pressure on an incoming coalition government to develop a
coherent approach toward NATO and to work with Yushchenko on
formulating a unified approach toward Bucharest.
Additionally, it would defuse the domestic debate over MAP by
indicating that NATO remains on the policy agenda
irrespective of the final outcome on the membership question.
We could also use the leverage of the upcoming Summit to

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push Yushchenko and the incoming goverment on other key
political and economic objectives.


5. (C) In discussions with our Ukrainian (and local European)
interlocutors Mission Kyiv continues to emphasize that MAP is
only the first step in a process and does not guarantee
membership. Achieving NATO standards will take time and
continued hard work, and a front-loaded discussion of
membership and its Article 5 implications should not be
determinants for MAP consideration. We have found that an
open and informed discussion of what MAP is and is not has
helped us address concerns expressed locally by some of our
contacts.

Emphasizing the Positive
--------------


6. (C) In Kyiv our daily interactions with the Presidential
Secretariat, MFA, MOD, NGOs and others continue to underline

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the high level of interest in engaging on NATO issues. While
political uncertainty, inconsistent efforts across some
Ministries, and budget constraints hinder the effectivness of
GOU efforts, we see continued progress toward achieving NATO
standards. Ukraine remains the only PfP member participating
in all current NATO deployments, and Defense Minister
Hrytsenko continues to push the Ukrainian Armed Forces toward
modernization and reform independent of on-going political
uncertainties. Ukraine has 34 personnel in Iraq, has
self-financed its 182 personnel contribution to UKRPOLBAT in
Kosovo for the past year, and intends to increase
participation in Operation Active Endeavor with deployment of
its only helicopter carrying frigate in April 2008. In 2007
Ukraine hosted successful SEA BREEZE and RAPID TRIDENT
exercises, and we see progress on MOD training system reforms
and better use of foreign defense advisors through the
establishment of a joint consultative committee.


7. (C) Additionally, the September 30 elections saw a sharp
deemphasis of NATO as a hot-button issue, and we are
witnessing a slow but steady uptick, albeit from a 25 percent
base, in support levels among the population. In short, we
believe that a gradual normalization of the membership issue
is taking place following the sharply negative politicization
of NATO membership in the 2004 and 2006 elections. Giving
Ukraine a substantive role and result at Bucharest would help
reinforce these trendlines. A positive NUC statement
detailing the key areas of ongoing NATO-Ukraine cooperation
as well as unilateral Ukrainian efforts would energize and
help focus future GOU activities. The statement could
highlight the potential for developing a strategic dialogue
on missile defense, CFE, terrorism and cyberdefense. It
could also outline expansion of ongoing cooperation and
specific projects, such as air defense cooperation, expansion
of airlift cooperation (including a possible helicopter
initiative),expanded NATO assistance for retired military
personnel, and NATO assistance for the Euro 2012 soccer
championship.

State-of-Play in Kyiv
--------------


8. (C) While the coalition formation saga continues in Kyiv,
we have seen no recent change on NATO positions by any of the
lead political actors. PM Yanukovych and BYuT leader
Tymoshenko have maintained their cautious positions (ref A),
strongly supporting robust cooperation with NATO while
presenting NATO membership as an "over the horizon" decision.
President Yushchenko's request to European partners at the
October 22 Southeast Europe Defense Minister's meeting in
Kyiv for assistance in realizing MAP tracks his consistent
forward-leaning position on NATO (ref B). We asked FM
Yatsenyuk during his November 14 meeting with DAS Kramer
about Ukrainian Ambassador in Washington Shamshur's hint to
EUR PDAS Volker at a possible MAP request at the December 6
Ministerial in Brussels (ref C). Yatsenyuk's response was
that the issue remained difficult as "some" in Kyiv were
against a MAP request (we believe he was referencing
Tymoshenko's overall position and recent refusal to sign a
letter asking for MAP as one of numerous preconditions for
Yushchenko's support of her as PM). Shamshur's statement
reflects the difficulties MFA is encountering in developing
and projecting NATO policy during the current political limbo
in Kyiv.


9. (C) Preparations for the December 7 NUC have also been
affected by the coalition formation delay, with the MFA
unable to clear a draft Joint Statement internally and also
encountering delays with finalizing Ukrainian Goverment
approval of the 2007 Annual Target Plan (ATP) evaluation and
2008 ATP submission. On the Ukrainian side, the key NUC
deliverable will be the MFA's plan (shared with us in
confidence) to announce Ukraine's intention to qualify a unit

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for NATO's Reaction Force, a deliverable that had been
initially intended for the Bucharest Summit. Another
positive should be the arrival of new Ambassador Ihor Sagach,
currently Ambassador to Norway, and DCM Vladyslav Yasniuk,
who has been acting Director of MFAs NATO Directorate. Both
are respected veterans of the MFA's IO and NATO offices and
should strengthen what has been an underperforming Ukrainian
NATO Mission. Additionally, the opening session of the Rada
(set for November 23),and related deadlines for formation of
a coalition and government within 30 days or by December 23,
should end the current policy impasse and hopefully provide a
clear NATO policy early in its tenure.


10. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor