UKRAINE: COALITION POSSIBILITIES - READING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002766 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: COALITION POSSIBILITIES - READING THE TEA LEAVES IN KYIV Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: With the opening of the Rada on the horizon and after five weeks of coalition discussions between representatives of all of the major parties and President Yushchenko, we have boiled down the main number of possibilities for the next government to four -- an orange coalition led by Yuliya Tymoshenko; a broad coalition between Party of Regions and Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense possibly to include the Lytvyn Bloc; a temporary, technocratic government made up of some combination of Regions, OU-PSD, Lytvyn's bloc and other individual lawmakers, with or without a formal coalition agreement; or a continuation of the Yanukovych Government in an acting capacity. An outside fifth possibility, floated recently by Regions with us and possibly with the President, would be an agreement to suspend the constitution and operate under a "political agreement" while a new constitution is being drafted, leaving the Yanukovych Government in place in an acting capacity, with or without new ministers from participating factions. Of course, all of these variants have sub-variants, and some may figure in two-step scenarios as Plan A and Plan B. For example, many in Kyiv continue to argue that orange will be given a chance, and when (not if) Tymoshenko's government fails, either a broad coalition or a technocratic government will take its place. The Rada is required to take its seats no later than November 26; once it is seated, it will have 30 days to establish a coalition (no later than December 26). So far, all political forces seem committed to sticking to the timeline. ¶2. (C) Comment. At this point, we believe that an orange coalition with a slim majority has a 50% chance of succeeding, although all options are definitely in play. Fortunately, the idea of suspending the constitution and working pursuant to some kind of vague political understanding appears to be more of a trial balloon rather than a real plan. If the factions cannot agree on a coalition, Yanukovych's Acting Government would stay in place until a new PM is confirmed. Normally, if no coalition emerges within 30 days of the Rada's opening or no government is confirmed within 60 days, the President has the right to dissolve the Rada and call for new elections; however, the constitution also says that new elections cannot be called for one year after pre-term polls. With regard to USG policy, we continue to state that we have no favorite colors or preferred coalition outcome. Our key USG messages to Ukrainian political forces should be: do not try to operate without a constitution in force; elect a Rada leadership and form committees as soon as possible to begin legislating; and select and confirm a permanent government as soon as possible and do not leave an acting unstable and uncertain government in place. End Summary and Comment. An Orange Coalition Still in Play -------------- ¶3. (C) Although the results of the September 30 election made an orange coalition between Yuliya Tymoshenko's BYuT and President Yushchenko's OU-PSD possible, thus far this has remained a theoretical rather than a concrete option. With a combined 228 seats -- 226 is needed for a majority -- BYuT and OU-PSD can form a coalition and elect a Tymoshenko-led government, but they would need practically every member of each bloc to both be present for the first few sessions of the new Rada and to vote in favor to do it. Although Tymoshenko and OU-PSD political leaders Lutsenko and Kyrylenko have been confident in public about their ability to deliver the necessary 228 votes, all have told us privately that they are concerned about getting and holding on to the votes. The effort to secure and maintain the 228 votes has taken place against the backdrop of continued public criticism from President Yushchenko and his chief of staff Viktor Baloha about Tymoshenko's proposed program as well as press reports regarding individual OU-PSD leaders refusing to initial the draft coalition agreement or expressing opposition to Tymoshenko's PM candidacy. ¶4. (C) Nonetheless, in our view, an orange coalition is still possible, including approval of a new government led by Yuliya Tymoshenko, even though the odds of this coming to pass are probably only 50% at most. Many in OU-PSD who might oppose Tymoshenko as PM believe that politically they must support her -- or at least not be seen to oppose her candidacy -- if they want to maintain voter support and if they want to avoid making her the shoo-in orange candidate for the presidency in 2009. There are others who argue that all of the posturing in the public and the press about disagreement on policies and positions is simply part of the negotiating process needed to establish the coalition. And, KYIV 00002766 002 OF 003 his protests in the press and comments to us about his dislike of Tymoshenko notwithstanding, if Volodymyr Lytvyn were to throw his lot in with the orange team, maybe taking the Speaker slot as part of the deal, the orange coalition might be more viable for a longer term. Elements in Regions have noted that they would be happy to sit back and wait for what they see as the inevitable -- another Yushchenko-Tymoshenko falling out, a la September 2005, that would lead to her dismissal or departure, and a resumption of Tymoshenko's campaign for the presidency. ¶5. (C) There is another factor supporting the establishment of orange -- some within OU-PSD, the Presidential Secretariat, and Regions have argued that an orange coalition SIPDIS and a Tymoshenko-led government is a temporary, but necessary measure before either a broad coalition or a technocratic government could take office. Formation of an orange government would deny Tymoshenko the chance to tell voters that Yushchenko and OU had thwarted her candidacy as PM. It would also let Yushchenko and OU show its voters that they had given Tymoshenko a chance and that she had failed. Finally, an orange coalition, albeit short-lived, would allow those who prefer a "technocratic variant" to fulfill the constitutional requirement that a coalition must be formed when a new Rada is seated, a scenario OU-PSD head Lutsenko laid out for the Ambassador in October. With regard to timing, as Lutsenko quipped to the Ambassador, a Tymoshenko-led government might survive only until the "drinking season" of the New Year's holidays ended (late January); others give it six to nine months. A Broad Coalition - Too Much for Yushchenko? -------------- ¶6. (C) Assuming that an orange coalition fails, one alternative is the formation of the long-debated and oft-discussed "broad coalition" between Regions and OU-PSD, perhaps including the Lytvyn Bloc. However, this may be too much for the OU-PSD faithful and a task that Yushchenko may not be able to accomplish. Yushchenko spent the last six months accusing Yanukovych and Regions of attempting to concentrate all political power in their hands. It is hard to see how he can convince his voters that OU should now form a coalition with them, at least not before he gives Tymoshenko a chance to form an orange coalition and govern. Yanukovych is doing his part to pave the way forward on this option, making numerous public statements about his close cooperative relationship with the President. Yanukovych is also wooing Lytvyn as an insurance policy to increase his number of votes. One way of making a broad coalition more palatable for OU voters would be for Regions to agree to a broad coalition without Yanukovych, leaving OU and Regions the job of finding a candidate acceptable to both sides -- Presidential chief of staff Baloha and trusted loyalist former PM Yekhanurov are considered to be leading candidates for the job. ¶7. (C) A broad coalition without Yanukovych at the head is also a challenge for Regions. According to the polls, no other Regions leader has the same high popularity as the Prime Minister. Other party leaders are not ready for or don't want the job -- for example, Raisa Bohatyreva is a political leader without her own base or financial resources; Rinat Akhmetov remains a businessman first and a reluctant politician second; and others just don't have the name recognition. Deputy Prime Minister Klyuyev somewhat cryptically told the Ambassador that in the end they would make a broad coalition work, implying that they would be willing to jettison Yanukovych if they had to. The party could keep Yanukovych in the public eye by ensuring that he ends up with another high-visibility post (such as Speaker), keeping him on track to land the President's office in 2009, another key goal for Regions. Or, the decision to agree to another Prime Minister could signal Regions' decision to back a different presidential candidate. A decision to enter into a broad coalition with OU-PSD would also come with political downsides -- Regions would have to explain the decision to its electorate, although its base might be more understanding than OU-PSD's. No Coalition -- The Technocratic Variant -------------- ¶8. (C) If Tymoshenko and her OU-PSD allies fail to get the 226 votes needed to either sign a coalition agreement or to elect a government, or if a Tymoshenko-led government takes office and then collapses, and if OU-PSD and Regions cannot reach agreement on a broad coalition, some in OU-PSD, Regions, the Lytvyn Bloc and even elements of BYuT might support some kind of a temporary, technocratic government. KYIV 00002766 003 OF 003 Given the difficulties of putting together a broad coalition in the current political environment, it is certainly a serious option backed by some in OU-PSD. In this scenario, the Rada could function without a formal coalition agreement, leaving political factions to work together to elect a Speaker, appoint committee chairs, and start legislating. However, it is unclear how this might work in practice since the Rada rules and the Constitution say that a coalition of parliamentary factions shall be formed in the Rada to include a majority of MP's. Some have seized upon the Constitution's use of the word "shall" rather than "must" to argue that a coalition is not absolutely required, but this strategy would be open to legal challenges in court. Others have pushed the argument laid out above that if the orange coalition is confirmed, and then fails to elect a government, the requirement for a coalition has been met and there does not need to be another version approved. ¶9. (C) Most see a technocratic government formed from scratch, to include representatives nominated by all of the factions in the Rada supporting this variant, potentially all but the Communists. No coalition agreement would be required, using the "shall" versus "must" argument. Members of OU-PSD have argued that since, in this scenario, neither Tymoshenko nor Yanukovych could get enough votes to be PM, the nomination for PM would fall to OU-PSD. Many see Yushchenko as then turning to either his ambitious chief of staff Baloha (rumored by many to be angling already for the premiership) or previous PM Yekhanurov, who is respected by many in Regions, to head a new technocratic government. Even better for Yushchenko, neither is reportedly interested in making a run at the presidency in 2009. Or No Coalition -- Yanukovych As Acting -------------- ¶10. (C) Should Tymoshenko and OU-PSD fail to conclude a formal coalition agreement or elect a government, another possibility might be that in the absence of any successful vote for a government, Yanukovych and his Cabinet would remain in power in acting status. Presumably the Government would remain in place until either a constitutional commission drafted a new constitution or a year has gone by, allowing Yushchenko to call new Rada elections. In this scenario, the Rada would elect a Speaker and appoint committee heads and get on with the business of legislating -- without a governing coalition agreement. Individual ministers could be replaced as part of the overall tacit agreement to leave Yanukovych in place as PM to better reflect the parties supporting this variant. Desperate Times ...Suspending the Constitution -------------- - ¶11. (C) A number of Regions representatives, including the Prime Minister, have hinted publicly and privately about working with the President to find an extra-constitutional solution to a future deadlock if no grouping of political forces succeeded in forming a coalition. Specifically, they have floated the idea of reaching an agreement with the President to suspend the constitution and govern the country under some kind of "political understanding" for a year while a special constitutional commission meets to draft and adopt a new constitution. Although not directly stated, the assumption is that Yanukovych would remain as PM during this period. Thus far, this seems to be nothing more than a trial balloon. However, should there be a deadlock in the Rada -- either because the parties cannot or do not want to reach agreement on forming a coalition, then we do not rule out the possibility that major political leaders may consider this among their options. ¶12. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor