UKRAINE: PSI Eastern Shield Exercise, October 29-31, Odesa,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 002753 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS Department also for EUR/UMB, EUR/PRA, and ISN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PTER KCRM PREL KNNP UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PSI Eastern Shield Exercise, October 29-31, Odesa, Ukraine REF: STATE 148432 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR INTERNET. ¶1. (U) Summary: Ukraine and Poland sponsored a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Eastern Shield demonstration, with Romanian, Georgian, Moldovan, and Bulgarian participation, October 29-31 in Odesa, Ukraine. The demonstration, planned as the first PSI exercise in the Black Sea region, employed a scripted scenario in which the respective ministries and agencies of the participating countries uncovered and interdicted the simulated illicit transit of dual-use technology from the participating countries through Ukraine. The Ukrainians demonstrated their capability at land, sea, and air interdiction before observers from 26 countries, not all of them currently PSI participants. The demonstration also provided an opportunity to showcase the capabilities of the USG-funded GUAM (for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) Virtual Law-Enforcement Center (VLEC). The demonstration was the largest multinational event that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU, successor to the Soviet-era KGB) and its Anti-terrorism Center (ATC) has organized to date; SBU Director Nalyvaichenko and Ambassador Taylor participated in the event and closing ceremony. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Comment: The exercise achieved the main general goals, but only partially achieved the specific agreed goals of the exercise: to review law enforcement, customs, and border control procedures relating to the control and effective interdiction of shipments of dual-use chemical precursors and other WMD-related equipment and supplies; to examine procedures for coordination among countries when these items move across borders; to uncover and document shortfalls in these procedures and recommend ways to revise/strengthen/improve them; to exercise national decision-making processes for interdicting WMD-related materials in the participating countries; and to review information sharing arrangements and determine ways to improve and make them more effective and timely. Various defense attaches and other observers from both Kyiv and Moscow-based embassies (Germany, UK, Belgium, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands) privately stated that the demonstrations did not constitute an exercise and were artificially constructed. The same sentiment was expressed by observers from other countries (UK, Croatia, Japan, India, South Korea). ¶3. (SBU) Comment cont.: Polish MFA Security Policy Department Deputy Director Tadeusz Chomicki, the chief instigator of the exercise, observed, however, the exercise achieved its intended general goals, which were not focused on testing the actual coordination mechanisms but to foster connections between governments, between counterpart agencies in participating countries, and among non-proliferation agencies within each government. In addition, the demonstration presented a limited opportunity to demonstrate PSI principles and operations to observing nations and to reach out to governments that have not yet become PSI partners. With non-PSI countries South Korea and Indonesia sending observers from their capitals, we would judge the PSI Eastern Shield exercise to have been successful from this perspective. (The United Arab Emirates also dispatched three observers.) Chomicki, in a private conversation, indicated an interest in holding a follow-on table-top exercise utilizing VLEC. End summary/comment. The Scenario and Program -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The scenario demonstration began with a powerpoint presentation of the detection by Polish intelligence services of efforts to purchase steel tanks with a glass lining for transport to the country, "Grey," in the Middle East. It proceeded as follows. Initial intelligence indicates that a shipment will be transferred imminently to a location in Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence established that the consignor is the Alena firm located in Odesa, and further coordination with the intelligence and law enforcement services of Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, and Romania develops additional information about the links between Alena to Grey and the other countries. The Mirea forwarding company, located in Constantsa, Romania, provides shipping services for most of Alena's cargo. An illegal shipment, without an export license, of tanks from Poland to Ukraine is allowed to proceed. The shipment is kept under surveillance as it crosses the Polish-Ukrainian border at Mostyska rail crossing and proceeds to the Odesa-Sortirovochnaya rail station. Merchant vessel Dana steams toward Odesa from KYIV 00002753 002 OF 002 Constantsa, presumably to take on the Polish cargo and other shipments originating in Moldova and Georgia. Moldova transmits information to the SBU, using the VLEC network, that Alena's representatives are proceeding by car to Odesa with purchases of chemical components. Georgia also transmits information to the SBU that two Alena representatives have chartered an aircraft to transport chemical weapons precursors from Georgia to Odesa. Finally, the Bulgarian intelligence service detects two Grey citizens who are proceeding to Odesa with a large sum of cash. ¶5. (U) The elaborate scenario timeline allowed Ukrainian ministries and agencies to discuss their ability to interdict illegal shipments and respond to accidents. According the participant list, a wide range of Ukrainian ministries and agencies besides the SBU were involved: the Presidential Secretariat, the Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Interior Internal Troops, the Ministry of Defense and uniformed services, Ministry of Emergency Situations, MFA, Ministry of Transport and Communications, National Security and Defense Council, State Border Guards Service, State Export Control Service, and State Customs Service. On the first day, observers viewed videotapes demonstrating how information was transferred using VLEC and the procedures used to detect the illicit rail shipment. On the second day, observers first watched an anti-terrorist stop of a vehicle movement at Chornomorsky training ground, culminating in the explosion of a mini-van and first-responders handling of a chemical contamination. In the afternoon, the observers saw a demonstration of SBU Alpha Troops storming an aircraft after it had landed at the Shkolny airfield and then toured an elaborate field hospital. On the third and final day, observers saw Alpha Troops board the simulated Dana commercial vessel, in reality a passenger ferry with the observers on board. All live demonstrations highlighted Ukrainian efforts on anti-terrorist consequence management tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP's). Lessons Learned -------------- ¶6. (SBU) We are grateful to the Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF),and especially to the NDF's John Conlon, for the support provided that allowed the exercise to happen at all. The bureaucratic hurdles that the Ukrainians overcame, however, were an instructive insight into the progress that SBU, ATC, and other Ukrainian agencies must still make in order to be able to cooperate with other countries to the degree required for actual PSI operations. The Ukrainians, for example, were unable to authorize a representative to sign a simple Memorandum of Discussion and Workplan, so that, ultimately, we resorted to an exchange of diplomatic notes (a simpler procedure, surprisingly, for the Ukrainians). The Ukrainians' ability to carry out relatively simple procedures continues to be hampered by an extreme over-centralization of authority. (Note: Per exchange of diplomatic notes, the Counter Terrorism Center of the Security Service of Ukraine will submit a report on the exercise outcome regarding NDF costs associated with the exercise.) ¶7. (SBU) The Ukrainians also had difficulty with simple issues of proper coordination. They failed to notify the Romanians in a timely fashion, for example, that they would be unable to accept an arrangement to have a Romanian Border Police vessel participate in the exercise. They explained during the September Final Planning Conference that insufficient time remained to obtain Ukrainian government clearance for a police/military vessel to visit Odesa. The Romanians nearly pulled out of the exercise, given their vessel participation was agreed back in April during the mid-planning conference held in Bucharest, but in the end, after consultations with USG representatives, reluctantly agreed to accept the use of the Ukrainian vessel in place of the Romanian one. We should note, however, that the Ukrainians had no way of anticipating the May 29 decision to call pre-term elections for September 30, which made it virtually impossible to obtain the required Cabinet of Ministers decision to authorize a visit by a foreign military vessel to Odesa port. Taylor