Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KYIV2713
2007-10-26 12:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: YANUKOVYCH AND TYMOSHENKO WAIT FOR

Tags:  PGOV PREL UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0560
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #2713/01 2991240
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261240Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4190
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KYIV 002713 

SIPDIS


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: YANUKOVYCH AND TYMOSHENKO WAIT FOR
YUSHCHENKO; COURT CLEARS WAY FOR FINAL ELECTION RESULTS


Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KYIV 002713

SIPDIS


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: YANUKOVYCH AND TYMOSHENKO WAIT FOR
YUSHCHENKO; COURT CLEARS WAY FOR FINAL ELECTION RESULTS


Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary and Comment: PM Yanukovych and his potential
successor, Yuliya Tymoshenko, met separately October 24-26
with Colin Powell and Richard Holbrooke, both of whom were in
KYIV to deliver speeches at the invitation of the Pinchuk
Foundation, established by businessman and Kuchma son-in-law
Viktor Pinchuk. The conversations all reflected the waiting
game going on in KYIV, with both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko
keenly aware that at this point, the next step in coalition
building must be President Yushchenko's. Yanukovych
attempted to portray a good working relationship with
Yushchenko, arguing that the two of them shared a common
vision for the future -- constitutional reform and the need
for a clear division of power. The PM acknowledged that
politically, Yushchenko had no choice but to support an
orange coalition, but argued that a Tymoshenko-led government
was sure to fail, sooner or later, leading to a broad
coalition with the Party of Regions. Until then, Regions
would work in constructive opposition. Tymoshenko underlined
that her assumption of the PM slot was not a done deal,
comparing the current situation with the "wasted
opportunities" following the 2004 and 2006 elections and
worrying that Yushchenko might not even support an orange
coalition. She further noted that the last three elections
had underlined Ukraine's support of integration into the
West, adding that resolution of energy issues with Russia
would have to be tackled first by a new government before
consideration of a way forward toward NATO membership.
Yanukovych speechwriter and Regions MP Hanna Herman told us
that they were exploring several ways to cooperate with Our
Ukraine-People's Self-Defense without a formal coalition.
End Summary.


2. (SBU) In other election-related news, the High
Administrative Court ruled at 11:15 pm on October 25, just 45
minutes before its five-day timeline for deciding the case
expired, that the Central Election Commission had not
violated election laws. The five political parties who
brought suits can only appeal to the Supreme Court if they

could show that the CEC or Administrative Court had violated
human or citizen rights, which is unlikely. Deputy CEC
Chairman Usenko-Chorno announced that the CEC will review its
paperwork one last time and the election results will be
published in government papers Holos Ukrainy and Uradoviy
Kuryer on October 27. The promulgation of the results will
start new clocks, with the preparatory committee for the new
Rada expected to convene within 10 days and the Rada being
required to open within 30 dates of the promulgation. If
they stick to the schedule, the Rada should open by November
26, although the President and members of the orange team
have called for it to convene sooner.

Yanukovych - I Have Good Relations with the President
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Although carefully prefacing his comments with a
note that the Party of Regions had won the September 30
elections, the PM told both Powell and Holbrooke that since
no one side had an advantage, this had made coalition
negotiations particularly difficult. In his meeting with
Powell, the PM indicated that this opened the door to setting
up an immediate "coalition of national unity" (with Our
Ukraine-People's Self Defense) in order to stabilize the
political situation for many years. With Holbrooke, the PM
acknowledged that this process would be slightly more
complicated. The election results made an orange coalition
"theoretically possible;" however, in the PM's view,
Yushchenko was very aware that an orange coalition would be
unstable. Nevertheless, Yushchenko politically "had to be on
the orange side" and, according to Yanukovych, Regions
understands this. However, on the other hand, the
participants in both the OU-PSD and BYuT blocs have more
potential internal conflicts than the number of conflicts
that exist between Yanukovych and Yushchenko. The PM noted
that "Yushchenko knows this, but he does not want to be the
reason for not establishing the orange coalition."


4. (C) As a result, in the PM's view, Yushchenko wants to
"give them a chance to do it." However, Regions was
convinced that an orange coalition would not happen -- or
would not survive for long -- and the President was also
aware of this point of view. As a result, Yanukovych was
confident that Regions would soon participate in formal
negotiations with Our Ukraine regarding the creation of a
coalition that would be more stable and allow the country to
continue to develop in a more stable environment. The
economy had been developing well -- a stable environment
would allow Ukraine to attract more foreign investment.
Yanukovych argued that Regions and Our Ukraine were "very

KYIV 00002713 002 OF 004


close" to joining forces. However, if that did not happen,
Yanukovych said that Regions would work in the opposition in
parliament. He argued that there was "nothing negative about
this" and that the party was ready. If the Party of Regions
was in opposition, Yanukovych argued that the party would be
a constructive opposition, joining in with the government in
areas of agreement and working as partners for the national
interest. He noted that there was a big part of the Regions'
faction who wanted to sit back and give Tymoshenko and BYuT a
chance to comply with all of the promises made during the
campaign that could not be complied with and then watch her
fail.


5. (C) In both meetings, Yanukovych went to great lengths
to talk about his shared point of view with President
Yushchenko, their agreement on 90 percent of all policy
issues, and the great potential for the two of them to work
as partners. He argued that he and the President were the
two key political leaders in the country, and carefully
avoided mentioning Yuliya Tymoshenko. The main goal for 2008
was to agree on a new constitution and a clear division of
powers. The PM also mentioned the idea of reaching some kind
of political "constitutional agreement" that might be
concluded while the politicians worked on a new constitution
(see section on Herman below). To Powell, Yanukovych argued
that he and Yushchenko made a good team -- "I am not a
humanitarian like he is; he is not a strong manager like I
am." He also described himself as a representative of the
east, with Yushchenko as a representative of the west -- and
by uniting, the two could unite the country. To Holbrooke,
he acknowledged that their relations over the past year
"could have been better," but since 2005 the level of
mistrust between them has decreased and they have become
partners. With regard to relations with Russia, they were on
the same page -- they needed to protect Ukrainian national
interests, but that good relations were key -- in fact,
unavoidable as a neighbor who was engaged in 30% of Ukrainian
international trade. The PM recalled that after the 2006
elections, he had offered Yushchenko a partnership and a
broad coalition, even placing Our Ukraine ministers in his
government. In spite of the President's agreement to sign a
formal coalition agreement after the August 2006 holidays,
this had not happened primarily due to the internal conflicts
within the large and disparate Our Ukraine bloc.


6. (C) Yanukovych told both Powell and Holbrooke that the
Party of Regions was committed to Europe and eventual
membership in the European Union. However, with regard to
Ukraine's relationship with NATO, Yanukovych said that his
government had made progress in calming popular fears about
membership -- something that former Foreign Minister Tarasyuk
had whipped up by telling people that Ukraine would join the
EU and NATO tomorrow. Instead, the Yanukovych Government had
taken a pragmatic and moderate approach to NATO, primarily
because Regions "represented that part of society that wants
pragmatism in these relations." When asked about his
attitude toward NATO, the PM said that he always responded
that Ukraine could not afford to ignore an organization that
provided security for all of Europe; cooperation was
necessary. Regions had a dialogue with Ukrainians who didn't
want Ukraine to have a dialogue with NATO. By doing this,
Regions was keeping this part of the population engaged in
the discussion and stopping the "radicalization" of the issue
by left-wing parties and others.

Tymoshenko - Not my Job Yet
--------------


7. (C) In both her meetings, Yuliya Tymoshenko said that she
and her party were ready to lead and that they were ready for
their "third chance." Noting that the same infighting that
doomed the orange coalition following the 2004 and 2006
elections was again occurring, she worried about problems
within the "democratic forces." Tymoshenko told Holbrooke
that her party has accepted all of "their" demands (a
reference to OU and the President),and that although there
are new demands each day, she will accept them all. It was
important that her party not be the cause of failure this
time. She told Powell that she saw a "small chance" of
becoming PM, but said that her path forward was being blocked
by "powerful forces with powerful economic interests."
Tymoshenko was more direct with Holbrooke, saying that people
around Yushchenko did not want an orange coalition to
succeed. She confided later that she was particularly
worried about Presidential Chief of Staff Baloha. When
Holbrooke asked whether Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were now
working well together, she noted that "nothing has changed.
They treat us as enemies, but now that we have 30% of the
vote, things are different." Unfortunately, according to
Tymoshenko, 30% was not enough to rule alone and therefore, a

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coalition agreement was needed. Tymoshenko said that
Yushchenko had two options -- to limit BYuT in the coalition,
or to not let BYuT in at all. She said that many in her
faction during the negotiations with Yushchenko had urged her
to stop because this was political suicide. However, in her
view, she had "no right" to quit.


8. (C) According to Tymoshenko, the President may himself
not even support an orange coalition. In her view, Yushchenko
would prefer to establish a coalition with Yanukovych, but he
was not free to do so. If it weren't for the 15% of the
people in the country who voted for him, he would already be
in a broad coalition. In Tymoshenko's view, this was not an
ideological issue, but a matter of presidential campaign
politics that would start next year. She had already told
the President that they could unite and that she would not
run against him for President. In fact, she would support
him. When Holbrooke asked whether it might be better for her
presidential aspirations to remain in opposition, Tymoshenko
agreed that this could be advantageous politically, but that
this would not be good for the country. She argued to Powell
that any broad coalition (to include Regions) would be a
"step backwards and a step towards Russia" which would go
against the voters' choice in the past three elections for
orange and for integration into the West. According to
Tymoshenko, the Russians had already tried to take control of
Ukraine's energy systems and bankrupt the gas transportation
system and interfered in "tens of other spheres." She told
Holbrooke that two or three more years of Yanukovych would
put threaten both Ukraine's energy security and its political
independence. In particular, she was worried that a broad
coalition would focus on revising the constitution -- and
since Yushchenko could not be popularly elected again as
president, he would choose a variant of election by the Rada
and "all would be lost."


9. (C) Tymoshenko recalled those who had criticized her
anti-corruption campaign during her previous stint as PM,
noting that Ukrainian business unfortunately still ran
primarily "through the back door." She agreed with Powell
that providing stability for foreign investors was a key
priority, underlining that she would work to create an open
and transparent system that treated domestic and foreign
investors equally. She told Holbrooke that corruption is "in
the air that our businessmen breathe" and that her efforts
last time around as PM to establish rules and competition
were criticized.


10. (C) Tymoshenko highlighted increased engagement on the
Transnistria issue as a priority issue for Ukraine. Regarding
NATO, Tymoshenko indicated that she would proceed carefully,
focusing initially on increased funding for an effective
public information campaign and engaging personally on the
issue. She indicated that responsibility for NATO issues had
been placed at the FM level by the current government, which
did not provide sufficient energy/weight behind the issue.
Hryhoriy Nemyria, Tymoshenko's primary foreign policy
advisor, had earlier told Powell that Yushchenko's attempt to
have Tymoshenko sign a letter supporting a push for a NATO
Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the April 2008 Summit was a
non-starter. Regions would "jump on this and make her a
scapegoat", and it would also limit her operating room in
trying to reach a settlement with Russia on gas/energy
issues. Tymoshenko told Holbrooke that she wanted normal
relations with Russia, but on equal terms. The goal for her
government was EU integration. She said a strategy was
needed for EU and NATO; Ukrainian society was radically split
and she envied Poland because there it did not matter who the
elected leader was -- they were all committed to Europe.

11 (C) Discussion also focused on Tymoshenko's announced goal
of eliminating conscription and shifting to a professional
armed forces in 2008. Reflecting the sharp criticism she has
received on this issue, Tymoshenko noted that her proposal
had been a starting point and that she was open to discussion
and compromise. She noted that annual conscription levels
remained at 40 thousand per year, but that only three months
of training was provided to inductees which reduced them to
"nothing more than free manual labor." Powell described his
personal experiences regarding the post-Vietnam shift to a
professional military in the U.S., underlining the sharp
increase in costs associated with competing for recruits in
an open labor market.


Hanna Herman: OU Will Be With Regions One Way or Another
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Regions MP Hanna Herman, who is close to Yanukovych
and writes many of the PM's speeches, told us October 27 that

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there were several paths to cooperation between Regions and
OU-PSD. One would be that Tymoshenko will be confirmed, but
her government will collapse within the first few months of
2008, leading to a broad coalition. A second way would be a
"situational majority," where they would come together on
votes without signing a formal coalition agreement. The
third option, which Yanukovych is now discussing with
Yushchenko, would be a "constitutional agreement" (mentioned
above). Although Herman was somewhat cagey about the
details, the two Viktors would agree to suspend or cancel the
current constitution while a new one was being written. This
would remove the requirement that there be a formal coalition
and it would leave some form of the Yanukovych government in
place temporarily. (Note. Presumably this scenario would see
OU-PSD members take some Cabinet positions. End note.)


13. (C) Herman argued that any form of cooperation between
Regions and OU-PSD would be good for the country and they
would get a lot done. For example, she said, they could
quietly change the public's views on NATO by improving
standards in the military to NATO levels and use that success
as a concrete example of why NATO was good. That, she
argued, was a far more effective method than Tarasyuk's
aggressive tactics. Herman thought that as a first show of
good faith, the Rada should vote on a bill making it a crime
to deny the 1934-35 Holodomor famine. (Note. This has long
been a desire of Yushchenko's. End note.) Such steps would
help reconcile the public to the idea of a broad coalition.
Herman said that she did not think there would be any balking
within OU-PSD about this plan -- they would go along with
whatever the plan turned out to be.


14. (U) Visit Embassy KYIV's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor