UKRAINE: FORMER PM YEKHANUROV ON TYMOSHENKO,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 002678

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FORMER PM YEKHANUROV ON TYMOSHENKO,
POLICY PRIORITIES, AND HIS FUTURE

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Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense Rada
deputy and former Prime Minister Yekhanurov told the
Ambassador October 24 that he did not believe Tymoshenko
would be a good prime minister, but he will vote for her if
that is the decision his bloc makes. He added, however, that
his continued membership in the bloc, and perhaps in the
Rada, is predicated on the bloc's agreement that any
coalition they join should support a list of concrete
economic reforms, including land market, anti-corruption, and
investment-related laws. Yekhanurov believed Tymoshenko
might last one year as Prime Minister, before resigning to
run for president while accusing Yushchenko and his allies of
preventing her from making good on campaign promises. He
also talked about the rifts inside OU-PSD and its main party,
People's Union Our Ukraine, saying that when Tymoshenko
leaves office, assuming she is confirmed as PM, she will take
up to 20 percent of OU with her. He saw problems with Party
of Regions as well, believing a stint in the opposition could
break up the party. In other coalition-related news, the
High Administrative Court continued to hear the case
contesting the elections, with a verdict possibly expected by
the end of October 25.


2. (C) Comment. Other interlocutors have described
Yekhanurov as a proponent of a broad coalition who is
plotting with the Presidential Secretariat to betray
Tymoshenko. In person, however, Yekhanurov comes across as
earnest, principled, and plainspoken, stressing his belief
that it is not cooperation with Regions that is necessarily
good for Ukraine, but that an unchecked Tymoshenko would be
bad for the country. Therefore, he has insisted on her
agreeing to very specific reform proposals before his party
agree to confirm her. Yekhanurov discussed at length the
need for reform to make Ukraine attractive for foreign
investment and to support Ukraine's growing small and medium
business class. He was at pains to make clear that we should
not read too much into his letter to the OU-PSD leadership;
it was not written for the public and was instead a call for
the party to take itself seriously. End summary and comment.


Tymoshenko or Not, Talks Should Focus on Substance
-------------- --------------


3. (C) A sincere and straightforward former Prime Minister
Yekhanurov tried to lay out his position regarding Tymoshenko
and an orange coalition. His bottom line was that he does
not play games, a point he stressed several times.
Yekhanurov said that he did not think Tymoshenko would be a
good prime minister, but if his bloc decided to support her
nomination, he would vote for her.


4. (C) In reference to his letter widely circulated in the
press in which he criticized Tymoshenko, Yekhanurov said he
had never intended the letter for public consumption. He had
written it for the President and OU-PSD leadership in order
to admonish OU-PSD leaders for what Yekhanurov saw as a poor
job handling the negotiations with BYuT. Yekhanurov thought
that people like OU leader Kyrylenko were inexperienced and
did not know how to handle Tymoshenko. In addition, they
were only focused on the distribution of positions, whereas
they should be discussing the substance of a future
government program. Yekhanurov and his allies were demanding
that attention be paid to important questions, issues OU
stood for in its campaign -- a land market now, a realistic
timeframe for ending conscription, passing the law on joint
stock companies that has been languishing in the Rada for
years, and taking real steps to fight corruption. Yekhanurov
said his task within the party was to make sure an orange
coalition did not neglect these issues.

Tymoshenko Will Last A Year at Most
--------------


5. (C) The former PM also laid out what he saw as the
progression of a Tymoshenko government. This new government
would pass a budget quickly and then the political games
would start. By March, Tymoshenko will be attacking Defense
Minister Hrytsenko for not letting her immediately abolish
conscription. Beginning in April, she will increase
repayments to people who lost savings from the Soviet
Sberbank to about 1 billion UAH a month ($ 200 million),
which she will only be able to sustain for about seven
months. Then, by November, she will be out of money and will
turn on the President, saying that he is blocking her work,
and she will resign. Yekhanurov predicted that Tymoshenko
could take as much as 20 percent of OU with her once she left
government and began to prepare for the presidential

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elections.


6. (C) Now was the time, Yekhanurov argued, for sober
analysis of the September 30 elections. Politicians needed
to understand why young people did not vote and pensioners
voted in such high numbers that they had influence
disproportionate to their percentage of the electorate. He
thought that it was important to know why people in the
non-Donbas East who did not like Regions chose to stay home
rather than vote for BYuT or OU-PSD. Instead, Tymoshenko was
running ads and putting up billboards saying that all her
campaign promises would be fulfilled.

OU-PSD and Regions Could Be Headed for Splits
--------------


7. (C) Yekhanurov said that there were serious problems
within OU-PSD and within People's Union Our Ukraine, the core
party within the bloc. He predicted that the nine
constituent members of OU-PSD, in the end, will decide not to
form a single, pro-presidential party, because they all want
to remain independent. Within PUOU, there was a struggle
between Kyrylenko, representing the national democratic wing,
and Baloha, representing the non-ideological pragmatists.
Yekhanurov said he has been trying to bring these wings
together to have a frank talk, but they refuse to meet or
even admit there is a problem. Yekhanurov thought Kyrylenko
himself might be part of the 20 percent to join BYuT if
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko parted company.


8. (C) Yekhanurov also saw problems within Regions.
Dissatisfaction with the party was high, especially in the
oblasts that Regions dominated. If the party ended up in the
opposition, it could split. Neither Yanukovych nor Regions
knew how to surrender. In Yekhanurov's view, they will all
look for someone to blame for the election results. This
split in Regions could be an opportunity for OU and BYuT to
expand their presence in eastern Ukraine, but they will be
too busy eating each other up to care.

Yekhanurov Will Be Active In or Out of the Rada
-------------- --


9. (C) As for himself, Yekhanurov shrugged. He said that he
would vote for Tymoshenko if his bloc made that decision and
if he got support for his policy demands. If he got no
concessions, there was a good chance he would not stay in
OU-PSD, maybe not in the Rada at all. He would go back to
working for small and medium businesses -- he was also
working with UNESCO on cultural heritage programs in
Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv, with an eye to expanding into
Crimea. He said he is also preparing to start a new lecture
series for university students on the impact of politics on
Ukraine's investment climate.

Court Continues to Hear Election-Related Case
--------------


10. (SBU) As of midday on October 24, the High Administrative
Court had heard testimony from the five parties that lodged
complaints -- the Specialists, Communists, Free Democrats,
Progressive Socialists, and the Al-Ukrainian Party of
People's Trust. Deputy CEC Chairman Andriy Mahera has also
already testified, denying the CEC was inactive or did
anything wrong. The Court is also reviewing materials
provided by the Interior Ministry showing possible election
falsification. Next, the Court will hear testimony from BYuT
and OU-PSD as interested third parties. According to the
administrative code, the Court should be done with the
proceedings five work days after the appeals were filed --
the press has calculated the date to be October 25. However,
many worry the Court may take longer to issue a decision,
thereby continuing to delay the CEC's promulgation of the
official final results.


11. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor