UKRAINE: COALITION SOUNDING ORANGE--FOR TODAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002575 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: COALITION SOUNDING ORANGE--FOR TODAY REF: KYIV 002555 KYIV 00002575 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary. As the five-day timeline President Yushchenko gave to the parties to submit coalition proposals draws to a close, BYuT and Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense took public steps intended to demonstrate that the orange coalition is close to becoming a reality. Tymoshenko and three representatives from OU-PSD -- Lutsenko, Kyrylenko, and Tarasyuk -- separately announced that an agreement on the formation of a orange coalition was ready for signing. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko also made positive public statements regarding an orange coalition, although negotiations continue between all parties. The President said in Slovakia on October 12 that he hoped the orange team had learned from its mistakes in 2005 and that this coalition was the only possible format, but he did not fully endorse that option. For her part, Tymoshenko made some public concessions in line with several of the demands Baloha passed to her earlier in the week (reftel). However, public back-and-forth between BYuT and OU-PSD about government posts suggests that not everything is agreed to. Oleh Zarubynskiy, lead negotiator for the Lytvyn Bloc told us that he thought that Yushchenko would choose orange in the end; the Lytvyn Bloc would stay neutral for now, waiting for the big parties to solidify their positions. Yuriy Miroshnychenko from Party of Regions told us that while they were still negotiating for a broad coalition, there was a sense within the leadership of the party that it was better to be in the opposition than to hold new elections. Unfortunately, this view was not shared by all, leaving Regions divided for now. ¶2. (C) Comment. Time remains for further coalition negotiations. The Central Election Commission has still not announced the official election results, and the Socialists have now filed an appeal against all the District Election Commission (DEC) protocols to the High Administrative Court, which will likely take at least an additional week. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko's public comments suggest they have moved forward in their talks, but the President still sounds hesitant to fully commit. Miroshnychenko's comment that not all of the Regions faction was yet convinced to take their seats in the new Rada means that Yushchenko and Regions' leadership must still find a way to reach out and reconcile them. Lytvyn Bloc's strategy may pay off in the end -- by not committing to an orange coalition now, their 20 votes may become very valuable later when it is clear that 228 MPs are not enough to get anything done. End summary and comment. Yushchenko, Tymoshenko Make Conciliatory Public Remarks -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Yushchenko, speaking to the press on October 12 in Slovakia, made comments that suggest he is willing to back a BYuT-OU-PSD coalition. He is quoted in one news website saying that an orange coalition is the only possible format. He also says that this was agreed on as far back as February. Yushchenko urged the parties not to bicker over positions and, in the case of on orange coalition, underscored his desire to keep talks going with the opposition. He also said that he would like to see the Lytvyn Bloc in the coalition, although added that as head of state it was not his place to decide this. ¶4. (SBU) Echoing this seemingly new-found air of cooperation, Tymoshenko held a press conference October 12, during which she said that BYuT and OU-PSD will have a formal coalition agreement on Yushchenko's desk on October 13. Representatives from both blocs later initialed the agreement. Tymoshenko also said that they will let the President select the Interior Minister (MOI),a conciliatory gesture given that both blocs wanted to control the contested post. ¶5. (SBU) Nevertheless, party representatives continue to publicly snipe. BYuT deputy head Mykola Tomenko said at a press conference that BYuT wanted 16 governors in the regions where BYuT had the strongest support. (Note. An interesting comment, coming after BYuT MP Nemyria told us part of the deal put forward by Baloha was the acknowledgment that the president would nominate all governors. End note.) Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat Bezsmertniy immediately replied that BYuT had no grounds to nominate governors. Tomenko also said that BYuT would not support Volodymyr Lytvyn as Rada Speaker. Zarubynskiy: Lytvyn Bloc Inclined to Stay On Sidelines -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) MP Oleh Zarubynskiy, Lytvyn's designated negotiator in KYIV 00002575 002.2 OF 003 coalition talks, told us October 12 that his bloc was currently inclined to join neither the coalition nor the opposition, but to try to play a constructive role in advancing parliamentary work. He said that at a minimum, Lytvyn Bloc would not consider an offer to join an orange coalition until it was clear that BYuT and OU-PSD had worked out all their issues and problems. Right now, they were completely focused on claiming various posts from themselves, especially within OU-PSD. This led to various leaders contradicting themselves and no one was talking about policies. Zarubynskiy added, however, that a 228-seat majority was inherently unstable and that's where the Lytvyn Bloc might come in. He said that they had not asked for any positions yet, although he confided that in a one-on-one meeting Tymoshenko had made an offer to Lytvyn. Instead, they would remain neutral for now. To associate themselves too closely with one side or the other would hurt them politically too. (Note. He even hinted that Lytvyn might have presidential ambitions and, like the party, offer a "third force" to Ukrainian voters. End note.) ¶7. (C) In response to a question about the possibility of a broad coalition, Zarubynskiy said that right now it looked like there was only a 10 percent chance that this would happen. He pointed to Tymoshenko's public statements in which she not only gave up the MOI, but also expressed her willingness to accept a new Law on the Cabinet of Ministers that stripped the PM's office of certain powers and to support a constitutional referendum in 2008 that could lead back to a presidential system of power as signs that she was willing to agree to anything to make the coalition work. In addition, he said, Yushchenko still remembered the Universal and Regions' readiness to break promises. Given this and the clear inclination of most of OU-PSD to be in an orange coalition, how could Yushchenko not choose this option? Zarubynskiy caveated this, however, by saying that there were a number of politicians and businessmen in OU-PSD -- such as Yekhanurov, Plyushch, Tretyakov, and Zhvaniya -- who were not eager for Tymoshenko to return to power. Miroshnychenko: We're in the Cabinet or Opposition, Not Both -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Regions MP Yuriy Miroshnychenko, who served as head of the campaign's legal department, told us October 11 that Regions was still conducting an internal debate about what to do. The higher leadership -- Yanukovych, Akhmetov, Kolesnikov -- saw that they must take their Rada seats and were working on trying to get a broad coalition. However, many of the mid-level MPs were unhappy with the election results and thought the party could do better in a second round of preterm elections. They saw no benefit to being in the opposition and were afraid of political and economic persecution from Tymoshenko, as they "suffered" in 2005; these people would rather spend the money on another campaign and were not concerned how this would affect Ukraine's international reputation. ¶9. (C) Miroshnychenko's personal opinion was that Regions must take their seats, but it was better to be fully in the opposition than to take a couple of posts in a Tymoshenko government. Such an arrangement, in which the opposition had one deputy prime minister post was simply unnatural. Regions had not yet had a party meeting to come to a formal decision and he could not say when this would happen. However, he remained optimistic that the Rada would convene in late October or early November. ¶10. (C) Regarding the elections, Miroshnychenko said the overall conduct had been free and fair and he credited Regions' Code of Conduct (which he co-authored) as a key reason for keeping the vote clean. He also said Regions had conducted training for its commissioners and observers. As far as he was concerned, there was no basis to challenge the overall results of the election. He believed the CEC was dragging out the count on purpose to allow more time for negotiations. Miroshnychenko did express regret that Regions had not done better getting voters into the polling stations, although he was proud that Regions had increased it support in central Ukraine -- a first step, he said, in becoming a national party. ¶11. (C) In terms of legislative priorities, Miroshnychenko said that the most important issue to tackle was systematic economic reform, even before trying to address all the social promises made in the election. For his part, he would be focused on judicial reform -- he was already working on a law on lawyers. He might also work on amendments to the constitution. He thought the correct path was to improve the political reforms already implemented. He and his colleagues were consulting constitutional experts from Ukraine, the EU, KYIV 00002575 003.2 OF 003 and the U.S., and were hearing that some form of parliamentary system was the best choice for Ukraine. ¶12. (C) In response to a question about his opinion of Baloha, Miroshnychenko said the Presidential Chief of Staff was a strong player who had unified the presidential team and its message. He wouldn't call Baloha a democrat, but he was pragmatic and effective and you always knew what to expect from him. Miroshnychenko thought Yushchenko needs Baloha and that Baloha's chances were good of becoming even more influential. ¶13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor