Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KYIV2566
2007-10-12 02:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: DASD CAGAN REQUESTS PLUS-UP IN IRAQ

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS IZ UP US 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #2566/01 2850218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120218Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4038
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002566 

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DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/UMB AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ UP US
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: DASD CAGAN REQUESTS PLUS-UP IN IRAQ
TRAINING MISSION

REF: A. KYIV 1459


B. STATE 8055

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002566

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SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/UMB AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ UP US
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: DASD CAGAN REQUESTS PLUS-UP IN IRAQ
TRAINING MISSION

REF: A. KYIV 1459


B. STATE 8055

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (U) Action Request: See paragraph 13.


2. (C) Summary. In consecutive meetings with Ukrainian Chief
of Defense, General of the Army Serhiy Kyrychenko, Minister
of Defense Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and Deputy Foreign Minister
Andriy Veselovsky on October 8, visiting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (DASD) Debra Cagan expressed continued

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U.S. support for Ukrainian Armed Forces reform, stressed the
benefits of Ukrainian interoperability gained by deployment
with U.S. forces and solicited increased Ukrainian Ministry
of Defense support to U.S. operations in Iraq. DASD Cagan
expressed a U.S. wish for Ukraine to increase its number of
armed forces personnel in Iraq with the purpose of increasing
capacity for Iraqi police and security forces training. The
request was politely received with some reservations from the
Minister of Defense. End summary.


3. (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Coalition,
Peacekeeping and Multinational Cooperation Debra Cagan and
her party visited KYIV October 7-8. Cagan, accompanied by
the Ambassador and DATT, met with Minister of Defense
Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Chief of the General Staff General of the
Army Serhiy Kyrychenko, and Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy
Veselovsky. MFA Arms Control and Military Technical
Cooperation Director Volodymyr Belashov, U.S. and Canada Desk
Director Yuriy Nykytiuk, and Third Territorial Department
(covering the Middle East) Counselor Mykola Leshchenko
participated in Veselovsky's meeting.

CHoD: Political Okay Needed to Do More in Iraq
-------------- -


4. (U) In the meeting with General Kyrychenko, DASD Cagan
thanked Ukraine for its ongoing support to U.S. operations in
Iraq where 34 Ukrainian Armed Forces officers and NCOs are
serving in headquarters staff and training Iraqi security
forces. DASD noted that, in many ways, Ukraine has a head
start on its neighbors in defense reform and interoperability

with NATO forces due to its rotation of service members
through Iraq and other operations.


5. (U) DASD Cagan informed General Kyrychenko that the
Ukrainian personnel in Iraq have an excellent reputation as
trainers of Iraqi forces. U.S. military commanders continue
to praise their police training work. Due to the combined
efforts of the Polish presence with the Iraqi 8th Corps and
the effective Ukrainian police training, the security
situation in Diwaniya had improved substantially from two
months ago. DASD stated she understood by existing
Presidential decree the Ukrainian Armed Forces could increase
their personnel in Iraq up to 50 military personnel. DASD
insisted that increasing the number of Ukrainian personnel to
at least 50 would go a long way in the training of Iraqi
counter-insurgency police forces. She added that the Iraqi
police hold the Ukrainian trainers in such high regard that
embedding Ukrainian trainers with Iraqi Police outside Camp
Echo would allow for direct mentorship and yield positive and
immediate results.


6. (U) DASD Cagan raised the possibility of off-setting
certain pre-deployment training costs associated with
Ukrainian military deployments to Iraq with existing
Coalition Support Funds. She added that if the Ukrainian
military could commit to increased military support to the
police training mission and expand that commitment to an
embedded mobile training team, the U.S. would undertake to
provide airlift, sustainment and necessary equipment
requirements to support the mission.


7. (C) In response, General Kyrychenko thanked the U.S. for
continued support in reform, joint exercises and training
assistance. While acknowledging the importance of
deployments and joint overseas military operations to
Ukrainian military reform, Kyrychenko stressed that Ukraine
was "politically and economically limited" in the nature and
extent of expanding such deployments. He stated that
deployment to Iraq was in fact a good school for the
development and transformation of the Ukrainian military. It
provided useful feedback and a test of sorts to allow Ukraine
to evaluate ongoing reforms. Kyrychenko allowed that the
existing Presidential decree permits up to 50 military

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personnel in Iraq; however he noted that the nature of the
mission in training police is not a normal task assigned to
the Ukrainian Armed Forces and required additional retraining
of Ukrainian instructors. He underscored the readiness of
the Ukrainian Armed Forces to conduct increased deployments
in support of operations in Iraq, if that decision were taken
by political authorities.

DefMin Skeptical About Increasing Numbers
--------------


8. (U) Immediately following the meeting with Kyrychenko,
DASD Cagan met with Minister Hrytsenko. DASD expressed
appreciation for Ukrainian soldiers serving in Iraq. She
told Hrytsenko they have been excellent trainers and have
earned a reputation among Iraqi police as some of the best
trainers they have had. Due to Ukrainian and Polish efforts,
the number of trained Iraqi counter-insurgency police had
increased enormously. Addressing the concern about attacks
against Coalition bases, DASD said the number of attacks
against Camp Echo had gone down to near zero and repeated the
observation of the level of violence in Diwaniya being
substantially decreased. The training of Iraqi police and
other security forces had contributed to the overall security
situation. 8th Iraqi Division and Iraqi police
interoperability had improved. Polish forces working with
the Iraqi Army and Ukrainian soldiers working with
counter-insurgency police had provided very effective synergy.


9. (U) DASD Cagan explained that General Petraeus wants to
move to the next stage of strategy, and he requires
additional trainers to do this. His desire was to move U.S.
forces to areas of high conflict where they are most needed
and to continue training Iraqi security forces in areas where
it is doing the most good. This is where the Ukrainians came
in. He would like to see more Ukrainian soldiers
accomplishing more training in Camp Echo and the surrounding
area. Since the Ukrainians have moved away from border
training in Wasit Province to Camp Echo, they were no longer
training border guard troops. They would do the most good by
training more Iraqi counter-insurgency police and security
forces.


10. (C) Minister Hrytsenko stressed that in accordance with
the Presidential Decree, Ministry of Interior (MoI) should be
covering ten personnel positions and State Border Guard
Service (SBGS) of Ukraine should be covering ten personnel
positions from the total of 50 allowed. They have not done
so to date due to what he called "bureaucratic laziness."
MoI and SBGS claim they were not trained for this type of
mission and had not completed the necessary staff work to
initiate preparation or deployment. Hrytsenko claimed the
Interior Troops of the MoI were perfectly competent to
fulfill the mission as they are a trained military force.
Hrytsenko continued to insist that MoI and SBGS had to
realize the intent of the Presidential Decree by fulfilling
their agreement.


11. (C) In response to further questioning on Ukraine's
ability to raise the number of deployed personnel to the
number allowed by the Presidential Decree (up to 50
personnel),Hrytsenko claimed the Ukrainian Armed Forces had
a limited number of qualified personnel to meet the
requirements of serving in Iraq. Specifically, he expressed
concern about language requirements for additional Ukrainian
trainers in Iraq. In expressing his reluctance to increase
the numbers of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, he cited the
difficulty in finding volunteers, saying wives and mothers do
not wish to see their men deploying to Iraq which they view
as being a dangerous place. According to Hrytsenko, the law
dictates that deploying personnel must be volunteers for the
deployment. (Note: The ChoD, however, had contradicted this
at the earlier meeting and observed there were three
volunteers for every one position in Iraq. End note.)


12. (C) Comment: During further discussion, Hrytsenko
appeared to gain an understanding that Iraqi police forces
were not being trained for traditional civic police roles,
but rather to operate in coordination with Iraqi military
security forces to battle the counter insurgency. In the
beginning of the conversation he did not believe armed forces
personnel should be used to train Iraqi police, but later
agreed that it was appropriate due to the counter-insurgency
missions being performed by the Iraqi police. The discussion
ended without a firm commitment by Hrytsenko as he expressed
skepticism that they could increase their current commitment

KYIV 00002566 003 OF 003


given the domestic political situation and the perceived
decreasing security situation in Iraq. Although he listened
intently, Hrytsenko appeared to be quite preoccupied, most
likely due to the continuing negotiations between political
parties as they work to form a government coalition. End
comment.

Ukraine's Issues
--------------


13. (C) Hrytsenko continued the discussion with two issues of
his own. He first asked about U.S. plans concerning Iran (he
was asking if the U.S. was making plans to attack or invade
Iran),to which, DASD said the U.S. has no intention of
attacking or invading Iran, repeating the President's policy
and statements. The second issue was one Hrytsenko has asked
us in the past (see reftels) regarding the planned deployment
of a U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System in Central Europe.
Hrytsenko claims that the U.S. written response to his
questions concerning BMDS sites in Central Europe differed
from the more positive response to his questions provided
orally by MDA heaad General Obering during his visit to KYIV.
Hrytsenko claimed this put Ukraine in a very difficult
position, and if the answers previously provided by the U.S.
represent U.S. policy (ref B),then there will be
geo-political complications for Ukraine. His three basic
questions are: 1) Will the U.S. provide launch warning to all
concerned countries of the region? 2) Will the U.S. allow a
verification regime to be constructed allowing inspection of
the BMD sites? And 3) Will the U.S. allow Russian and
Ukrainian military officers to work on a permanent basis at
the BMD sites? Hrytsenko said that he would raise these
issues with SecDef Gates when he visits KYIV October 21-22.
Department's guidance on these two issues would be
appreciated.

Foreign Ministry Cautious As Well
--------------


14. (C) Veselovsky responded to Cagan's request that Ukraine
consider providing the full Presidential authorization of 50
personnel to the Iraq training mission by noting that the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) felt that its personnel resources
were stretched to the limit. The Defense Ministry leadership
was keenly interested in improving interoperability, but,
with 37,000 Ukrainians having served in international
peacekeeping operations, MOD was encountering difficulty in
rotating overseas deployments in a balanced fashion
throughout the entire uniformed force. Nevertheless, Foreign
Ministry representatives continued to make the case for
Ukraine's PKO participation in discussions with MOD
counterparts.


15. (C) On a political level, President Yushchenko's decision
to withdraw Ukrainian troops from participation in the
Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) had been widely supported;
redeployment of combat troops would be difficult. (At this
point, Cagan noted that this was not what she was
requesting.) Veselovsky said MFA hoped to convince the
Ministry of Interior to contribute the personnel envisioned
in the Presidential Decree, but would also continue to engage
with MOD on the question. Cagan responded that the police
training mission was not civil police training, but
counterinsurgency training, at which the Ukrainian military
had demonstrated that it excelled. She cautioned that the
U.S. would be cautious about the deployment of MOI forces,
with an unproven track record, and observed that, above all,
the military prefers to know, and be able to trust, the
forces on its right and left on the battle front and that
they be interoperable. Veselovsky said Ukraine's Interior
Troops differed from the police in other European countries,
resembling a militia more, and that the MOI had already
proven its capability during PKO operations in Kosovo.


16. (U) DASD Cagan has cleared this cable.


17. (U) Visit Embassy KYIV's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor