UKRAINE: COALITION SCENARIOS IN A CLOSE RACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KYIV 002401 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: COALITION SCENARIOS IN A CLOSE RACE REF: KYIV 2247 KYIV 00002401 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. With reliable polling suggesting that no one party will win an outright majority on its own in the September 30 elections, a coalition will have to be formed either based on an orange variant, a broad coalition that in some way joins the Party of Regions and Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense (OU-PSD),or a return to a Regions-Communists coalition. Most likely, the decision will fall to either Regions or President Yushchenko and OU-PSD, depending on the voting results. If the two orange blocs, OU-PSD and BYuT, win a majority (226 seats),it will be OU-PSD's decision whether to form an orange coalition or to move to a broad coalition with Regions. If the orange teams are not successful, Regions will have the option to collaborate again with the Communists (CPU) or form a broad coalition with OU-PSD. Should a fifth party make it into the Rada -- with the Lytvyn bloc being the most likely to do so -- that party may hold the "golden share", putting it in a position to determine what the coalition looks like, in the absence of a Regions-OU-PSD coalition. A major calculation now in the thinking of all three leaders -- Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yanukovych, and opposition leader Tymoshenko -- is the 2009 presidential elections and how various coalition permutations will benefit them or harm their opponents. To some degree, according to many political insiders, this has become the most important consideration, with less concern given to the functioning of the Rada and the governing of the country for the next eighteen months. End summary and comment. Current Polling Shows Neck and Neck Race -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Polls announced in the last week by two reliable firms -- Democratic Initiatives (DIF) and Razumkov Center -- and a poll commissioned by IFES for USAID all show the totals for Regions and CPU on the one hand and for the orange side on the other as very close, with still a significant number of undecideds, making the final outcome hard to predict. Given the close race, even a small amount of fraud has the potential to dramatically alter the results (reftel). The IFES poll indicated that of likely voters, Regions would receive 32.4 percent, BYuT 20.9 percent, OU 10.6 percent, CPU 3.3 percent, and Lytvyn 2.3 percent. However, there were 15.9 percent still undecided, but likely to vote, and IFES analysts believed that Tymoshenko may benefit from these voters and that Lytvyn may slip across the three-percent threshold. DIF reported that Regions was polling at 29.9 percent, BYuT at 20.3 percent, OU-PSD at 9.4 percent, and 2.1 percent for CPU, with 9.4 percent still undecided. Razumkov reported support as: Regions 33.9 percent, BYuT 23.5 percent, OU-PSD 13.1 percent, CPU 5 percent, Lytvyn 3 percent, and 9.3 undecided. Choice Lies with Regions: Current vs. Broad Coalition -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) If the orange opposition does not win 226 seats and just the four main parties make it into the Rada (Regions, OU-PSD, BYuT and the Communists),as polls currently suggest, then the decision on with whom to unite lies primarily with Regions. This is likely to produce a debate within Regions among the Akhmetov wing, Yanukovych/Klyuyev, and the Azarov wing over whether a coalition with OU-PSD or the Communists would be more preferable. We believe that Regions' first overture would be to OU-PSD, but would include the demand that Yanukovych be named Prime Minister again, as the head of the party that got the most votes. Because Yushchenko and OU-PSD would have fewer options, this demand would be seen as more reasonable. And on the Regions' side of the house, although some whisper that Akhmetov would like to jettison Yanukovych as part of the deal to get to a broad coalition, most including leading journalist Yuliya Mostova and industrialist Viktor Pinchuk have told us that Yanukovych is simply too popular with Regions' voters to not get the PM job again this time around. ¶4. (C) If Regions are smart, they will use the threat of a Communist alliance and the argument that Ukraine needs unity to persuade Yushchenko to accept a broad coalition. Regions may even offer OU-PSD a number of key ministries and the speakership to sweeten the bitter pill of the renomination of Yanukovych. In this scenario, there is likely to be a split in OU-PSD, as Lutsenko told the Ambassador on September 10, with some of the bloc voting with the opposition. Yushchenko may be able to use his personal sway with Lutsenko and Kyrylenko to convince them not to vote against the Yanukovych government's confirmation, but he probably will not succeed KYIV 00002401 002.2 OF 004 in getting them to participate in the Cabinet or to vote with the coalition, except on a case-by-case basis. Number 3 on the Regions list Inna Bohoslovska told us that "we know Yushchenko will agree to coalition talks only if we have an undisputed victory," meaning that Regions wanted to win by enough of a margin to push the President into negotiations. ¶5. (C) If Regions becomes frustrated with Yushchenko's lack of commitment or indecisiveness -- as they did in 2006 -- Regions could in the end return to the Communists as an alternative, although they may be more reluctant to do so this time than in 2006. To begin with, the Socialists would no longer be in the coalition as a buffer between Regions and the Communists, so the latter's hostile anti-Western rhetoric and anti-market reform position could taint Regions more in the international view, a concern for pro-European businessmen in the party. In addition, Regions would be forced to offer more to the Communists this time -- last year the Communists received only one ministry. There is already talk that the Communists would like the speakership. However, some in Regions argue that this is the only realistic alternative. For example, number 5 on the Regions list Nestor Shufrych told the Ambassador September 12 that it was very unlikely that there would be a broad coalition given the fact that the country was about to launch into the 2009 presidential election. In fact, Shufrych said he was put at the top of the Regions party list in order to reassure people that after everything, there would be no broad coalition. Communist leader Symonenko is reportedly telling everyone who will listen that a Regions-Communist Alliance is Moscow's choice and that Regions will listen to the Kremlin. Choice Lies with Yushchenko: Orange, Broad, or Technocratic -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) If the opposition does win 226 seats and just the four main parties make it into the Rada, the decision on coalition formation will lie primarily with the President, in consultation with his bloc. Many of the key leaders in OU-PSD -- Lutsenko, Kyrylenko, Tarasyuk -- have said publicly and privately that they will not be in a coalition with the current majority parties. However, they have been somewhat careful in their phrasing to hint that their objection is to some current ministers, including Yanukovych, rather than to everyone in Regions and their personal loyalty to Yushchenko could allow them to be persuaded by the President. This leaves open the possibility of the so-called "technocratic variant" that has become the subject of speculation in the past two weeks. If Regions sees the likelihood of a coalition between OU-PSD and BYuT, it may be more inclined to offer up a neutral technocratic PM, in exchange for a broad coalition with OU-PSD. Even if orange does not have a majority, Akhmetov may push for a technocratic PM to lock OU-PSD in and avoid the Communists, but this is less likely. ¶7. (C) This technocrat variant would be difficult to accomplish, given the high level of distrust between the two parties and the strong objections from Yanukovych and the pro-Russian wing of Regions, but it is not impossible. One compromise could include giving Yanukovych the speakership, as the head of the largest party in the Rada, in exchange for his agreement to a different PM. Such a new government would probably also see the departure of Azarov. Lutsenko told the Ambassador September 10 that they would want Klyuyev gone as well, but the DPM may have enough ties to key leaders in OU to keep his position intact. PM foreign policy adviser Gryshchenko told the Ambassador September 11 that the technocratic cabinet was the most probable variant, Regions just need to overcome Yanukovych,s opposition. Journalist Mostova told the Ambassador September 18 that she believed that Yanukovych was afraid to lose power, or worse end up in prison, and would agree to be Speaker if necessary to avoid that if his non-Akhmetov backers let him. ¶8. (C) On the other hand, Yanukovych may have enough backing within Regions to fight off a technocratic variant. Oligarch Viktor Pinchuk told the Ambassador September 14 that he believed Yanukovych, who was now more popular than even a year ago, would not agree to a OU-PSD/Regions deal in which he would be replaced by a technocrat PM. Pinchuk believed Yanukovych could convince Regions voters to support NATO, suggesting that some in OU would be okay with Yanukovych as PM. Mostava argued that Yanukovych was simply too popular with his voters to be denied the PM's chair. OU financier Poroshenko also discounted a possible broad coalition with a technocrat PM, saying Regions would not support it because Yanukovych was immensely popular among the party's core voters and integral for Regions' plans for the 2009 presidential election. He argued, however, that he saw no alternative to a broad coalition if the country is to address much needed constitutional and economic reforms; Ukraine KYIV 00002401 003.2 OF 004 needed a coalition of economically liberal, forward learning thinkers that were present in both OU and PR. 9.(C) Given the likelihood that the negotiations described above will take place even if the combined orange forces get the needed 226 seats to form a Rada majority, BYuT will have to work hard to keep OU-PSD interested in a new orange government. Tymoshenko and her lieutenants have been clear that they believe the offer to split the Cabinet slots 50-50 with OU-PSD is a major concession, since they anticipate that they will hold far more seats that OU-PSD in the new Rada. However, their insistence that Tymoshenko be PM is a given and the level of suspicion and distrust in the Presidential Secretariat and OU of Tymoshenko will make it hard for the SIPDIS President to accept the deal. Making it worse could be BYuT's decision to go on the attack against OU-PSD during the campaign in a bid to get 226 seats on its own. (Note. A scenario we deem highly unlikely. End note.) Even Lutsenko expressed unhappiness with her use of black PR against them; we judge his disappointment with his former orange ally as the possible reason that he told us he was now open to the technocratic variant. Golden Share: Lytvyn's Possible Comeback -------------- ¶10. (C) There are three other parties that have a chance to make it across the three-percent threshold -- the Lytvyn bloc is the most likely, but Vitrenko's Progressive Socialists (PSPU) and the Socialist Party (SPU) could also make a run for the Rada. Should any fifth party make it into the Rada, that party is likely to influence the outcome of the coalition, as Moroz did in 2006. In Lytvyn's case, he will have a strong say in whether the coalition is orange, broad, or a new Anti-Crisis coalition. If the Socialists make it in, the chances for the current Anti-Crisis Coalition to be reformed increases significantly. On the other hand, a PSPU victory would greatly increase the likelihood of a broad coalition because Regions is unlikely to want a coalition that includes Vitrenko's radicals. At this point, the polls suggest that neither the Socialists nor PSPU will make it into the new Rada, leaving only Lytvyn's party as a potential deal-maker. ¶11. (C) Lytvyn, who has been accused by both sides of accepting campaign contributions from the other, has noted his preference for entering a coalition with OU-PSD as the lesser of two evils. However, he told us that his main focus was on keeping Tymoshenko out of power, repeatedly describing her as power hungry and a disaster for the country. He implied that he would join any coalition, including with Regions, to block BYuT. Moreover, Lytvyn has financial and political support from proponents of a Regions-OU-PSD coalition. Poroshenko confided that he has acted as an informal consultant to Lytvyn's campaign and has supported polling on Lytvyn's behalf. He argued that Lytvyn's presence in the Rada would create more stability and more motivation for a broad coalition, because he also does not want to see Tymoshenko in power. Moreover, Poroshenko said Lytvyn would not fight hard for a specific position, such as the PM job in a broad coalition. (Note. Lytvyn recently commented publicly that he would seek a top position, such as the speakership or premiership, should he make it into the Rada. End note.) Pinchuk also confirmed that he was "supporting" Lytvyn's efforts, adding that they have been friends for many years. The Presidency Factor -------------- ¶12. (C) Politicians and analysts alike tell us that the 2009 presidential race is now a major factor in calculating possible post-electoral coalitions. Yushchenko, in particular, seems focused on how to win reelection. Some, including Mostova and Lutsenko, suggested he could make Tymoshenko his PM, because doing so would require her to promise not to run in 2009, a deal her foreign policy adviser Nemyria told us she was willing to make. Lutsenko suggested that if Tymoshenko was the PM, she would be forced to implement potentially unpopular reforms, which could set her up for failure and possibly ensure a Yushchenko victory. Finally, others argue that if Yushchenko wants a broad coalition, then he will need to find a way to bring Tymoshenko into the deal. Otherwise, as leader of the opposition to a Yushchenko-Yanukovych alliance, Tymoshenko could end up getting half of the president's electorate and set her up for an easy victory. However, the same calculation might keep Tymoshenko from objecting strenuously to a broad coalition, if she thinks she can gain maximum political advantage on remaining on the outside. ¶13. (C) Similar presidential calculations have made many KYIV 00002401 004.2 OF 004 skeptical that Regions would agree to a coalition without Yanukovych as PM. Poroshenko believed that Regions would not jettison Yanukovych because the party needs a strong candidate for the presidency in 2009 if it is to become a lasting institution in Ukrainian politics. Yanukovych is Regions' figurehead, the glue that keeps the party together. He is immensely popular among the party's core voters. And the party simply does not have an alternative leading figure. Lytvyn said that he believed a broad coalition could be formed if Yanukovych and Regions promised to back Yushchenko to receive Regions support for 2009 -- since both are focused on keeping Tymoshenko out of power. ¶14. (C) Presidential Secretariat Head Baloha suggested to the Ambassador on September 18 that OU-PSD would promote the idea that whichever major party was not in the coalition should receive the speakership, in effect tying all three parties into the government in some form in order to unite the country and stop the bickering. Such a move would also prevent either Tymoshenko or Yanukovych from completely distancing themselves from the others in 2009 and would allow the presidential team to keep them more in check. On the flip side, this very point will make the scenario a potentially hard sell for both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. ¶15. (C) In Mostova,s view, when Yushchenko agreed to push for pre-term elections, his main goal was to reshape the formation of the coalition and to prevent his rivals -- Yanukovych and Tymoshenko -- from getting ahead, presumably on the road to the presidency. She thought that Tymoshenko would do everything possible to be PM, but her bottom-line goal, either as PM or not, was to be President in 2009. If Tymoshenko was denied the PM's chair, she could still win the presidency as head of the opposition, if OU and Regions formed a broad coalition, or even if OU and BYuT formed a government without her. In this case, she would have to campaign as the people's champion, thwarted by powerful political interests. However, according to Mostova, this scenario was unlikely since Tymoshenko would be without the necessary administrative resources to conduct a successful presidential campaign, making her more likely to at least engage in all potential coalition discussions rather than taking a stand against any option but orange. ¶16. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor