UKRAINE: TARASYUK RESIGNS AS FOREIGN MINISTER,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000223 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV RU UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TARASYUK RESIGNS AS FOREIGN MINISTER, BLASTING OPPONENTS ON THE WAY OUT REF: KYIV 186 Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Borys Tarasyuk ended two months of uncertainty and political confrontation over his lame-duck tenure as Ukraine's Foreign Minister by offering his resignation to President Yushchenko January 30, after a district court deferred a decision on his legal challenge to the Rada's December 1 dismissal vote. Tarasyuk told Ambassador January 31 that he planned to devote more time to political party efforts (Tarasyuk heads the small Rukh party, part of the Our Ukraine bloc) but would continue to be involved in foreign policy work. In press appearances announcing and explaining his resignation late January 30, Tarasyuk stressed the importance and professionalism of the institution of the Foreign Ministry, as well as Presidential prerogative in foreign policy, blasted the government ministers he blamed for withholding financing from the MFA and damaging Ukraine's national interests (DPM Azarov, DPM Tabachnyk, Minister of the Cabinet Tolstoukhov),and accused Tabachnyk, Transport Minister Rudkovskiy, and the Communist Party of representing Russian rather than Ukrainian national interests. ¶2. (SBU) Comment: Tarasyuk's official departure -- the ruling coalition led by PM Yanukovych considered his tenure to have ended December 1, when the Rada (parliament) voted to dismiss him -- leaves Defense Minister Hrytsenko as the sole remaining "Orange" minister of the eight temporarily retained in the Cabinet named by Yanukovych in early August, though Hrytsenko belongs to no political party. Speculation immediately shifted to whom Yushchenko might nominate to replace Tarasyuk, with conventional wisdom focused on current Presidential Secretariat deputy head Oleksandr Chaliy, who served as deputy Foreign Minister during Tarasyuk's first tenure from 1997-2000. End Summary and Comment. Tarasyuk finally bows out of the Ministry -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Despite a vigorous two-month legal campaign to defend his right to remain Foreign Minister as long as Yushchenko supported him, Tarasyuk finally ended rear-guard efforts to stay in office January 30 after the Shevchenko District Court, citing a court brief filed by a representative of the Cabinet of Ministers, deferred a decision on Tarasyuk's case to countermand the Rada's December 1 dismissal decision until February 13. After discussing the situation with Yushchenko, Tarasyuk offered his resignation and Yushchenko accepted it, Tarasyuk told a press conference afterwards. As a politician, diplomat, and citizen, he understood there was no sense in pushing his effort further, even though he remained convinced the Constitutional Court would eventually affirm the President's constitutional prerogative both to name and to dismiss the foreign minister. ¶4. (C) Defense Minister Hrytsenko, now the sole remaining "Orange" minister in the cabinet, had told Ambassador January 29 that Tarasyuk's departure might be pegged to the January 30 court session, which had been expected to rule in Tarasyuk's favor, and by extension support presidential prerogatives. Such a decision would have allowed Tarasyuk and the President's team to claim he was not being forced out but had chosen to leave in order to end a dispute that was damaging to the nation's interests. ¶5. (SBU) In the end, Tarasyuk, sounding neither broken nor resentful, chose to leave rather than continue a nasty spat which had seen the Cabinet of Ministers physically prevent him from attending two cabinet meetings in December and led DPM/Finance Minister Azarov to cut off funding for the MFA for the first 20 days of January. Tarasyuk told Channel 5 in an evening interview that his decision to leave was based on his concern for the professionals at the MFA and Ukrainian national interests; he laid the blame for damage inflicted to both at the feet of Azarov, Tabachnyk, and Tolstoukhov. He cited the defense of the constitutional prerogatives of the President -- who had been elected directly by the people, receiving a majority of votes -- to guide foreign policy as a second major factor in both his efforts to stay and his ultimate decision, in consultation with Yushchenko, to resign. Who might be the next FM? Focus on Chaliy -------------- ¶6. (SBU) At his press conference, Tarasyuk stated that Ukraine's next foreign minister would continue the foreign policy course of Yushchenko and supported by a majority of Ukrainians - a implied reference to western orientation KYIV 00000223 002 OF 003 chosen in the 2004 Presidential elections. ¶7. (C) Speculation immediately focused on whom Yushchenko might nominate as the next FM, with Oleksandr Chaliy the leading contender. Chaliy joined the Presidential Secretariat in September based on an informal understanding SIPDIS that, sooner or later, he would get a shot at becoming Foreign Minister, a Chaliy associate told us at the time. Since serving as Tarasyuk's deputy Foreign Minister in charge of European Integration from 1997-2000, Chaliy had worked as an executive in the Kyiv offices of the Industrial Union of the Donbas (IUD),the second large Donetsk-based conglomerate to Regions' MP Rinat Akhmetov's Systems Capital Management. IUD had quietly supported Yushchenko in the 2004 Presidential election, but not enough to rile Regions; Chaliy's name was included in a list of four possible FMs Regions' MP Leonid Kozhara told us in August that Regions had passed to Yushchenko for consideration, and Regions representatives told the media January 30 after Tarasyuk's resignation that Chaliy remained acceptable to them. From 2004-06, Chaliy publicly advocated Ukraine consider neutrality, but both IUD and Presidential Secretariat associates have suggested to us that Chaliy in his heart remained a supporter of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic choice. ¶8. (SBU) Other names in press play included: former FM and current PM foreign policy adviser Konstantijn Hryshchenko, whom Chornovil admitted had little chance; First Deputy FM Volodymyr Ohryshko, who was confirmed Acting Foreign Minister January 31; OU MP and ex National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) Secretary Petro Poroshenko, rejected out of hand by Regions commentators; and deputy Presidential Secretariat head Arseniy Yatsenyuk. SIPDIS Tarasyuk's future... -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In his comments to Ambassador, Tarasyuk said he was looking forward to devoting more time to political efforts as head of the Rukh party but would remain active on foreign policy (note: Tarasyuk is the director of the Institute of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation). Elaborating on Channel 5, Tarasyuk described the rapprochement between Rukh and the Ukrainian People's Party, led by Yuri Kostenko, which had split acrimoniously in the mid-1990s. It was important for all patriotic, democratic forces to unite efforts in opposition to the Regions-led coalition, rather than bickering amongst themselves, he stressed. During his press conference, Tarasyuk said he respected Yuri Lutsenko but would not join his People's Self-Defense project. ...and legacy: western focused, irritant to Russia -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Tarasyuk's legacy in his second tenure as FM will likely be seen in his efforts to bring the attitudes of the Orange Revolution into previously cautious Ukrainian foreign policy, as well as a return to a more vigorous advocacy of a Euro-Atlantic future and defense of Ukrainian national interests vis-a-vis Russia that had marked his previous tenure (1997-2000). Internally, Tarasyuk was seen as an oppressive micromanager by much of the ministry staff, few of whom will be sorry to see him depart, even if they agreed with the policies he promoted. ¶11. (C) Shortly after assuming office in February 2005, Tarasyuk overruled his subordinates by changing Ukraine's traditional abstention votes on Cuban and Belarusian human rights resolutions to be in line with U.S. and EU positions. In 2005 Ukraine actively sought to associate itself with all EU foreign policy positions/votes in international fora; helped restart the Transnistria negotiations with U.S. and EU participation under the "Yushchenko plan"; launched the Community for Democratic Choice initiative as a regional democracy promotion vehicle; invigorated the GUAM grouping as a western-leaning counterbalance to Russia in CIS gatherings; and significantly improved nonproliferation cooperation and dialogue with the U.S. Tarasyuk also pushed hard on the NATO front, advocating a move to a Membership Action Plan (MAP) as soon as possible to lay the groundwork for a possible membership invitation at the 2008 NATO summit. ¶12. (SBU) Tarasyuk's domestic and external critics, particularly in Moscow, faulted him for his handling of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Tarasyuk defended his record on Channel 5, noting that Ukraine had succeeded in placing the long-buried issue of a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) inventory on the bilateral agenda and stressing that there were no quick solutions to the unresolved issues of border demarcation, lighthouse control, or BSF rental terms. Interestingly, Tarasyuk expressed understanding of Russian KYIV 00000223 003 OF 003 hard line negotiating positions, explaining that the first obligation of any government official is to defend his nation's interests, and Kyiv should expect no less from Russian officials. What was inexplicable and unacceptable for him was that a part of Ukraine's political elite continued to prioritize meeting Moscow's demands at the expense of Ukrainian national interests. Asked to name names, Tarasyuk hesitated only slightly before answering: the Communist Party; Minister of Transportation Rudkovskiy; and DPM Tabachnyk. ¶13. (C) Note: Socialist Rudkovskiy recently has been involved in a controversy over invitations to Turkmen opposition leaders to meet in Kyiv after Niyazov's death in what some suggest was a Moscow-inspired provocation (reftel); others claimed in July 2006 that Rudkovsky had done Moscow's bidding in convincing Socialist leader Moroz to defect to a Regions'-led coalition, terms of which he negotiated along with Moroz' lieutenant Yaroslav Mendus. Tabachnyk in late 2006 co-signed an op-ed in a Russian newspaper with the Russian bureau chief in Kyiv that was notable for its strident anti-American, pro-Russian argumentation. In early August 2006, shortly after the formation of the Yanukovych cabinet, First Deputy Defense Minister Polyakov told us Tabachnyk was in the core pro-Russian contingent within the Yanukovych government, along with Energy Minister Boiko and PM adviser Orel. ¶14. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor