UKRAINE: TARASYUK RESIGNS AS FOREIGN MINISTER,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000223

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV RU UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TARASYUK RESIGNS AS FOREIGN MINISTER,
BLASTING OPPONENTS ON THE WAY OUT

REF: KYIV 186

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (SBU) Summary. Borys Tarasyuk ended two months of
uncertainty and political confrontation over his lame-duck
tenure as Ukraine's Foreign Minister by offering his
resignation to President Yushchenko January 30, after a
district court deferred a decision on his legal challenge to
the Rada's December 1 dismissal vote. Tarasyuk told
Ambassador January 31 that he planned to devote more time to
political party efforts (Tarasyuk heads the small Rukh party,
part of the Our Ukraine bloc) but would continue to be
involved in foreign policy work. In press appearances
announcing and explaining his resignation late January 30,
Tarasyuk stressed the importance and professionalism of the
institution of the Foreign Ministry, as well as Presidential
prerogative in foreign policy, blasted the government
ministers he blamed for withholding financing from the MFA
and damaging Ukraine's national interests (DPM Azarov, DPM
Tabachnyk, Minister of the Cabinet Tolstoukhov),and accused
Tabachnyk, Transport Minister Rudkovskiy, and the Communist
Party of representing Russian rather than Ukrainian national
interests.


2. (SBU) Comment: Tarasyuk's official departure -- the
ruling coalition led by PM Yanukovych considered his tenure
to have ended December 1, when the Rada (parliament) voted to
dismiss him -- leaves Defense Minister Hrytsenko as the sole
remaining "Orange" minister of the eight temporarily retained
in the Cabinet named by Yanukovych in early August, though
Hrytsenko belongs to no political party. Speculation
immediately shifted to whom Yushchenko might nominate to
replace Tarasyuk, with conventional wisdom focused on current
Presidential Secretariat deputy head Oleksandr Chaliy, who
served as deputy Foreign Minister during Tarasyuk's first
tenure from 1997-2000. End Summary and Comment.

Tarasyuk finally bows out of the Ministry
--------------


3. (SBU) Despite a vigorous two-month legal campaign to
defend his right to remain Foreign Minister as long as
Yushchenko supported him, Tarasyuk finally ended rear-guard
efforts to stay in office January 30 after the Shevchenko
District Court, citing a court brief filed by a
representative of the Cabinet of Ministers, deferred a
decision on Tarasyuk's case to countermand the Rada's
December 1 dismissal decision until February 13. After
discussing the situation with Yushchenko, Tarasyuk offered
his resignation and Yushchenko accepted it, Tarasyuk told a
press conference afterwards. As a politician, diplomat, and
citizen, he understood there was no sense in pushing his
effort further, even though he remained convinced the
Constitutional Court would eventually affirm the President's
constitutional prerogative both to name and to dismiss the
foreign minister.


4. (C) Defense Minister Hrytsenko, now the sole remaining
"Orange" minister in the cabinet, had told Ambassador January
29 that Tarasyuk's departure might be pegged to the January
30 court session, which had been expected to rule in
Tarasyuk's favor, and by extension support presidential
prerogatives. Such a decision would have allowed Tarasyuk
and the President's team to claim he was not being forced out
but had chosen to leave in order to end a dispute that was
damaging to the nation's interests.


5. (SBU) In the end, Tarasyuk, sounding neither broken nor
resentful, chose to leave rather than continue a nasty spat
which had seen the Cabinet of Ministers physically prevent
him from attending two cabinet meetings in December and led
DPM/Finance Minister Azarov to cut off funding for the MFA
for the first 20 days of January. Tarasyuk told Channel 5 in
an evening interview that his decision to leave was based on
his concern for the professionals at the MFA and Ukrainian
national interests; he laid the blame for damage inflicted to
both at the feet of Azarov, Tabachnyk, and Tolstoukhov. He
cited the defense of the constitutional prerogatives of the
President -- who had been elected directly by the people,
receiving a majority of votes -- to guide foreign policy as a
second major factor in both his efforts to stay and his
ultimate decision, in consultation with Yushchenko, to resign.

Who might be the next FM? Focus on Chaliy
--------------


6. (SBU) At his press conference, Tarasyuk stated that
Ukraine's next foreign minister would continue the foreign
policy course of Yushchenko and supported by a majority of
Ukrainians - a implied reference to western orientation

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chosen in the 2004 Presidential elections.


7. (C) Speculation immediately focused on whom Yushchenko
might nominate as the next FM, with Oleksandr Chaliy the
leading contender. Chaliy joined the Presidential
Secretariat in September based on an informal understanding

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that, sooner or later, he would get a shot at becoming
Foreign Minister, a Chaliy associate told us at the time.
Since serving as Tarasyuk's deputy Foreign Minister in charge
of European Integration from 1997-2000, Chaliy had worked as
an executive in the Kyiv offices of the Industrial Union of
the Donbas (IUD),the second large Donetsk-based conglomerate
to Regions' MP Rinat Akhmetov's Systems Capital Management.
IUD had quietly supported Yushchenko in the 2004 Presidential
election, but not enough to rile Regions; Chaliy's name was
included in a list of four possible FMs Regions' MP Leonid
Kozhara told us in August that Regions had passed to
Yushchenko for consideration, and Regions representatives
told the media January 30 after Tarasyuk's resignation that
Chaliy remained acceptable to them. From 2004-06, Chaliy
publicly advocated Ukraine consider neutrality, but both IUD
and Presidential Secretariat associates have suggested to us
that Chaliy in his heart remained a supporter of Ukraine's
Euro-Atlantic choice.


8. (SBU) Other names in press play included: former FM and
current PM foreign policy adviser Konstantijn Hryshchenko,
whom Chornovil admitted had little chance; First Deputy FM
Volodymyr Ohryshko, who was confirmed Acting Foreign Minister
January 31; OU MP and ex National Security and Defense
Council (NSDC) Secretary Petro Poroshenko, rejected out of
hand by Regions commentators; and deputy Presidential
Secretariat head Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

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Tarasyuk's future...
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9. (SBU) In his comments to Ambassador, Tarasyuk said he was
looking forward to devoting more time to political efforts as
head of the Rukh party but would remain active on foreign
policy (note: Tarasyuk is the director of the Institute of
Euro-Atlantic Cooperation). Elaborating on Channel 5,
Tarasyuk described the rapprochement between Rukh and the
Ukrainian People's Party, led by Yuri Kostenko, which had
split acrimoniously in the mid-1990s. It was important for
all patriotic, democratic forces to unite efforts in
opposition to the Regions-led coalition, rather than
bickering amongst themselves, he stressed. During his press
conference, Tarasyuk said he respected Yuri Lutsenko but
would not join his People's Self-Defense project.

...and legacy: western focused, irritant to Russia
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Tarasyuk's legacy in his second tenure as FM will
likely be seen in his efforts to bring the attitudes of the
Orange Revolution into previously cautious Ukrainian foreign
policy, as well as a return to a more vigorous advocacy of a
Euro-Atlantic future and defense of Ukrainian national
interests vis-a-vis Russia that had marked his previous
tenure (1997-2000). Internally, Tarasyuk was seen as an
oppressive micromanager by much of the ministry staff, few of
whom will be sorry to see him depart, even if they agreed
with the policies he promoted.


11. (C) Shortly after assuming office in February 2005,
Tarasyuk overruled his subordinates by changing Ukraine's
traditional abstention votes on Cuban and Belarusian human
rights resolutions to be in line with U.S. and EU positions.
In 2005 Ukraine actively sought to associate itself with all
EU foreign policy positions/votes in international fora;
helped restart the Transnistria negotiations with U.S. and EU
participation under the "Yushchenko plan"; launched the
Community for Democratic Choice initiative as a regional
democracy promotion vehicle; invigorated the GUAM grouping as
a western-leaning counterbalance to Russia in CIS gatherings;
and significantly improved nonproliferation cooperation and
dialogue with the U.S. Tarasyuk also pushed hard on the NATO
front, advocating a move to a Membership Action Plan (MAP) as
soon as possible to lay the groundwork for a possible
membership invitation at the 2008 NATO summit.


12. (SBU) Tarasyuk's domestic and external critics,
particularly in Moscow, faulted him for his handling of
Ukrainian-Russian relations. Tarasyuk defended his record on
Channel 5, noting that Ukraine had succeeded in placing the
long-buried issue of a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF)
inventory on the bilateral agenda and stressing that there
were no quick solutions to the unresolved issues of border
demarcation, lighthouse control, or BSF rental terms.
Interestingly, Tarasyuk expressed understanding of Russian

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hard line negotiating positions, explaining that the first
obligation of any government official is to defend his
nation's interests, and Kyiv should expect no less from
Russian officials. What was inexplicable and unacceptable
for him was that a part of Ukraine's political elite
continued to prioritize meeting Moscow's demands at the
expense of Ukrainian national interests. Asked to name
names, Tarasyuk hesitated only slightly before answering: the
Communist Party; Minister of Transportation Rudkovskiy; and
DPM Tabachnyk.


13. (C) Note: Socialist Rudkovskiy recently has been involved
in a controversy over invitations to Turkmen opposition
leaders to meet in Kyiv after Niyazov's death in what some
suggest was a Moscow-inspired provocation (reftel); others
claimed in July 2006 that Rudkovsky had done Moscow's bidding
in convincing Socialist leader Moroz to defect to a
Regions'-led coalition, terms of which he negotiated along
with Moroz' lieutenant Yaroslav Mendus. Tabachnyk in late
2006 co-signed an op-ed in a Russian newspaper with the
Russian bureau chief in Kyiv that was notable for its
strident anti-American, pro-Russian argumentation. In early
August 2006, shortly after the formation of the Yanukovych
cabinet, First Deputy Defense Minister Polyakov told us
Tabachnyk was in the core pro-Russian contingent within the
Yanukovych government, along with Energy Minister Boiko and
PM adviser Orel.


14. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor