UKRAINE: TEN YEARS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002001

SIPDIS


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TEN YEARS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE
NATO-UKRAINE CHARTER, INFORMATION CAMPAIGN STILL SPUTTERS

REF: 06 KIEV 3570

Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Ten years after the signing of the
NATO-Ukraine Charter and two and a half years after the
Orange Revolution, many policy makers and experts in Ukraine
and in the West hoped that Ukraine would jump on a fast track
to NATO membership. However, today public support for NATO
membership hovers in the 20-25% range, lower than it did in
2002, at the fifth anniversary. In stark contrast, the
percentage of support for NATO membership among policy elites
-- academics/think tankers, journalists, government and
military officials -- continues to rise, to 80% in November
2006, the last systemic polling of experts. The low level of
public support can be explained by several factors: the
lingering legacy of Soviet stereotypes of NATO as an
aggressive military bloc; the deleterious impact of two hotly
contested election cycles in 2004 and 2006 in which current
PM Yanukovych and his Party of Regions abandoned their
previous insider support of NATO membership for a public
anti-NATO line designed to lock in support in Ukraine's east
and south, where suspicions of NATO are strongest; and an
anemic and poorly organized information campaign effort to
explain what the new NATO is and why it is in Ukraine's
national interest to join. NGOs, universities, and some
provincial governments have become more active in education
efforts, but overall coordination of an effective strategy,
better messaging targeting specific population groups, and
adequate financing remain lacking.


2. (C) Comment: The ten year anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine
relationship has come and gone without much notice; a missed
opportunity that fell victim to the April/May political
crisis. With slow progress on the institutional reforms
needed for Ukraine to meet Euro-Atlantic standards, most
notably wider security sector reform, the hopes of 2005-06
for a Membership Action Plan and an invitation to membership
within several years have disappeared. Given the
disorganized and to date ineffective information effort, the
low level of public support would have made early membership
difficult in any event. Recent discussions at NATO show the
onset of Ukraine fatigue among some allies, particularly the
French, backed by Spain and Greece. Even though the path
forward will be longer and more winding than we and the
Ukrainians hoped/expected two years ago, Ukrainian inclusion
in the Euro-Atlantic community remains an important element
of completing the long-term vision of a Europe whole, free,
and at peace -- a real consideration as we prepare for the
next NATO Summit in Bucharest. The U.S. also has a vested
interest in the success of the information campaign because
in the public mind, NATO and U.S. foreign policy are
intertwined. End Summary and Comment.

Key Issues of Public Support and Government Inaction
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) In the 1990s, there was general consensus among
Ukraine's political and policy elite that its future should
be European, and ultimately include membership in the
European Union and NATO, although both seemed distant goals.
Their aspirations were enshrined in law as the basis for
Ukrainian foreign policy in 2003 under PM Yanukovych, with
unanimous support from Party of Regions MPs. Through 2002,
public opinion was roughly split into thirds: in favor,
against, and unsure about NATO membership. The contentious
election cycles of 2004 and 2006, however, broke the
political elite consensus, as Yanukovych/Regions adopted an
anti-NATO stance as part of an effort to lock in core voters
in the South and East of Ukraine, and drove public support
down to the 10-20 percent range. Embassy comment: polls
depend widely on the precise wording of the question posed.
End comment.


4. (SBU) With Yanukovych/Regions' return to government in
August 2006 on the heels of a Universal political declaration
which reaffirmed NATO membership as a strategic goal (albeit
to be put to public referendum after all necessary
preparations were complete),the dynamic changed. Regions
adopted a more positive, though skeptical stance on
membership, stressing practical cooperation and the need for
an information campaign but as PM Yanukovych's key September
14 speech at NATO underscored (reftel),not a request for a
MAP as Yushchenko had expected. Following Yanukovych's
positive words on an information campaign, close Yanukovych
ally Eduard Prutnik, the new State and Radio TV Chair,
pledged to the Political Committee on Thanksgiving that the
Yanukovych government would set aside 10 million hryvnia ($2
million) in the 2007 budget.


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5. (C) The situation on the ground back in KYIV did not back
up Yanukovych and Prutnik's positive words. The Regions
drafted 2007 budget, in the hands of DPM/Finance Minister
Azarov, slashed the information budget for 2007 to 5 million
hryvnia, of which 4 million hryvnia was earmarked for EU
information efforts and only 1 million for NATO. The
Government also removed the authority for administering this
budget from two pro-NATO institutions - the MFA and the
Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration, headed by Volodymyr
Horbulin - and handed it to the Education Ministry under a
NATO-skeptic Socialist Minister Nikolayenko answerable to a
NATO-hostile DPM, Dmytro Tabachnyk.


6. C) In December, Prutnik's Committee spent 4 million
hyrvnia ($800,000),of the 2006 budget his predecessor had
refused to spend, on a single seminar which had nothing to do
with security issues and at which NATO was not mentioned
once. In March 2007, Nikolayenko's Education Ministry rushed
through a nontransparent tender process with little notice
for the 3.416 ml hryvnia ($680,000) at its disposal; it
remains unclear as to who won or what happened. It was
particularly strange that the Government could not find ways
to support NATO information campaigns in the country while
grassroots organizations with very small budgets were finding
ways to get the word out. For example, the Association of
School Principals, on its own and in cooperation with a
Polish NGO, initiated an innovative nationwide competition
for school kids to write essays on the meaning of NATO for
Ukrainian security.


7. (SBU) At present, the GOU continues to talk about the
information campaign, prepares and publishes plans of
activities, but financial constraints remain. Extensive
documents promise coverage of joint NATO-Ukraine operations,
appearances on talk shows and press conferences by state
officials to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
membership, training for journalists and contests for best
NATO-related coverage, military and NGO exchanges with NATO
countries, and a strong focus on the younger generation.
However, there is little emphasis on the southern and eastern
parts of the country, where the information is needed most,
and the programs that are implemented, do not necessarily
reach their intended audiences (such as the "NATO: Friend or
Alien?" documentary that aired at 1AM).

NGO Efforts Well-Meaning, but Disorganized
--------------


8. (SBU) By early 2007, civil society activists on NATO
issues had concluded that, for now, they would have to press
forward on information efforts without notable government
support. Most activists also had reached consensus that the
time of seminars in KYIV for policy experts had passed
(preaching to the converted),and that efforts needed to be
refocused on reforging political elite consensus and on a
more effective outreach campaign outside KYIV to the general
populace. In the absence of a central government coordinator
and financing, however, the effort lacks a defined "center of
gravity." The well-intentioned Ukraine-NATO Civic League, a
loose affiliation of more than 50 NGOs nationwide, has
little/no resources and largely lacks any strategic
campaign/marketing planning capacity, outside of Democratic
Initiatives' Ilko Kucheriv (one of the country's leading
political sociologists).


9. (C) The first activist to try to provide such a focus for
efforts was Presidential adviser Oleh Rybachuk, DPM for
Euro-Atlantic integration issues in the first post-Orange
Revolution government and Yushchenko's chief-of-staff during
the second. Rybachuk aimed to engage Ukrainian oligarchs of
all political colors to finance a combined European and
Euro-Atlantic future campaign, featuring notable pop stars
and policy heavyweights and media coverage to get the word
out. Rybachuk launched his effort at a March 2, 2007 seminar
most notable for the clear consensus on the European future
and negotiating with the EU as opposed to pursuing the all
but dead Single Economic Space project. There was little
discussion of the differences of opinion on timing and
tactics for NATO, particularly the wisdom of entering a MAP
or holding a referendum. When the political crisis began
several weeks later, Rybachuk all but disappeared from the
scene with no follow-up, in what domestic and international
friends critically characterized as "typical Oleh."


10. (C) The latest pretender is pop star/Our Ukraine MP
Ruslana (Lyzhychko),who has engaged US policymakers in
Washington and in KYIV with increasing regularity in 2007 on
the NATO issue, and who attended a specialized seminar at the
Marshall Center in Garmisch in May (along with young BYuT MP
Andriy Shevchenko) to try to bolster her ability to speak

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more credibly on NATO related issues. Although she recently
decided to give up her Rada seat to pursue her music career,
she intends to remain active in Ukraine's political scene.
Ruslana wants to form a working group of primarily Ukrainian
activists/experts, but drawing on international experience,
with a heavier focus on sociologists and marketing
professionals to design a campaign that uses tested messages
on segments of the population, resamples opinion, and
readjusts messages and marketing techniques - essentially
treating NATO as a brand in the Ukrainian marketplace. This
approach tracks the more sustained and professional efforts
in the Baltics and central Europe in trying to engage a
skeptical population. Even if an effective working group can
be formed, an effective information campaign would still face
the challenge of financing, as well as successfully
convincing a more complex and difficult market audience than
existed in any previous aspirant country.

Marking Ten Years of NATO-Ukraine
--------------


11. (C) NATO membership advocates in the GOU were
disappointed that the ten year anniversary of the
NATO-Ukraine partnership was by and large overshadowed by the
April/May political crisis and months of political stalemate.
After succeeding in delivering a President and Prime
Minister endorsed invitation to the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) for a July visit to KYIV, the pro-Euro integration
cadre was crestfallen when the NAC balked for fear of
contributing to the turmoil. NATO Secretary General de Hoop
Scheffer also kept a distance, but did participate in an
anniversary video teleconference that included GOU officials
and national media.


12. (SBU) An event that did attract media attention was a
KYIV - Washington video teleconference co-sponsored by the
Atlantic Council and the Democratic Initiatives Fund, with
Embassy support. The DVC included Ambassador Taylor, First
Deputy Foreign Minister Ohryzko, MP Ruslana, and Slovak
Ambassador Rusnak in KYIV and EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State David Kramer and Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S.
Shamshur in DC. Three messages emerged from the
well-attended discussion: first, NATO and Ukraine continue to
work well together in practical terms; second, statistics
show that public support for Ukraine's NATO membership
aspirations increases as people receive more information; and
third, the Ukrainian government must make the case to its
citizens. On the last point, U.S. officials agreed that NATO
Allies can provide support, but the effort can only succeed
if the GOU owns the information campaign and makes a tangible
effort.


13. (U) Visit Embassy KYIV's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Pettit