UKRAINE: TURKMEN OPPOSITION VISA SCANDAL REALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000186

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM EPET TX UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TURKMEN OPPOSITION VISA SCANDAL REALLY
ABOUT INTERNAL UKRAINIAN POLITICS

REF: USOSCE-EMBASSY KYIV JANUARY 25 EMAIL

Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary. The scandal that has erupted over Socialist
Transportation Minister Mykola Rudkovskiy pressuring
Ukrainian ambassadors to issue visas to Turkmen opposition
figures to travel to KYIV in late December in the wake of
former Turkmen President Niyazov's death is, at its heart,
the latest battle in the struggle by the President's team to
protect what remains of its eroding power and to carve out
its role in foreign affairs rather than an issue of democracy
versus gas supplies. It also features some internal
coalition dynamics, with Rudkovsky a target of Regions'
pressure and his ministerial seat, overseeing plum resources
and contracts, in their sights. On January 20, respected
newspaper Dzerkalo Tyzhnya broke the story that Prime
Minister Yanukovych had ordered an internal investigation
into Rudkovskiy for inviting the opposition figures to KYIV
without notifying the government. The Presidential
Secretariat increased attention on the story by calling

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publicly on January 23 for Rudkovskiy to be fired for his
disregard for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
presidential role in foreign policy.


2. (C) Comment: Although the Presidential Secretariat couched
its criticism of Rudkovskiy in terms of his having threatened
Ukrainian-Turkemistani relations, its specific focus on the
violations of protocol, the publication of a December 28
letter from Yushchenko to Yanukovych calling for an
investigation into the issue, and the lack of criticism
directed at Our Ukraine MP Mykola Katerynchuk also involved
in arranging the opposition meetings in KYIV all suggest that
this controversy has little to do with the Turkmen
opposition's presence in KYIV. Yanukovych initially may have
sought a way of removing an irritating Socialist and may have
been concerned that Rudkovskiy's actions could have
potentially damaged the GOU's relationship with
Turkmenistan's leaders at a time when Niyazov's commitments
may be re-examined--the opposition figures reportedly offered
lower gas prices in exchange for support. However, once
Yushchenko took an interest in Rudkovskiy's removal,
Yanukovych chose to defend his minister. End summary and
comment.

The Minister, the Ambassador, and the Visas
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3. (C) There were signs in early January that Rudkovskiy, an
abrasive lieutenant of Socialist Party leader Moroz who
helped broker the Socialist "betrayal" of Our Ukraine and the
Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) in forging a new coalition with
Regions and the Communists in July, had become a target of
Regions' efforts to oust him. On January 11, Volodymyr
Makeyenko, a deputy faction leader for Regions, told us that
Regions was disgusted with the amount of power the Socialists
had within the coalition, given its small size. Regions
thought the Socialists held too many ministerial posts.
Makeyenko said they were specifically targeting Rudkovskiy as
the first to go and that corruption-related issues would be
the pretext. (Note: This was the mechanism used in late 2006
attempts to unseat Interior Minister Lutsenko and Defense
Minister Hrytsenko).


4. (SBU) Dzerkalo Tyzhnya (DT) broke a story on January 20
about Rudkovskiy's role in procuring last-minute visas for
Turkmen oppositionists Hudayberdi Orazow and Nurmuhammet
Hanamow to travel to Ukraine in late December 2006 to
announce their opposition to the interim government in
Ashgabat and their unified candidacy for upcoming
presidential elections. According to DT and a January 23
press conference by Deputy Head of the Presidential
Secretariat Oleksandr Chaliy, Rudkovskiy called the Ukrainian

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Ambassadors to Austria, Bulgaria, and Norway on December 22
in the middle of the night to demand visas for the opposition
leaders be issued before opening of business the next
morning. The ambassadors reportedly told Rudkovskiy that
because the Turkmen had refugee status, they needed an
official invitation before they could issues visas, which had
to be coordinated through the MFA. Rudkovskiy, according to
Chaliy, promised that everything had been approved, but it
had not been. Visas were issued in Vienna, Austria. (Note:
after the scandal broke, Rudkovskiy told the press that he
had called the Ambassadors "as a private person, not as a
Minister."). In addition, DT reported that Ashgabat had
accused the two opposition figures of embezzlement and issued
a warrant for them through Interpol, suggesting that even if
the charges were unfounded and political in nature, KYIV
would have been in an awkward position without having advance
notice to prepare for the visit.

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5. (SBU) Note: the Turkmen opposition meetings took place
December 25 to moderate publicity, with Orazow and Hanamow
holding a press conference afterwards. Interestingly, the
Ukrainian politician named publicly as having helped organize
the meetings was OU MP Mykola Katerynchuk; Rudkovskiy's
involvement was initially not mentioned.

Pressure from the PM...
--------------


6. (C) Dzerkalo Tyzhnya claimed that Yanukovych, incensed
about the supposedly awkward position in which Rudkovskiy had
put Ukraine, ordered the government to launch an internal
investigation into why Rudkovskiy was involved in issuing
visas to Turkmen opposition leaders. At a January 10 Cabinet
meeting, Yanukovych reprimanded the Transportation Minister.
(Comment: Yanukovych may have been concerned about preserving
good relations with whomever becomes the next leader of
Turkmenistan, or this may have been the beginning of the
campaign to unseat Rudkovskiy which Makeyenko described to
us. End commment). An MFA colleague suggested another
theory, also mentioned in the DT story, that Rudkovskiy was
acting on the basis of instructions from Moscow -- that
bringing Turkmen opposition figures here would complicate or
harm Ukrainian-Turkmen relations and the existing gas deal.


7. (SBU) Note: According to the January 2006
RUE-Ukraine-Russia gas agreement, Turkmenistan supplies 41
bcms, or 55% percent, of Ukraine's yearly natural gas
consumption, at a lower price than Russian-sourced gas ($100
vice $230/tcm). In practice, Turkmen gas likely travels no
further than Russia, with all Ukrainian-bound gas provided
from Russian wells. Ukraine's paper gas "mix" allows Gazprom
to save face in making its "market pricing" arguments to
other European countries, while monopolist gas supplier
RosUkrEnergo supplies below-market priced gas to Ukraine.
While in KYIV, the Turkmen oppositionists supposedly offered
to strike a new, cheaper gas deal with Ukraine if KYIV
supported them, which could have been embarrassing for the
GOU. Rudkovskiy owns a short section of a domestic gas
distribution pipeline and is believed to have links to energy
trading companies in Ukraine, a likely explanation of his
interest in Turkmenistan gas.

...and the President
--------------


8. (C) The Presidential team took the controversy further on
January 23, while Yushchenko was in Switzerland for medical
treatment, when Chaliy held a press conference to announce
that Yushchenko had requested the internal investigation of
Rudkovskiy on December 28 and that he was now asking
Yanukovych to dismiss Rudkovskiy. Chaliy initially framed
the issue as Rudkovskiy having endangered Ukrainian-Turkmen
relations, which could jeopardize gas supplies. However,
Chaliy subsequently laid out a second, probably more decisive
factor: Rudkovskiy had circumvented the Foreign Ministry and
Presidential Secretariat in the foreign policy process by
issuing orders to an Ambassador. On January 24, Rudkovskiy
told the press that Presidential Secretariat Chief Baloha had
asked the SBU to open its own investigation, although an SBU
spokesman was noncommittal on its role.

What's really involved? Internal political maneuvering
-------------- --------------


9. (C) As soon as Yushchenko jumped on the "dump Rudkovskiy"
bandwagon, however, Yanukovych jumped off and began defending
the Minister. The PM even denied that he had ordered an
investigation, although on January 25 Deputy Prime Minister
Tabachnyk publicly acknowledged that the investigation was
ongoing and might be concluded by early February.


10. (C) Comment: It is striking that Yanukovych should drop
Regions' plans to remove Rudkovskiy when it became apparent
that to do so would be to accommodate Yushchenko and
presidential prerogative as well. While a quick read of
Presidential Secretariat statements may make it seem that
Yushchenko was criticizing someone for facilitating the
meeting of Turkmen opposition politicians trying to fight a
rigged transfer of power, the attack on Rudkovskiy and the
dismissal of Ambassador to Austria Yelchenko (below) has
little to do with the Turkmen angle. In the December 28
letter Yushchenko sent Yanukovych, which the Presidential
Secretariat made public in mid-January, Yushchenko cited the

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concerns that Ashgabat might have about opposition meetings,
but seemingly acknowledged the concerns without endorsing
them. Our Ukraine MP Katerynchuk, who was publicly
identified in December as the coordinator of the Turkmen

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opposition meeting, has not received any subsequent criticism
regarding his role in the meeting. That suggests that any
genuine concern about potential fall-out in the bilateral
relationship with Ashgabat is secondary at best.


11. (C) Comment continued: Instead, the heart of the
controversy is about the Presidential Secretariat making an
example of a minister who directly tasked Ukrainian diplomats
in other countries, without going through the MFA or the
Presidential team which, in theory, controls foreign policy.
As the Yanukovych government continues to encroach on
Presidential responsibility, Yushchenko's team is trying to
find ways to assert presidential prerogatives. A secondary
element, at least initially, may have been the
intra-coalition struggle between Regions and the Socialists,
and Regions' interests in cutting the Socialists down to size
after having given them many plum positions to defect in July

2006.

Diplomatic footnote: a split decision?
--------------


12. (C) Yushchenko also signed a decree December 28
dismissing Yelchenko as Ukrainian Ambassador to Austria for
authorizing the visas without proper permission, although
this only became known after DT's Rudkovskiy story broke.
Chaliy said that the President's main goal was to make sure
that all officials understand that they must follow orders
and protocol and not to act outside these boundaries. Chaliy
added that although the decree dismissing Yelchenko had been
signed, it would not be promulgated until Yelchenko
"completes his diplomatic assignment in Austria." The
Ukrainian mission to the OSCE told USOSCE January 25 that
Yelchenko would remain as Ukrainian Ambassador to OSCE and
that a new Ambassador to Austria would be appointed (ref A).
Our MFA counterparts concurred, noting that Yelchenko would
remain as Ukraine's Ambassador to both the OSCE and
UN-related agencies in Vienna. There was no information yet
about a new Ukrainian bilateral ambassador to Austria.


13. (U) Visit Embassy KYIV's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor