UKRAINE: KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE: DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000133 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PBTS OPDC UNMIK UN YI MD RS UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE: DEMARCHE DELIVERED REF: A. STATE 5652 ¶B. KYIV 4413 Classified By: Acting DCM Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary/comment: In view of Ukrainian officials' previous concerns about the impact of Kosovo independence on "frozen conflicts" in Moldova and elsewhere, acting DCM drew on ref A background to brief DFM Veselovsky January 18 on the Kosovo settlement process. While underscoring that Ukraine's views did not support the Russian position, Veselovsky urged the U.S. to move slowly and on the basis of a consensus by parties concerned on the way forward. Veselovsky's comments represented an incremental change in the Ukrainian position. While he obliquely noted the impact that Kosovo settlement would have on "frozen conflicts" and urged a "go-slow" approach, Veselovsky did not appear to dispute that Kosovo would eventually have to become independent. End summary/comment. ¶2. (C) Drawing on ref A background, acting DCM and poloff notetaker met January 18 with Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy Veselovsky and MFA First Secretary Ihor Kulish to brief them on U.S. expectations for developments in Kosovo after the January 21 Serbian parliamentary elections. Noting that EUR A/S Fried had said as much during the November 16 political directors meeting in Kyiv (ref B),A/DCM stressed that the U.S. saw no alternative to independence for Kosovo. UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari was developing a comprehensive Kosovo settlement package, on which he would consult with both Belgrade and Pristina. By March, he would present the package to the UN Security Council, paving the way for a new UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) to replace UNSCR 1244. (On the last point, Veselovsky expressed skepticism that a new UNSCR would be possible in the face of Russian opposition to Kosovo independence.) A/DCM emphasized that a united U.S. and European position was essential to the success of the timeline. ¶3. (C) Veselovsky thanked A/DCM and said the information would be helpful as the Ukrainian government reviewed its position. He perhaps put more weight on the importance of the Serbian elections than did the U.S., and would not want to predetermine actions before the event. He then drew our attention to a January 16 Moldovan news agency Infotag report of Romanian President Traian Basescu's visit to Chisinau the same day. Basescu's comments were important from two aspects. First, he made a connection between Kosovo and Transnistria and, second, he said Moldova's territorial integrity should be preserved, as it should be in Kosovo. Veselovsky said he understood that other EU countries shared the Romanian view and that the EU might not be so willing to proceed according to the timeline that A/DCM had briefed. ¶4. (U) Note: In the report, Basescu and Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin agreed that Kosovo settlement would affect, even if indirectly, prospects for resolving the Transnistrian conflict. Basescu is also reported as saying Transnistrian settlement should be based on three requirements: Moldova's territorial integrity, inviolability of Moldova's borders, and no granting of collective rights to ethnic minorities. Basescu felt that ethnic minorities should be granted rights, but not rights that would lead to the creation of other states. End note. ¶5. (C) Veselovsky said he did not want Ukraine to be lumped with Russia regarding Kosovo. Russia was interested in preserving its position in the Balkans and undercutting the European Union and the trans-Atlantic alliance. Ukraine, on the other hand, wished to support the EU and Moldova. His remarks were directed toward reaching common goals, but doing it in way that was better and more certain. Living as he did in Europe, he understood the sensitive implications of changing national boundaries and adjusting borders to match ethnic communities. The principle that changes would be made only upon the mutual agreement of the parties concerned was an important one that had to be preserved. He urged the U.S. to consider some preliminary stage for Kosovo, perhaps some sort of protectorate under EU auspices, that would allow Serbia to adjust to its changed relationship to Kosovo. This approach should be developed as a back-up, in the event that the situation in the Balkans should turn violent and in case the UN Security Council needed to review its Kosovo policy. He conceded that the international community could not go back, but he cautioned against going forward too quickly. ¶6. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor