UKRAINE:SCENESETTER FOR COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KYIV 001300

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR GENERAL MCKIERNAN FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE:SCENESETTER FOR COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY
EUROPE, GENERAL DAVID MCKIERNAN,S JUNE 5-7 VISIT TO KYIV

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 b,d.


1. (SBU) General MacKiernan: We look forward to welcoming you
to KYIV. The past couple of months have been marked by
political turmoil as the President and Prime Minister search
for ways to reach agreement on a
date for pre-term parliamentary elections and a way forward
on resolving contradictions between existing law and a
newly-amended constitution that came into force in 2006.
During your KYIV meetings, I recommend that you raise the
following themes with your counterparts:

-- Good Partners: Ukraine has been a good partner and we
hope it will remain so in the future. We appreciate
Ukraine's ongoing and past contributions to coalition
operations and Ukraine's support for U.S. policies/operations
in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. We look forward to
strengthening our relationship.

-- Mil-Mil Cooperation. We support your efforts to modernize
and reform; working together in future exercises,
multi-lateral training, and NCO development efforts
contribute to NATO interoperability as well as helping
prepare for future coalition efforts. I offer you continuing
opportunities for multinational training at our JMRC. This
may be particularly helpful to you in your efforts to develop
the Yavoriv Peacekeeping Training Center.

-- Military Development. We are looking forward to seeing you
again at the annual Conference of European Armies; our theme
this year will be Land Forces Transformation. We look
forward to the attendance of two of your Senior NCO leaders
or trainers at our Conference of European NCOs this June.
Both conferences offer important forums for discussion as we
transform to develop flexible and deployable forces for
coalition operations.

-- As appropriate, you may wish to reiterate our position on
the current political crisis. Our approach is that the
problem is Ukraine's to solve, but we urge all parties to
take responsibility for their supporters and not permit
any violence. We support a solution to the current crisis
that is consistent with Ukraine's recent democratic past.

President and PM Continue to Search for Agreement
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2. (SBU) Ukraine may be heading into early parliamentary
elections sometime this year as the continuing political
power struggle between President Yushchenko on the one hand
and PM Yanukovych's Cabinet and the Rada (parliament) on the
other has led to deadlock within the government. In the two
years and a half since the Orange Revolution and Viktor
Yushchenko became President, Ukraine has been feeling its way
forward on democratic development and Euro-Atlantic
integration. Internecine squabbling in the Orange camp
slowed reform in key areas during Yushchenko's first 18
months in office. In March 2006, Ukraine held fully free and
fair Rada elections for the first time since independence;
after months of political wrangling, a new coalition emerged
in August to form a government led by PM Yanukovych,
Yushchenko's 2004 opponent.


3. (SBU) Poorly-crafted new constitutional amendments,
introduced in January 2006, created ambiguities in the
division of authority between the President and PM, leading
to the current political power struggle. This conflict came
to a head in early April when Yushchenko issued a decree
disbanding the Rada and calling for preterm parliamentary
elections. The Rada and Prime Minister ignored the decree
and appealed to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on its
constitutionality--the Court has not yet issued an opinion.
Both sides initially turned their supporters onto the
streets, but the President and PM reached a general agreement
on May 4 to hold early parliamentary elections and implement
certain legislative changes that President Yushchenko wanted,
although the date for a new vote is still a point of
contention. Security, military, and law enforcement
structures have been careful to remain professional and
outside this fray. Our policy is not to prescribe an outcome
to the Ukrainians, but we have urged all sides to refrain
from violence and to seek a solution consistent with
Ukraine's democratic norms.


4. (SBU) Despite all the political maneuvering, Yanukovych
and Yushchenko share a strategic goal of Ukraine joining the
EU and NATO, although they differ on timing and tactics. For
example, Yanukovych in a key speech at NATO last September 14

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made clear Ukraine supported deepened cooperation with NATO
and an information campaign about NATO but would not ask for
a Membership Action Plan (MAP),as desired by Yushchenko and
Defense Minister Hrytsenko. While defense reform has
continued forward progress, wider security sector reform has
been slowed by the political wrangling and the return of a
number of reform-averse figures to the Ministry of Interior
in particular.

Other Issues of Interest: NATO and Russia
--------------


5. (SBU) NATO has become the most contentious issue in
Ukraine's security/foreign affairs sphere; public opinion,
based on outdated Soviet-era stereotypes and fanned by two
electoral cycles, remains largely negative, even though the
overwhelming majority of Ukraine's policy and defense experts
support NATO membership as soon as possible. Within days of
taking office, new FM Yatsenyuk visited Brussels (March 26)
to meet with the NATO Secretary General as well as key EU
officials; after his April 16 visit to Moscow, Yatsenyuk just
concluded a good April 30-May 1 visit to Washington. PM
Yanukovych has set the current government policy as
supportive of cooperation with NATO, but not actively
pursuing membership via a MAP or pursuing an information
campaign that might help improve popular attitudes toward
NATO.


6. (SBU) Relations with Russia, always complex, feature
energy issues as the current dominant factor, not to
Ukraine's advantage; the status of the Russian Black Sea
Fleet and its lease on facilities in Crimea through 2017 is
another key element in the bilateral relationship. The
Yanukovych Government managed to conclude a positive price
deal for the 2007 winter season soon after coming to power,
although it is not clear if the price came at the cost of
other national interests. While Russia clearly hopes to take
control of Ukrainian energy infrastructure, the Ukrainian
government has held the line against Russian acquisition of
gas pipelines.

Defense Situation: Continued Reform, Difficult Environment
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7. (SBU) Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, one of two
ministers (along with FM Yatsenyuk) nominated by Yushchenko,
continues to push his aggressive defense reform program,
amidst renewed efforts by some in the majority coalition to
remove him for his outspoken loyalty to President
Yushchenko's agenda. Unfortunately, lack of adequate
funding, continued political uncertainty, and some
misdirected policies have increased the level of frustration
among senior military officers who are ordered to implement
the programs. Major programs are moving forward, but not
without problems and delays. The Armed Forces are creating
professional NCOs, but many are choosing to leave military
service because of dissatisfaction with pay and housing.
Lack of combat training funds continues to take a toll on
equipment, readiness, and morale. The uncertainty about the
future composition of the Ministry of Defense and a possible
change in speed or direction it may take with regard to
Euro-Atlantic integration is causing many senior officers to
hunker down in the trenches until the dust settles.
Hrytsenko continues to be outspoken regarding NATO membership
and the lack of an adequate military budget, but has been
able to work with the Yanukovych government.


8. (SBU) The Ukrainian General Staff and the Ground Forces
have consistently reiterated their intent to continue
modernization and reform along a path toward NATO MAP
readiness independent of on-going political uncertainty.
They have maintained that their objective is to meet NATO
standards in anticipation that eventual political
circumstances will permit receipt of a MAP.


9. (SBU) Despite cancellation of the land portion of SEA
BREEZE (SB) 2006 exercise, the U.S. and Ukraine conducted two
highly successful training exercises in 2006 (RAPID TRIDENT
and ROUGH AND READY). In addition, lessons gleaned from Ex
SB06 have led to much improved interagency planning and
coordination among Ukrainian ministries concerning logistics
and force protection. Although the RAPID TRIDENT FTX was
cancelled due to deployment of the supporting USAREUR unit,
the Ukrainian Ground Forces remain eager to execute the CPX
portion as scheduled.


10. (C) Under Ukrainian law, the participation in exercises
by foreign units on Ukrainian territory requires

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parliamentary approval each year. With President
Yushchenko's April 2 dissolution of the Parliament, the
status of the 2007 foreign exercise law is currently
uncertain. The Rada majority, which continued to work
despite the presidential decree, approved the 2007 exercise
authorization legislation April 6, but Yushchenko refuses to
recognize any actions taken by the Rada after April 2. The
Ukrainian constitution has provisions that will permit the
Rada to promulgate a law, such as the exercise legislation,
even if the president refuses to sign it, but the Rada has so
far chosen not to use those provisions, instead preferring to
hold the bill frozen in an effort to force the President to
sign the law. Interim guidance from Commander EUCOM, based
on our input and EUCOM J5 concurrence, is to continue
planning for all exercises pending greater clarity in the
political situation. COM EUCOM decided on a June 8 decision
date for Ex SB07 FTX; without exercise legislation by June 8,
the FTX portion of Ex SB07 will be canceled.


11. (SBU) During the on-going political turmoil surrounding
the Rada dissolution and attendant street protests, the
General Staff and Ground Forces have remained studiously
quiet. No uniformed figure has made any public comments
concerning divisive issues. Only Defense Minister Hrytsenko
has commented on the situation. He has reiterated the
constitutional role of President Yushchenko as Commander in
Chief and "Guarantor of the Constitution," while making clear
the armed forces will only act within the framework of the
law.

Current Operations outside of Ukraine
--------------


12. (SBU) Ukraine currently has contingents and personnel
serving in various operations in nine countries.


13. (SBU) Iraq. Ukraine maintains 43 personnel in Iraq
currently; it is the only non-NATO country to have trainers
involved in NATO's Iraq training mission. Forty personnel
serve on headquarters staffs and in training of Iraqi forces.
Three personnel serve in the NATO training mission training
Iraqi security personnel. (Note. One of the three was
severely wounded by an IED and has returned to Ukraine. End
note.)


14. (SBU) Kosovo. Ukraine recently completed a rotation in
which, for the first time, a formed and intact unit deployed
as opposed to a unit which was created from personnel from
several different units. Ukraine has a contingent of 182
personnel in Kosovo serving in the UKRPOLBAT and headquarters
staffs. Two personnel serve on U.S. staffs.


15. (SBU) UN Peacekeeping Mission, Liberia. Ukraine
maintains a helicopter unit in Liberia with a contingent of
301 personnel.


16. (SBU) Lebanon. The United Nations ordered Ukrainian
Forces to depart Lebanon in April 2006 after a July 2005 UN
investigation of alleged corruption activities by the
leadership of their engineering battalion serving in UNIFIL.
This engineering battalion went to Lebanon under the Kuchma
regime (prior to the Orange Revolution). Since this
incident, Minister Hrytsenko has implemented several measures
to prevent and guard against unlawful activities during
deployed operations. Ukraine offered military troops for
Lebanon to assist in their 2006 crisis but that offer was
rejected by the UN. Currently, Ukraine is coordinating with
Italy and Belgium to send medical personnel to Lebanon with
Italian/Belgian forces.


17. (SBU) Afghanistan. Ukraine provided airlift to transport
the Southeast European Brigade Headquarters to Afghanistan in
February 2006. Ukraine has sent one medical doctor with the
Lithuanian PRT and may send up to ten personnel. Due to its
history in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghanistan war, in
which Ukrainians bore a disproportionate brunt of Soviet
casualties, Ukraine will not entertain sending combat troops.

Summary of major U.S. assistance to defense reform
-------------- --------------


18. (U) NCO Professionalization Project. A U.S. project team
has been on the ground for over a year and a half. The
project which is managed by the Office of Defense
Cooperation, is being re-scoped following an October 2006
program management review and being extended through FY08.
While initial academic courses have been written and
implemented in the service NCO schools, implementation of the

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necessary policy, regulatory, and cultural reforms necessary
to create proper conditions for a professional force have
lagged and will be the focus of the next efforts.


19. (U) Defense Planning case. Non-resident defense advisory
seminars have been on-going since 2004 with a focus on
institutional and doctrinal reform and development of a
western-modeled Ukrainian Defense planning system. Focus
areas include creation of Joint Mission Essential Task Lists,
a modern defense acquisition system, an improved logistics
system, a joint operational command structure, and joint
staff officer training. Minister Hrytsenko recently issued a
directive to make better use of the MOD's foreign defense
advisors and established a joint consultative committee.


20. (U) Global Peace Operations Initiative. The U.S. has
apportioned $2.2M in GPOI funds to assist Ukraine in
enhancing the capability of its regional peacekeeping
training center near Lviv in Western Ukraine.


21. (U) NATO interoperable communications equipment for Army
and Navy Joint Rapid Reaction Units. The Office of Defense
Cooperation is developing cases for providing interoperable
tactical communications equipment for select units of the
Ukrainian Naval and Land Forces Rapid Reaction Units. Site
surveys have been completed and DSCA is currently preparing
letters of acceptance to move the cases into implementation.


22. (U) Professional Military Education Reform. The U.S.
National Defense University is assisting Ukraine's National
Defense Academy in restructuring its senior officer course
from a two-year to a one year curriculum.



23. (U) Visit Embassy KYIV's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor