U.S.-GOK DISCUSS SECURITY MEASURES NECESSARY FOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000455 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NEA/ARP, S/WCI, S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2017 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PHUM KU TERRORISM SUBJECT: U.S.-GOK DISCUSS SECURITY MEASURES NECESSARY FOR GUANTANAMO DETAINEE TRANSFER REF: A. KUWAIT 319 ¶B. 06 KUWAIT 4582 ¶C. 06 KUWAIT 4429 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4(b) and (d ). ¶1. (S) Summary. A visiting USG interagency delegation discussed concerns about possible transfer of the four remaining Kuwaiti detainees at Guantanamo with GOK officials on March 24. USG delegation told the GOK officials that the remaining detainees were significantly more dangerous than those previously released to Kuwait. The delegation stressed that the need for heightened post-trial GOK measures aimed at mitigating the likelihood that the detainees would "return to the fight" was the key USG concern rather than heightened focus on successful GOK prosecutions. GOK officials detailed the monitoring and mitigation actions taken against the previously released detainees as some options for dealing with additional transferees. The GOK stressed the importance of family interaction in rehabilitating detainees already transferred, claiming that none had engaged in extremist activities since their return to Kuwait. GOK officials described assistance it provided to former detainees and also GOK disincentives aimed at the detainees and their families for detainees' failure to meet expected standards of behavior. The USG delegation stressed the importance of heightened and robust measures above what was already in place against detainees already transferred to Kuwait. The USG delegation invited the GOK to send a delegation to Guantanamo to assess how best to structure the heightened mitigation measures necessary. The meeting concluded with the expectation that the GOK would attempt to formulate the heightened measures it would take toward the remaining four detainees and communicate the measures to the USG. End summary. ¶2. (S) On March 24, U.S. delegation members Christopher Camponovo (NSC),Alan Liotta (DoD),Andrew Morrison (DoS), and Marisa Porges (DoD) met with GOK's Khaled Al-Maqamis, Director of Coordination and Follow-up, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Sultan Abu Jarwa Assistant Undersecretary, Ministry of Justice;, and three Kuwait State Security officials: Abdullah Al-Kandari, Counterterrorism Department Director; Abdullah Al-Rashid, Counterterrorism Department Deputy Director; and Hamdi Al-Abdullah Counterterrorism Department Deputy Director, and discussed measures needed to allow the possible future transfer of the remaining four Kuwaiti nationals detained at Guantanamo Naval Base. ¶3. (S) Camponovo said at the outset of the meeting that the remaining four Kuwaiti detainees at Guantanamo were substantially more dangerous than previously released Kuwaiti detainees and had not yet been approved for transfer. Camponovo said that the U.S. was concerned given that all previous detainees had been released following acquittals by Kuwaiti courts on terrorism charges. (Note: All eight detainees returned to Kuwait thus far have been prosecuted and found not guilty. The GOK is currently appealing to Kuwait's highest court the not guilty verdicts of five of the detainees. The GOK officials also reported that one of the previously transferred detainees, Nasser Al-Mutairi, had recently died. End note.) Prosecution Option -------------- ¶4. (S) Camponovo said that prosecutions were only part of the equation, noting that in other countries only a few detainees transferred to their home countries had been successfully prosecuted. For this reason, the U.S. is particularly interested in what measures, beyond prosecution, the GOK could take to mitigate the threat that these detainees would "return to the fight." Liotta concurred with this, noting that in many countries counter-terrorism laws had not proved effective in obtaining convictions against known terrorists. ¶5. (S) The MOJ's Jarwa said that GOK actions must adhere to Kuwaiti law. He said that 95% of the evidence used in the prosecutions of detainees already tried by the GOK had been statements provided by the USG from questioning at Guantanamo. He said the defendants refused to admit the truth of the USG-supplied statements in the Kuwait trials. He said that the defense attorneys cited reports of detainee abuse at Guantanamo and that this seriously undermined the credibility of the statements. Jarwa underscored this point by stating that the evidence supplied to the GOK to date KUWAIT 00000455 002 OF 003 lacked credibility. ¶6. (S) Morrison asked if the courts had considered sending officials to Guantanamo to take depositions from potential witnesses. Jarwa was not sure if this would be possible under Kuwaiti law or logistically practical. Liotta asked if there were ways to maximize the pre-trial and trial periods by bringing multiple charges against each defendant. Abu Jarwa replied that multiple charges would be combined into a single case if they were considered related. If considered unrelated they might be tried in separate trials. ¶7. (S) Al-Maqamis said that the GOK had a program aimed at all prisoners in which imams "well-schooled in the Quran" sought to spread the understanding that Islam does not support extremism. He also described the GOK's broader efforts to educate religious leaders and the general public on principles of moderation. He said there was no program specifically directed at Guantanamo returnees. Post-trial Options -------------- ¶8. (S) KSS Director Al-Kandari said that post-trial release mitigation efforts on detainees/returnees already released consisted of: - Monitoring their travel abroad through arrangements with their counterparts in neighboring countries. (He said that thus far none of the eight detainees already returned had traveled outside Kuwait.) - Daily monitoring of their activities in Kuwait including who they met, where they went; - All information collected was entered into a database; - Families sign oaths that they will monitor the actions of the returnee; - Returnees also sign oaths that they will abide by the laws of Kuwait; ¶9. (S) MFA Al-Maqamis stressed that the key to mitigation/rehabilitation was the families of the returnees. He said previously the families were unaware of the returnees' extremist activities but that now they were very aware and concerned particularly about avoiding further punishment for their family members. He said that family interaction played a key role in rehabilitating these individuals noting that none of the former Guantanamo detainees had engaged in any extremist activities since returning to Kuwait. He claimed that they were "changed persons" who were now "rational and calm." Morrison asked how the KSS would characterize the families of the remaining four detainees at Guantanamo: i.e. whether they would be likely to support rehabilitation efforts. Al-Maqamis said the four families had grown close over the years but did not provide any details on their possible willingness to help wean the returnees from the extremist Islamist cause. ¶10. (S) Al-Maqamis said that the GOK provided assistance to the returnees to help the reintegration process including finding jobs. Al-Maqamis said the level of compliance by the returnee and the families determined the level of support provided by the GOK and that inadequate compliance resulted in less assistance. In more serious instances, the GOK would make it difficult for the returnee and his family to find jobs, obtain necessary official documents, including passports, and to receive other forms of government services. But he did not provide examples of cases where this had been effective in the past. In response to Camponovo,s questions, the KSS officials noted that they were limited in the sort of monitoring they could carry out; for example, a court order is required to search bank records. Porges asked how restrictive the GOK could be in denying passports. He replied that the Ministry could defer issuance for up to five years in cases of lost passports. However, individuals could challenge delays in passport issuance; this has not yet become an issue, as none of the returnees have applied for passports. ¶11. (S) In response to a question from Maqamis, Liotta said that the assurances given by the GOK in the agreement to transfer previous detainees would not change. He stressed that the implementation measures in support of those assurances would need to be substantially more robust to permit the transfer of the remaining four Kuwaiti detainees. He said that the USG would provide further information to the GOK on the remaining detainees but reiterated that prosecution was only part of what should be a comprehensive KUWAIT 00000455 003 OF 003 approach to preventing the detainees from returning to terrorism. ¶12. (S) In response to Camponovo's inquiry, the GOK officials said that it might be possible to craft an agreement between the detainees and the GOK that conditioned their return on acceptance of heightened requirements for the detainees after their return to Kuwait such as regular meetings with GOK security officials, restrictions on movements/activities, regular meetings with "moderation counselors." Camponovo said that a similar agreement had been reached between the United Kingdom and one of its nationals detained at Guantanamo. The GOK requested a copy of that agreement. ¶13. (S) Liotta invited the GOK to send a team of GOK officials to Guantanamo to visit the detainees for the purpose of evaluating how the GOK mitigation plan might be strengthened. The team could include officials from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Religious Affairs and others. He noted that this visit was not a precondition to transfer of the detainees but that it would give the GOK an opportunity to evaluate the detainees individually and determine an appropriate response in each case. ¶14. (S) At the conclusion of the meeting, the US delegation agreed to provide additional releasable information on the detainees. The GOK will then provide a response to the invitation to visit Guantanamo and a comprehensive proposal of measures they would plan to take with regard to the remaining detainees. ¶15. (S/NF) DELEGATION COMMENTS: While the meetings increased GOK,s awareness of the importance of post-transfer security efforts, it was clear that the GOK has limited, if any, capability to effectively implement additional security measures. Prosecution is not a viable option, so ultimately any assurances will rest on the credibility of the organization offering them. For example, the KSS was quite straightforward in their limited ability to monitor and keep track of returned detainees once released from GOK control, despite a willingness to do so based on the threat the detainee presents. The delegation was convinced that although the MOJ, MOI, and KSS officials understood the basis for our heightened security requirements, follow-up will likely be required at more senior levels to ensure Minister-level support for these efforts. ¶16. This cable was cleared by the interagency delegation. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * Tueller