CRITICAL ENERGY ASSESSMENT TEAM VISITS KUWAIT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000419 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, DS/ATA, S/CT, EB/ESC/IEC; LONDON FOR TSOU DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FOR IE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2015 TAGS: ASEC BEXP ECON ENRG EPET KCIP KU PTER SUBJECT: CRITICAL ENERGY ASSESSMENT TEAM VISITS KUWAIT, MARCH 13-22 REF: A. 06 KUWAIT 4581 ¶B. KUWAIT 177 Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: A multi-agency USG Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) team visited Kuwait March 13-22 to assess security vulnerabilities in Kuwait's energy infrastructure and make recommendations on improvements (see para 8 for a complete list of the U.S. delegation). The team found significant security vulnerabilities from both land and sea approaches to the refineries. Essential controls at a number of critical points in and around the three refinery complexes were lacking, rendering key installations open to terrorist attack. Throughout four days of meetings and site visits, the team found the security orientation at the refineries to be limited to safety concerns such as fire and industrial accidents -- which have occurred in recent years -- but with inadequate focus on threats from terrorists. Kuwait's refineries and associated electrical power lines need immediate and basic security upgrades. Over the long-term, the GOK needs to create a mechanism -- the team recommended a joint operations center staffed by representatives of relevant security agencies at the national and refinery level -- to ensure better coordination and communication between security agencies. The Kuwaitis, who were engaged and cooperative throughout the visit (the U.S. delegation was able to see anything it requested and to photograph extensively within the facilities),were sobered by the recommendations and appeared eager (at the technical level) to make both short and long-term enhancements to their energy infrastructure, but orientating the Kuwaitis toward a greater focus on terrorism and reduced stove-piping is a very long-term project that will require commitment from the highest levels of the GOK. We will follow up (before receiving the delegation's final report in approximately ONE month) with senior petroleum and security officials to make sure that the delegation's call for immediate improvements is heard beyond the working level and that the Kuwaitis are clear about the delegation's recommendation to make security changes now. The mid-April visit to Kuwait of U.S. Deputy Energy Secretary Sell should also provide momentum. End Summary. Program -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) From March 13-22, an eleven-member team representing four USG agencies -- State, Energy, Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard -- conducted the most thorough assessment to date by the USG of Kuwait's critical energy infrastructure. The assessment built upon previous visits to Kuwait by APHSCT Townsend in November (Ref A) and by CENTCOM in January (Ref B). ¶3. (C/NF) The delegation undertook the following activities during the visit: -- Day 1: GOK energy sector officials briefed the CEIP team on the structure of Kuwait's vital installations protection scheme, including the responsibilities of various organizations and ministries. Muhammad Al-Faresi, Advisor to the Security Decision and Follow Up Committee (SDFC),which reports directly to the Council of Ministers, led the briefing. Also participating were Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) Manager for Safety and HEALTH Fadhel Al-Ali and Oil Sector Services Company (OSSCO) Security Manager Abdullah Al-Ajmi. (Note: KPC is the parent company of all Kuwaiti oil sector companies, collectively known as the "K Companies.") Al-Faresi's presentation highlighted communication and mandate gaps between the various KPC subsidiaries and the Ministry of Interior, which holds responsibility for perimeter security at all oil installations, and the fragmented nature of responsibility for security in general. Al-Faresi discussed several initiatives that the SDFC is pursuing, including a joint operations center to bring together the KPC subsidiaries, MOI, and the Kuwait Coast Guard. He stated that Kuwait's facilities are most vulnerable from the seaside, and that the most fundamental problem is an unclear chain of command, with "too many bosses." -- Day 2: The CEIP team delivered a series of presentations covering basic security threats and how to prepare for them, as well as a video presentation on physical security barriers and blast mitigation techniques. The presentations were attended by representatives from KPC, the Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC),Kuwait Oil Company (KOC),OSSCO, the MOI, National Security Bureau (NSB),and the Coast Guard. In the evening, SDFC officials gave the U.S. delegation an unscheduled presentation highlighting the need for Kuwait to make energy infrastructure protection a national priority. The officials indicated that the highly compartmentalized nature of the Kuwaiti government and poor communication both between and within ministries made it essentially impossible to implement a broad interagency approach to improving critical infrastructure protection in Kuwait. In order to overcome these obstacles, the officials proposed the establishment of a Kuwait Homeland Security Institute that would combine local private sector support and USG expertise in homeland security to advise GOK decision makers, educate Kuwaiti policy makers, and prepare the Kuwaiti civil community to address homeland security issues in an informed manner. -- Day 3: The CEIP delegation, which split into land and sea teams, toured energy infrastructure sites controlled by KNPC, which runs Kuwait's three refineries and export terminals. The land team toured the large Al-Ahmadi refinery, focusing on perimeter barriers and entry controls at the gate and met with fire and emergency personnel to review their ability to respond to a terrorist incident. The maritime team toured seaside installations such as the sea island loading facility, the maritime perimeter of the secure area, and oil piers and met with the harbormaster to discuss his equipment and security procedures. -- Day 4: The CEIP land team toured the Shuaiba and Abdallah refineries. As at Al-Ahmadi, the focus was mainly on entry gate and perimeter security, although the team did tour the fire station and refinery HEALTH clinic. The sea team met with Coast Guard officials toured the control center and facilities at the Coast Guard headquarters. -- Day 5: In a briefing attended by representatives from the various K companies, MOI, NSB, and two consulting companies hired by KOC and KNPC (The Armor Group and Global Villages, respectively),the CEIP team delivered a recap of the visit and provided a series of recommendations covering Kuwait's immediate physical security needs and its long-term structural needs in decision-making and chain of command. The team provided discs to several of the agencies present with specifications and diagrams on security upgrades they could consider. -- Day 6: The CEIP team de-briefed its findings to the DCM and representatives from Econ, Pol, RSO, FCS, and NCIS at the U.S. Embassy. Findings and Recommendations -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) The team expects to finalize its report within a month and send a set of detailed recommendations to the GOK. Foremost among them will be recommendations to immediately install fortified concrete vehicle barriers along the exterior fence-line, anti-ram barriers at all access gates and emergency perimeter gates, and provide hardened control booths for MOI personnel. MOI personnel who inspect vehicles entering the facilities need training in basic bomb detection. On the maritime side, recommendations include prioritizing which facilities are the most critical to oil export and implementing enforceable security zones around them, establishing a joint operations center with Port Control and the Coast Guard with clear procedures for reporting and responding to threats, and conducting pilot boat authentication during outbound liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) transits. Reaction from the Kuwaitis -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) The Kuwaitis assembled for the almost three-hour de-brief and question and answer session on March 20 appeared to find the presentation sobering. Graphic images of flimsy gates protected only with padlocks separating refinery installations from a major expressway -- from which a truck or even a passenger vehicle could gather speed and plow through the fence and enjoy unimpeded access into the interior of the refinery -- were powerful. Photographs of vehicle exit routes protected only by tire spikes were similarly unnerving to the audience. The Kuwaitis absorbed the recommendations in a non-defensive manner and asked numerous questions about specifications of recommended improvements that demonstrated a level of concern and indicated that the urgency of the message penetrated. Some attendees expressed concern about the costs of installing more physical barriers around facility perimeters. ¶6. (C/NF) Of equal concern to the Kuwaitis was how to overcome the lack of inter-agency cooperation and coordination, particularly with the MOI and Coast Guard. As one Kuwaiti participant put it, the fragmented nature of the GOK's security apparatus, with responsibility divided among numerous organizations, is "the biggest challenge Kuwait faces." The CEIP team concurred, and suggested the establishment of a joint committee composed of representatives from all GOK and K company elements involved in securing critical facilities. This committee would clearly define each organization's roles and responsibilities, and would establish basic security standards to be employed across all critical facilities. In addition, the CEIP team suggested the creation of a joint operations center staffed by representatives of these same agencies, which would be a central control center in the event of an emergency or terrorist attack. Lastly, the team suggested that all the K companies create dedicated security offices supervised by a Deputy Managing Director-level security officers, each with its own dedicated staff, budget, and authority to make security-related decisions. Next Steps -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) We believe it is essential for the GOK to act immediately on the basic perimeter upgrades on both the land and sea sides, which can be done relatively easily and inexpensively. The delegation's full report, which we anticipate receiving in approximately ONE month, should help guide the GOK's planning. In the meantime, we will follow up directly with senior petroleum officials, Ministry of Energy and security agency officials to further debrief the visit and to ensure that the most important recommendations reach beyond the technical level. The delegation mentioned to the Kuwaitis additional training in conducting assessments -- that would train the Kuwaitis to conduct their own assessments -- available through Sandia Laboratories, which the Kuwaitis expressed interest in. While there are immediate steps that can be taken, the longer-term and ultimately more challenging goal of creating an integrated, multi-agency security apparatus that encompasses critical energy sites will require considerable political commitment from the highest levels of the GOK. Participants from the U.S. Delegation -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The U.S. delegation included the following individuals: ¶1. Richard P. Soler, DS/T/ATA - Team Leader ¶2. Bruce A Averill, CEIP Policy Coordinator, S/CT ¶3. Donald C. Grant, Captain, US Coast Guard, Chief, Port Security Evaluation ¶4. Randy Rhodes, Port Security Specialist, US Coast Guard ¶5. Walter Lewis Edwards, Operations and Training ¶6. Kevin Maloy, DS/T/ATA ¶7. Patrick Willging, Office of Energy Delivery and Reliability, DOE ¶8. Donald L. Moffett, DS/PSD/PSD - Anti-Ram/Blast Mitigation Specialist ¶9. Gary Risden, DS/PSD/PCB - Physical Security Specialist ¶10. Patrick Whelan, DS/PSD/PCB - Physical Security Specialist ¶11. William Spencer, DHS ¶9. (U) This cable was cleared by CEIP Team Leader Rich Soler. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * LeBaron