SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 11-12

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001741 SIPDIS SIPDIS //////// C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT //////// DEPT FOR WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KCIP OVIP KU IZ IS EAID KPAO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 11-12 VISIT TO KUWAIT KUWAIT 00001741 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Alan Misenheimer for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Mr. President, your January 11-12 visit to Kuwait offers a timely opportunity to acknowledge the invaluable cooperation of a key regional ally, and also to press the Government of Kuwait (GOK) to do more on issues of vital interest to the United States - especially Iraq and counterterrorism. The Amir has repeatedly expressed to us his appreciation for the First Lady's visit in October. He will extend the utmost hospitality to you, including the personal touch of hosting you in his home for a meal following your official meeting. From the Kuwaiti public as well, your arrival will evoke an outpouring of the pro-U.S. sentiment that has remained strong here since the U.S.-led liberation in 1991. That goodwill, derived from a shared past, will be an important asset as you drive home the need for stronger GOK performance to help assure a better future for the region. -------------- Domestic Malaise Overshadows Policy Decisions -------------- ¶2. (C) Despite record oil revenues and political stability (women vote, Kuwait has had a functioning constitutional democracy for more than 40 years, and the ruling Sabah family has been in charge for more than two centuries),the domestic political scene is dispirited and dysfunctional. The Amir remains well-regarded and faces no opposition; but the Sabahs have lost the political initiative, and querulous MPs smear cabinet ministers with impunity while neglecting a large docket of urgently needed legislation - including key counterterrorism measures, tax reform, a new labor law and intellectual property protection. ¶3. (C) This slow-rolling domestic "crisis" will not destabilize the country; but it does make the Amir all the more hesitant to take decisions - e.g. attending Annapolis, or sending the first Arab ambassador to Baghdad - that might draw parliamentary criticism. The Amir has the power to dissolve parliament and call new elections, and last week he told Tony Blair "don't be surprised if I do it." He may act during the three weeks between the December 19-20 eid al-adha holiday and your arrival; but it is more likely that Kuwait's internal malaise will fester awhile longer before he decides the time is right. -------------- -------------- Iraq: GOK Backing Indispensable, But Much More Needed -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S) Admiral Fallon has described Kuwaiti support for Operation Iraqi Freedom - including access to airspace and ground bases, discounted fuel, and use of airports and seaports to move materiel and personnel in and out of Iraq - as "indispensable." The estimated annual value of Kuwait's contributions exceeds a billion dollars. During 2007 the GOK has hosted visits from VP al-Hashemi, PM al-Maliki and President Talabani. Nevertheless, the overriding theme of GOK economic and political support for Iraq is timidity. Despite naming retired General Ali al-Moumin as its Ambassador-designate to Baghdad in 2004, the GOK continues to resist our urging to send him to post. Similarly, Kuwait has pledged over 575 million dollars in aid, but so far disbursed little; and despite a few major investments in Iraq's telecom and banking sectors, the GOK has not promoted merchant-to-merchant contact and still bars Iraqi commercial exports from the Kuwaiti market. The GOK needs an urgent change of course on these issues. The time will also come to press Kuwait for relief of Iraq's 11 billion dollars in pre-war debt; but the need for parliamentary approval makes that issue extremely tough for the GOK at present. -------------- GOK Falling Short on CT Cooperation -------------- ¶5. (S) The Amir is likely to ask you explicitly for at least two things: reassurance of a long-term U.S. KUWAIT 00001741 002.2 OF 003 commitment to Kuwait's security, and the return of the four Kuwaitis still detained in Guantanamo. On the former, the Amir will hope to hear you affirm positive statements by Secretary Gates and Admiral Fallon during their fall 2007 visits. On the latter, the Amir needs/needs to hear from you that his government's inconsistent handling of the eight previously transferred GTMO detainees precludes further transfers at this time, and that his government urgently needs to boost its CT performance across the board. ¶6. (S) Despite the dramatic disclosure in early 2005 of domestic plotting by the "Peninsula Lions" terrorist cell, the GOK has taken few steps to strengthen counterterrorism cooperation with us. It urgently needs to do so, particularly in the areas of intelligence sharing, oversight of Islamic charities, and the monitoring of previously transferred Guantanamo detainees (several of whom have traveled outside Kuwait and are re-engaged in supporting terror). Through financing, recruiting, and propaganda, a small number of Kuwaiti nationals play a significant role in facilitating al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. The leadership nevertheless continues to indulge a reflexive preference for cooptation and appeasement of local extremists and terrorist facilitators in order to mute domestic opinion. ¶7. (C) The GOK also needs to push ahead with a long-delayed comprehensive terror finance law and a law criminalizing affiliation with, or support of, terrorist groups. Kuwait's oil infrastructure represents an attractive and relatively soft target for terrorists; but the GOK, even after receiving vulnerability assessments and technical recommendations from us, has been slow to embrace a U.S. offer of formal cooperation. On a positive note, the GOK has launched a somewhat promising Islamic Moderation Initiative designed to discourage extremism through standardized training for imams and Islamic Studies teachers. -------------- Treading Lightly on Iran -------------- ¶8. (S) On Iran, Kuwaiti leaders are conflicted: they distrust Khamenei, Ahmadi-Nejad and co., but also fear the consequences of regional conflict. In fact, the Defense Minister has launched his own preemptive strike, publicly stating several times that the GOK will not allow an attack against Iran to be launched from Kuwait. The Amir is likely to express to you his anxiety over the risk of fallout from Busheir, only 90 miles from Kuwait City, and seek your views on the NIE. Trade and investment between Iran and Kuwait are small. You should urge the Kuwaitis to support international sanctions, refrain from commercial ventures with Iran, and to put the Iranian regime on notice that its involvement in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories is unacceptable. -------------- Supporting Middle East Peace -------------- ¶9. (S) The Kuwaiti leadership has consistently supported regional peace efforts, mainly through financial support to the Palestinian Authority (lingering ill will over Palestinian support for Saddam's 1990 invasion notwithstanding). The Amir and his government remain unwilling to play KUWAIT 00001741 003.2 OF 003 a more active role or meet with Israelis, however, and the decision to skip Annapolis put them on an embarrassing regional short-list with Libya and Iran. A 300 million dollar pledge in Paris appears to reflect a return to the GOK's traditional approach: a willingness to get out the checkbook when we ask, but not necessarily to write the check we sought. The Amir will be keen for a briefing on your vision for the way ahead, but not keen to take on a bigger role. -------------- Sustaining Friendship -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Your visit can have a powerful impact in helping to strengthen Kuwait's pro-Americanism within the generation born since 1991. There are favorable trends. Embassy Kuwait handled 26,000 visa cases this year, surpassing pre-9/11 levels for the first time. There are currently over 2000 Kuwaitis studying in the United States, an all-time high and a 20 percent increase over last year. Public encouragement for Kuwaiti students to pursue higher education in the United States will go far toward sustaining the current bilateral friendship for years to come. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * MISENHEIMER