SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL PACE,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KUALA LUMPUR 000924 SIPDIS SIPDIS FROM AMBASSADOR FOR CHAIRMAN PACE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2027 TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PREL PTER OVIP MY SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL PACE, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Classified By: Ambassador Christopher J. LaFleur, reasons 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) General Pace: Welcome to Malaysia. During your meetings here with the Deputy Prime Minister and other senior officials, we recommend in your discussions you: -- Applaud Malaysia's success in the reduction of piracy attacks in the Straits of Malacca and inquire what are the next steps Malaysia plans to take with its littoral partners. (ref para 8) -- Congratulate Malaysia's efforts in combating Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other terrorist groups, including in Malaysian portions of the triborder area of the Sulu and Sulawesi seas. (ref para 6) -- Request Malaysia's consideration of a multilateral exercise to enhance cooperation; propose CARAT exercises as a venue to work with neighboring countries and develop Malaysia's Joint Command Headquarters capability. (ref para 13) -- Note that after a long hiatus, the U.S. is planning a major increase in our assistance program, including radars and communications equipment (CENTRIX) through 1206 funds. (ref para 8) -- Thank Malaysia for their hosting of a notable increase in ship visits and note the positive media attention these visits have received. (ref para 10) -- Note Prime Minister Abdullah's visit to Afghanistan (that should be on-going during your stop in Malaysia) and provide your assessment of the situation there. (ref para 16) -- Describe our approach in Iraq and note how countries such as Malaysia could help the Iraqi government. (ref para 4) ¶2. (C) Malaysia is important to us because it is a successful, moderate, predominantly Muslim country. It is strategically located on the Straits of Malacca, through which one quarter of the world's trade flows, and it borders five of the other nine ASEAN countries. It is our tenth largest trading partner, and many major American companies have invested here. Malaysia is also a good partner in the war on terror. The overall tone in Malaysian-American relations has improved considerably since Abdullah Badawi replaced the vituperative Dr. Mahathir Mohamad as Prime Minister in late 2003. Abdullah brought with him a friendlier style and an interest in projecting a more moderate image, both for himself and for his country. Malaysia has acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol, begun drafting export control legislation, and participated as an observer in PSI exercises. Malaysia has played a positive role in helping to stabilize Aceh, Mindanao, and East Timor. Military-to-military cooperation is improving, with 23 US Navy ship visits to Malaysian ports in 2006, up from three in ¶2003. ¶3. (C) However, Malaysia's traditional approach to global issues, which Abdullah has continued albeit at a lower decibel level, remains an impediment to closer bilateral cooperation. Malaysia actively participates in the NAM and the OIC, often adopting distinctly Non-Aligned positions on issues of importance to us. Our public affairs environment is also challenging. The Malaysian public is strongly opposed to our policies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. A strong "post-colonial overhang" also colors Malaysian attitudes toward the U.S. role in Southeast Asia. With Abdullah we have nevertheless been able to pursue a set of broad common interests, and pragmatism generally rules in bilateral security relations. Your visit will help us further cement military-to-military ties and, in broad terms, strengthen our bilateral relationship. We look forward to your arrival. End Summary. Political/Economic Landscape -------------- ¶4. (C) Malaysia has been a difficult political partner in the past. Malaysians nurse strong anti-colonial sentiments. They are fiercely protective of their sovereignty and (among the Muslim Malay majority) resent perceived ill treatment of KUALA LUMP 00000924 002 OF 005 Islam by the West. Malaysian intellectuals tend to hold a "Euroskeptic" view of U.S. foreign policy in general and like to cast themselves as defenders of "third world" and Non-Aligned interests. Former Prime Minister Mahathir played on these sentiments to generate political support for himself and his ambitious economic agenda. When he relinquished his post in 2003, he left behind a modernized economy but also strained relations with much of the West. Today, however, Malaysia presents us with important transformational opportunities. In terms of its economic development, educational achievement, public welfare, and political stability, Malaysia stands out among Muslim-majority nations. The Malaysians project a moderate version of Islam, and, over the longer term, could lend additional support to democratic forces in the Middle East and Iraq. We also share strong common East Asian regional interests in stability and prosperity. Malaysian counter-terrorism cooperation is indispensable in defeating Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the region. Malaysia's economy is one of the most open, diverse and well-developed economies in the Islamic world and in ASEAN. Malaysia is our tenth largest trading partner, we are Malaysia's number one foreign investor, and economic ties could strengthen further if ongoing negotiations on a free trade agreement are successful. Bilateral Ties--Improving the Substance -------------- ¶5. (C) Secretary Rice met with PM Abdullah and FM Hamid at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2006 and President Bush met with PM Abdullah on the sidelines of the UNGA in September ¶2006. Last year, the GOM acceded to our long-standing urging and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol; the Malaysians have also sent observers to recent PSI exercises; they are preparing legislation to implement an export control regime and have recently passed a Trafficking in Persons (TIP) law that is a positive step in avoiding U.S. sanctions. ¶6. (C) Although they keep the details closely held, the GOM has been a key partner on counterterrorism. Early round-ups in 2001-2002 of scores of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects helped ensure there have been no terrorist attacks here. However, Malaysian extremists, as illustrated by a series of arrests in Malaysia's Borneo states last year, still have the capability to support JI operations elsewhere. Two Malaysian citizens were among the 14 high value U.S. detainees transferred to Guantanamo last year. In 2003, Malaysia established the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT),which runs multilateral training courses, many conducted with U.S. support. We and our colleagues in Manila, Jakarta and other Southeast Asian posts have embarked on a regional effort to strengthen these countries' border controls. In cooperation with GOM, we undertook a Border Control Assistance Initiative (BCAI) in eastern Sabah with participants from the Department of State, Homeland Security, USCG and JIATF West. The heads of the Embassy's Defense Attach and Defense Cooperation offices attended the field portion of this assessment. Security Cooperation -------------- ¶7. (C) Former Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) Chief Admiral Anwar conducted a very successful visit to the U.S. in October 2006, including Anwar's meeting with you; the Mid Year BITACG review in November; and the Chiefs of Defense Conference in November that was hosted jointly for the first time by PACOM-MAF. Anwar retired in March this year and was replaced by General Abdul Aziz bin Hj Zainal. Changes in the military leadership have not adversely affected mil-mil cooperation between the United States and Malaysia, which grew under Anwar's leadership. Ship visits have significantly increased and received greater visibility, and security-related training sponsored by the United States for military and law enforcement participants has also been on the rise. Although the possibility of a terrorist threat to the Malacca Strait has received the bulk of international attention, the fact is that although pirate attacks illustrate vulnerabilities, we have never identified any terrorist activities in the Straits. Moreover, the number of pirate attacks in the Straits had dropped in the last two years. Conversely, terrorists operate regularly in the Sulu/Sulawesi Sea corridor and we are focusing increasingly on this theater. ¶8. (C) Malaysia concluded a new 505 agreement last year that allows us to utilize 1206 funds to put CT equipment into KUALA LUMP 00000924 003 OF 005 Malaysia's hands in the vulnerable Sulu and Sulawesi Seas border areas of Sabah where terrorists are known to transit. Malaysia has not signed either an Article 98 or PSI agreement but has consistently stated its support of the principles behind PSI, including recent public remarks by DPM Najib. A reduction in incidents of piracy in the Straits of Malacca and improved risk assessment by Lloyds of London have lowered the priority in the GOM of projects such as the "Eyes in the Sky" program, a regional aerial monitoring of the Straits of Malacca (SOM) and Malaysia moves cautiously forward in its multilateral efforts in this area. ¶9. (C) In general, Malaysia remains open to bilateral cooperation that strengthens its own defense capacity, but the GOM will quickly raise the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity when discussing international security regimes and coordination, such as for the Straits of Malacca. Malaysia remains reluctant to engage in multilateral exercises. Malaysia's only multilateral defense arrangement is the Five Power Defense Pact with the UK, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. ¶10. (S) We have been pleased by the overwhelmingly positive media coverage our ship visits have received, in contrast to the quiet arrivals of past years. The flip side to this is that our visits are getting increased attention from ideological foes on the Islamic right and secular left. Deputy Prime Minister Najib has defended our cooperation before Parliament, and we do not see that our engagement is under threat. However, we do need to be cognizant of our increased military visibility and sensitive to GOM concerns, particularly with high tensions in the Middle East. The GOM cited concerns about the growing visibility of training in eastern Sabah when it recently decided to review on a case by case basis proposed training events involving foreign military forces in that region. ¶11. (C) Port fees and aircraft clearances represent two challenges to our practical mil-mil relations. The Malaysian port authority is attempting to impose port fees on U.S. naval vessels, which we cannot accept. We desire to continue or increase the pace of our port visit and naval interaction, but need to resolve the port fee issue. This has greater national security implications as we attempt to bring in our larger vessels, including an aircraft carrier later this year, as we have done during the last two years. Another issue is Malaysia's requirement that we get individual aircraft clearances for the 1000 plus overflights we have each year, representing support missions to Central Asia and the Middle East for the GWOT. We seek to convince Malaysia to ease their requirements, as they did during the tsunami relief operation in 2005. SIPDIS ¶12. (C) Malaysia has one of the best records in UN peacekeeping operations. They have committed forces to operations in Timor in the past and are presently engaged there in police operations. Some 360 Malaysian troops are currently participating in UNIFIL and the GOM has offered a contingent of up to 1000 soldiers. We believe Malaysia is strongly considering a deployment in support of possible peacekeeping Missions to Sudan or Somalia. Malaysia has developed a Peacekeeping Training Center and updated the facility in recent years to provide specialized training for the troops it sends into the field as well as personnel from foreign militaries. The USG has obligated almost 1.1 million dollars for GPOI funds that will focus on developing a multilateral peacekeeping operations exercise in 2009. Recent Mil-Mil Talks -------------- ¶13. (C) We continue an active agenda of mil-mil talks. On May 3-4, PACOM staff and the Malaysian Armed Forces conducted annual bilateral defense talks (BITACG) in Port Dickson. While Malaysia declined PACOM efforts to increase engagement in Eastern Malaysia near the Sulu and Sulawesi seas and refused to commit to multilateral events, there were a good number of bilateral issues advanced that underscored our effective relationship. Malaysia recently hosted the military law conference and has agreed to co-host the first annual conference for military intelligence chiefs in the Asia-Pacific region this September. Malaysia's request to hold bilateral policy-level discussion is moving forward. ¶14. (SBU) Malaysia has put forth a regional Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Center initiative that is promising, and has wide support in the government. The MAF KUALA LUMP 00000924 004 OF 005 has identified Subang Airfield as a likely choice for the center which would be administered under UN auspices. Subang, the former international airport, served as the focal point for Malaysia's tsunami and Yogyakarta relief efforts. The facilities are modern and are available. Malaysia is no further than two hours by air to almost any country in the region. ¶15. (C) Avian influenza preparedness is another promising area of bilateral cooperation. Last September, PACAF conducted a successful AI SMEE with the Ministry of Health. The U.S. team recommended changing Malaysia's AI preparedness rating from High risk to Partner Nation. Building upon this success, the ODC has proposed a regional workshop on Bio-terrorism Defense-Strategic and Tactical Planning for spring 2007 with PACAF and the U.S. has provided personal protection gear and laboratory analysis equipment to the Malaysian government. Malaysia will co-host this multilateral/regional event as it has demonstrated capacity as a regional partner in preparing for the threat of avian/pandemic influenza. In August-September, Marine Force Pacific will conduct an avian influenza subject matter expert exchange with the Health and Defense ministries. PACOM's efforts in furthering Malaysia's capacity as a regional responder are critical to the country teams in this regard. Malaysian Foreign Policy and U.S. -- A Mixed Bag -------------- --- ¶16. (S) Abdullah champions his moderate vision of Islam -- albeit with limited impact to date -- within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),which Malaysia will continue to chair through March 2008. Malaysia supports Abbas, the Palestinian Authority, whe MEPP roadmap, and Iraqi reconstruction. However, the`Lalaysian `ublic 2mains highlyQ4 critical&of nur Middle@East policies and tx GOM i{ con}istently riQcal of Is fel, with which it has no diplom!HcQreltionsv Hwever,jn ar\ tQ chann5 dRne3,~c ager in a '_stuctive dAMection, PMbSllah volune_eQ 1,1\ptops'to parti7iXQQe UNILQO. Qftr o2Qthan aQ3Oth /e oobjyog, andin(t9`ace hQ obje|RQ DRnm IsQLdll U =Y#%n.nQ:eedtoaEowXMa(ysQ` sed i Qrcef7QQsoldiezs tj5Ar4UNIFIL. QBese0sl*i)rs d=amo-d@t/va{ enHWQ+5r_ nd`VM s(v%purtQdteEi24 rmjf}'Q/I~)L@@kz}gyQk.;$PQn=|gzo[eu~j!>|}y bbmS^ZQ{I3NH Q]E$`)UCSQPHhUQQSUdASE0RDiSCQ#D(#RUEH`!/?n4QQ 44P3MKNuQsRp` 2L36zMq):D:AB+BA^SY QUqQL5MQR#`zUl/SeoT{4|;WuSH-L IY I QQ1 R7]JCS/-G{yEbTASHCFEMUQ_E INFQHHMU:QQUSCIN]PACPGv@QUL- H%I[#DIASE R=CNASQi!*EqN 5EMBEJ CO{.TBV;MQQRHHNC/>C WQSH,pJTQ #RExCQ`D 4SEC9O 0Q G5VQR, MASS McAP,:MOPS, PREL, P4W, OVIP, MY cUBJECT: SC)S%HTU FOTE VSIT OF GENERAL P5CE, SHAIRMA"O&THEJOINTHJHIQS OF ETAFV hQs ident3fie Subang AirfyldQasa l}keR choikf for theo centez whch would be administered under`N auspices. Subang, the former international airport, served'as the focal}point for Malaysia's tsunami and Yogyakarta relief efforts. The facilities are modern and are available. Malaysia is no further than two hours by air to almost any country in the region. ¶15. (C) Avian influenza preparedness is another promising area of bilateral cooperation. Last September, PACAF conducted a successful AI SMEE with the Ministry of Health. The U.S. team recommended changing Malaysia's AI preparedness rating from High risk to Partner Nation. Building upon this success, the ODC has proposed a regional workshop on Bio-terrorism Defense-Strategic and Tactical Planning for spring 2007 with PACAF and the U.S. has provided personal protection gear and laboratory analysis equipment to the Malaysian government. Malaysia will co-host this multilateral/regional event as it has demonstrated capacity as a regional partner in preparing for the threat of avian/pandemic influenza. In August-September, Marine Force Pacific will conduct an avian influenza subject matter expert exchange with the Health and Defense ministries. PACOM's efforts in furthering Malaysia's capacity as a regional responder are critical to the country teams in this regard. Malaysian Foreign Policy and U.S. -- A Mixed Bag -------------- --- ¶16. (S) Abdullah champions his moderate vision of Islam -- albeit with limited impact to date -- within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),which Malaysia will continue to chair through March 2008. Malaysia supports Abbas, the Palestinian Authority, the MEPP roadmap, and Iraqi reconstruction. However, the Malaysian public remains highly critical of our Middle East policies, and the GOM is consistently critical of Israel, with which it has no diplomatic relations. However, in part to channel domestic anger in a constructive direction, PM Abdullah volunteered 1,000 troops to participate in UNIFIL. After more than a month of lobbying, and in the face of objections from Israel, UN SYG Annan agreed to allow Malaysia to send a force of 376 soldiers to support UNIFIL. These soldiers deployed to Lebanon in January and GOM has requested their term be extended. During your visit, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister will be in Afghanistan in line with Malaysia's desire to be seen as helpful in addressing needs in Muslim countries. ¶17. (S) Malaysia surrendered the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in September last year, but as past chair remains a member of the leadership troika. During Malaysia's tenure it supported NAM positions on the Iranian nuclear program, and engaged with such problematic international players as Zimbabwe, Cuba and Venezuela. The GOM nevertheless tells us that they argued for moderate approaches within the NAM on such issues as Iran. Abdullah hosted Hugo Chavez for a visit to Malaysia last August, and assured Chavez of his support for Venezuela's election to the Latin American chair on the UN Security Council. This was followed by a well publicized visit to Venezuela by Abdullah in December to explore stronger commercial ties. There is little evidence to date that Malaysian business is actually pursuing such opportunities seriously. ¶18. (C) Malaysia maintains friendly relations with Iran, including a growing commercial relationship. Malaysia has lent rhetorical support to Iran's right to develop "peaceful" nuclear technology but has also consistently maintained that it will implement UN decisions on Iran, including sanctions regimes. After the latest UNSC resolution, Prime Minister Abdullah called clearly and publicly for Iran to respect UNSC resolutions on its nuclear program. Recent actions by Malaysian firms have generated concerns of violations of U.S. laws and the Wassenaar Arrangement and a Malaysian company was among those recently sanctioned under the Iran Syria Non-proliferation Act (ISNA) for its role in shipping proscribed materials to Iran. The activities of local firms doing business with Iran need to be closely monitored and we continue to request Malaysia's assistance in investigating suspicious activity. The Malaysian firm announced its intention to carry out a multi-billion dollar investment to develop enormous natural gas fields in Iran, a deal which has drawn condemnation from U.S. congressional voices in light of the Iran Sanctions Act. ¶19. (C) The closer you get to home, the more practical KUALA LUMP 00000924 005 OF 005 Malaysian policy tends to become. The GOM issued a public condemnation of North Korea's nuclear test and publicly supports UNSCR 1718, although it has no enthusiasm for sanctions. They repeatedly called for a return to the six-party DPRK nuclear talks and criticized North Korea's truculence. The Malaysian government is publicly supportive of China's "peaceful rise", welcoming in particular China's growing imports of Malaysian products, despite lingering suspicions among some officials of China's long-term intentions. The recent improvements in bilateral defense and cooperation with U.S. track closely with the clear rise in Chinese economic influence here, indicating KL's intent to maintain balance. ¶20. (C) Malaysia has played an increasingly prominent role in addressing conflicts facing its Southeast Asian neighbors. Last year Malaysia completed its earlier peacekeeping mission to East Timor following the armed uprising that led to deployment of Australian, Malaysian and Portuguese forces, while a new deployment of Malaysian police personnel is in East Timor now. The GOM has also taken a leading role as the facilitator for the southern Philippines peace process. Malaysia's sympathies for the Muslim Moro population and geopolitical calculations vis--vis the Philippines do not make it a completely honest broker, but Malaysia has nonetheless played a valuable role, hosting negotiations and contributing observers to the International Monitoring Team in the southern Philippines. Geography and cross-border ethnic bonds make Malaysia a de facto safe haven for some southern Thai insurgents, though the GOM has not encouraged this. The Malaysians have urged the Thai government to resolve peacefully the unrest in Southern Thailand, with its ethnic Malay Muslim population, and Malaysia and Thailand are cooperating on new border security measures. Malaysia is especially chagrined by Burma's intransigence because it championed Burma's entry into ASEAN. Malaysia, however, spoke out against the UNSC draft resolution on Burma, which we championed before the UN Security Council in January, and firmly backed the ASEAN argument that Burma was not a threat to international peace and security. In late May, Malaysia joined the ASEAN chorus calling for Burma to release political prisoners. Malaysia's Moderate Islam -------------- ¶21. (C) Malaysia, with its entrenched majority coalition, is hardly an ideal democracy, but it can still serve as a reference point for evolving Islamic societies elsewhere. The Malay people, long known for their tolerance, have become more religiously conservative in recent years, but Prime Minister Abdullah has enshrined the Malay political elite's continued preference for moderation in his "Islam Hadhari" or "Civilizational Islam" policy. Abdullah's key message is that Islam can become a leading world civilization again only if it embraces economic development, education, innovation and tolerance. Observers are wary of a longer-term trend toward greater divisions between the Muslim Malay majority and other ethnic groups, and religious minorities increasingly complain of growing Islamization. Nevertheless, Malaysia has kept inter-ethnic tensions well under control by regional and world standards for almost 50 years. LAFLEUR