Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KUALALUMPUR758
2007-04-25 09:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Cable title:
IRAQ: MALAYSIA WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO COALITION,
how-toVZCZCXRO6192 OO RUEHBC RUEHCHI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHNH RUEHPW RUEHROV DE RUEHKL #0758 1150920 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 250920Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9060 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0073 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0036 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEHMK/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 000758
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS MOPS EAID KISL IZ MY
SUBJECT: IRAQ: MALAYSIA WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO COALITION,
BUT MIGHT RESPOND TO DIRECT IRAQI REQUESTS FOR CIVILIAN AID
REF: A. STATE 54925 - NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ
B. KUALA LUMPUR 419 - FM CONSIDERS BAGHDAD VISIT
C. KUALA LUMPUR 381 - PAKISTAN INITIATIVE
D. 06 KUALA LUMPUR 2271 - MALAYSIA'S OIC ROLE
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark reasons 1.4 (b and
d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 000758
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS MOPS EAID KISL IZ MY
SUBJECT: IRAQ: MALAYSIA WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO COALITION,
BUT MIGHT RESPOND TO DIRECT IRAQI REQUESTS FOR CIVILIAN AID
REF: A. STATE 54925 - NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ
B. KUALA LUMPUR 419 - FM CONSIDERS BAGHDAD VISIT
C. KUALA LUMPUR 381 - PAKISTAN INITIATIVE
D. 06 KUALA LUMPUR 2271 - MALAYSIA'S OIC ROLE
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark reasons 1.4 (b and
d).
1. (C) Summary: Although Malaysia clearly would reject any
approach to provide military resources to support the Iraq
Coalition, it might consider a request by the Iraqi
government for modest civilian assistance if this were made
directly to the GOM by the Iraqi government itself. End
Summary.
2. (C) Malaysia as a matter of policy opposed the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq. While Prime Minister Abdullah once
suggested the notion of a Malaysian military medical unit
being sent to Iraq, nothing came of this suggestion and,
since that time, the GOM has periodically criticized the
continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq. This has
included the Prime Minister and other senior officials
describing Iraq Coalition actions as in violation of
international law. Malaysian public opinion, particularly
within the Malay/Muslim majority, also strongly opposes
U.S.-led actions in Iraq. Malaysia deploys its competent
peacekeepers to UN-led missions, including an on-going
contribution to UNIFIL in Lebanon and the Prime Minister has
mused about the possibility of OIC member forces somehow
replacing the U.S.-led coalition. Given its opposing policy
on Iraq, however, Malaysia would reject any approach to
provide military resources to support the current Iraq
Coalition.
3. (C) Post has quietly encouraged the Malaysian government
to assist in bolstering the capacity of Iraq's civilian
authorities. Malaysia has provided some training to a
limited number of Iraqi diplomats and has played host to
several Parliamentary delegations from Baghdad (ref B). The
visits usefully served to confirm Malaysia's recognition of
the elected Iraqi government as legitimate. We believe that
Malaysia could consider some modest requests for assistance
if these are made by the Iraqi government directly to
Malaysia. The Iraqi government would need to describe the
request as supporting its own goals. Because Malaysian
officials question the security environment in Iraq (and
their chancery property is outside the Green Zone),the
assistance ideally would be delivered outside Iraq (e.g.,
training officials in Malaysia) or involve minimum Iraq
travel by Malaysians.
4. (C) As current OIC chairman, Prime Minister Abdullah has
focused rhetoric and some effort on moving OIC countries to
take more practical steps to help fellow Muslims (ref D).
Over the past six months, Prime Minister Abdullah has
demonstrated an increased foreign policy interest in the
Middle East, reflected in the UNIFIL deployment,
participation in the Pakistan Initiative (ref C),and stepped
up senior official travel to the region. At this juncture, a
modest Iraqi government request for civilian aid might match
with Malaysia's aspirations to provide a good example for the
OIC and take on a greater role in the Middle East issues that
attract the concern of Malaysia's Muslims.
LAFLEUR
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS MOPS EAID KISL IZ MY
SUBJECT: IRAQ: MALAYSIA WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO COALITION,
BUT MIGHT RESPOND TO DIRECT IRAQI REQUESTS FOR CIVILIAN AID
REF: A. STATE 54925 - NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ
B. KUALA LUMPUR 419 - FM CONSIDERS BAGHDAD VISIT
C. KUALA LUMPUR 381 - PAKISTAN INITIATIVE
D. 06 KUALA LUMPUR 2271 - MALAYSIA'S OIC ROLE
Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark reasons 1.4 (b and
d).
1. (C) Summary: Although Malaysia clearly would reject any
approach to provide military resources to support the Iraq
Coalition, it might consider a request by the Iraqi
government for modest civilian assistance if this were made
directly to the GOM by the Iraqi government itself. End
Summary.
2. (C) Malaysia as a matter of policy opposed the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq. While Prime Minister Abdullah once
suggested the notion of a Malaysian military medical unit
being sent to Iraq, nothing came of this suggestion and,
since that time, the GOM has periodically criticized the
continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq. This has
included the Prime Minister and other senior officials
describing Iraq Coalition actions as in violation of
international law. Malaysian public opinion, particularly
within the Malay/Muslim majority, also strongly opposes
U.S.-led actions in Iraq. Malaysia deploys its competent
peacekeepers to UN-led missions, including an on-going
contribution to UNIFIL in Lebanon and the Prime Minister has
mused about the possibility of OIC member forces somehow
replacing the U.S.-led coalition. Given its opposing policy
on Iraq, however, Malaysia would reject any approach to
provide military resources to support the current Iraq
Coalition.
3. (C) Post has quietly encouraged the Malaysian government
to assist in bolstering the capacity of Iraq's civilian
authorities. Malaysia has provided some training to a
limited number of Iraqi diplomats and has played host to
several Parliamentary delegations from Baghdad (ref B). The
visits usefully served to confirm Malaysia's recognition of
the elected Iraqi government as legitimate. We believe that
Malaysia could consider some modest requests for assistance
if these are made by the Iraqi government directly to
Malaysia. The Iraqi government would need to describe the
request as supporting its own goals. Because Malaysian
officials question the security environment in Iraq (and
their chancery property is outside the Green Zone),the
assistance ideally would be delivered outside Iraq (e.g.,
training officials in Malaysia) or involve minimum Iraq
travel by Malaysians.
4. (C) As current OIC chairman, Prime Minister Abdullah has
focused rhetoric and some effort on moving OIC countries to
take more practical steps to help fellow Muslims (ref D).
Over the past six months, Prime Minister Abdullah has
demonstrated an increased foreign policy interest in the
Middle East, reflected in the UNIFIL deployment,
participation in the Pakistan Initiative (ref C),and stepped
up senior official travel to the region. At this juncture, a
modest Iraqi government request for civilian aid might match
with Malaysia's aspirations to provide a good example for the
OIC and take on a greater role in the Middle East issues that
attract the concern of Malaysia's Muslims.
LAFLEUR