PHILIPPINES/MILF: OTHMAN CONTINUES SHUTTLE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000496 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2027 TAGS: PREL PINR PTER MOPS EAID KISL RP MY SUBJECT: PHILIPPINES/MILF: OTHMAN CONTINUES SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, CONCERNED OVER RECENT FIGHTING REF: A. MANILA 828 ¶B. MANILA 782 ¶C. MANILA 594 ¶D. KUALA LUMPUR 173 Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reasons 1.4 (b an d d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Malaysian facilitator for the Philippines/Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace talks Othman Abdul Razak told polchief March 14 he remained focused on shuttle diplomacy, although he also expressed serious concern over March 5-7 fighting in Mindanao. His efforts between the MILF and Manila seek to resolve the critical issue of territory, with Othman in effect lobbying for concessions from the government side. Othman believed a territory roughly twice the size of the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) would be appropriate. Any understanding on territory should remain confidential until after the Philippines elections so that it could not be used against President Arroyo. Othman laid the blame for recent fighting on the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and described AFP actions as supporting a land grab by non-Moro settlers, a traditional pattern he claimed. Othman questioned whether Arroyo would be strong enough to control AFP elements that he said wished to scuttle the peace process. Othman appreciated information provided on Embassy Manila's meeting with the MILF in February. Othman continues to convey strong pro-Moro sympathies during our meetings. End Summary. Shuttle Diplomacy Seeks GOM Concessions on Territory -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) Othman told polchief March 14 that he had visited Mindanao in late February as part of his "shuttle diplomacy" between Manila and the MILF focused on achieving a solution to the territorial issue. He would continue this diplomacy despite his serious concerns over March 5-7 fighting (see below). He had no dates in mind for another round of informal talks and would not propose another face-to-face meeting between the sides unless he saw the promise of a compromise. Othman said the onus for such compromise rested foremost on the Philippines government as a matter of fairness and justice to the Moro people. Othman said the MILF would settle for an area that would roughly double the current size of the mainland ARMM, expanding it into contiguous areas in Mindanao. ¶3. (S) Othman intended to travel later in March to Manila to continue his diplomacy. He did not suggest any imminent breakthrough. In any event, the two sides should not publicly announce any compromise on territory prior the Philippines' election in May. President Arroyo's political opponents would use such an announcement against her, Othman stated, as compromise on the part of the government was bound to be unpopular. AFP Hostilities Threaten Peace Process -------------- ¶4. (S) The March 5-7 fighting in Midsayap between the MILF and AFP (refs A and B) represented a serious threat to the continuation of the peace talks, Othman stated, and the AFP was to blame for initiating the hostilities. The fighting was part of a "sinister plot" representing a "land grab" by non-Muslim settlers. The AFP used its fire power, including artillery and aerial bombardment, to drive away Moro residents. The hostilities left between 16 and 20 people dead, and many displaced. Othman alleged that this fit a pattern of similar attacks linked to land acquisition. ¶5. (S) Othman said he believed many elements in the AFP were opposed to a peace settlement with the MILF because of the benefits they received from a continuation of the conflict, including career advancement and personal enrichment through corruption. He questioned whether President Arroyo had the ability to enforce discipline within the AFP, and he described Arroyo's recent statement on the fighting as "weak." KUALA LUMP 00000496 002 OF 002 ¶6. (S) Othman cautioned that more hostilities could result in MILF retaliatory attacks and scuttle the peace process. MILF commanders clearly remained able to launch their own attacks. If Manila could not enforce the ceasefire on its side, he questioned whether it would be worthwhile for Malaysia to continue its participation in the International Monitoring Team (IMT). (Comment: We were left with the impression that Othman used this remark to highlight his concern over the fighting, rather than as a real threat to walk away from Malaysia's Mindanao mission. End Comment.) Comfortable with U.S. Engagement -------------- ¶7. (S) Polchief provided Othman with a read-out of Embassy Manila's mid-February meeting with MILF based on points provided by Embassy Manila and as a follow-up to our earlier brief (refs C and D). Among other matters, Polchief emphasized that the U.S. did not intend to take up a mediation role or supplant Malaysia's facilitation efforts. Othman appreciated the briefing and implied he had spoken to the MILF regarding the U.S. delegation. He highlighted the MILF's hope that the U.S. would exert influence on the Philippines to compromise on the critical territorial issue. Othman raised no other point related to the U.S.-MILF consultation and appeared at ease with current U.S. engagement. ¶8. (C) Continuing a theme from previous meetings, Othman said training of MILF leaders to take up civil administration positions constituted an important task. He intended to propose to Prime Minister Abdullah that Malaysia grant several scholarships to MILF leaders to study public administration in Malaysia. Othman asked that the U.S. consider offering similar scholarships for the MILF to study in Malaysia, suggesting a cost-sharing arrangement could be worked out with the GOM. Comment -------------- ¶9. (S) Othman continues to convey strong pro-Moro sympathies in our meetings and does not hide his view that, at this juncture at least, compromises should come from Manila, not from the MILF. He spoke emotionally regarding the fighting in Midsayap and the reported displacement of the Moro population. LAFLEUR