MALAYSIA SUPPORTS BURMA'S FULL PARTICIPATION AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 001563

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS/AARON COPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM BM MY
SUBJECT: MALAYSIA SUPPORTS BURMA'S FULL PARTICIPATION AT
ASEAN SUMMIT; U.S. SANCTIONS DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: STATE 146862 - U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b
and d).


1. (C) Summary: Malaysia appears satisfied that Gambari is
making some progress, and consequently Malaysia is not
prepared to support a high-pressured ASEAN approach to Burma
at the upcoming summit, per our October 24 meeting with a
senior Foreign Ministry official to deliver the demarche on
the latest U.S. sanctions (reftel). Measures like excluding
or downgrading Burma's summit participation received no
traction in our discussion. We would have a better chance of
bringing Malaysia along as part of a broader approach using
senior Washington engagement to foster a realistic but
meaningful ASEAN-wide position at the November Summit. End
Summary.


2. (C) Polchief delivered reftel demarche on strengthened
U.S. sanctions against the Burmese regime to the Foreign
Ministry's Southeast Asia and South Pacific Division chief
Rahimi Harun on October 24. Polchief urged strong Malaysian
and ASEAN action to build on momentum from recent tough
Malaysian statements on Burma and in support of UN special
advisor Gambari's mission. Polchief asked about new measures
under consideration by Malaysia and ASEAN.


3. (C) Rahimi replied that Malaysia's approach would
continue to focus on full support for Gambari, who "is making
progress." The Burmese regime had responded positively so
far, and Rahimi understood from New York that Burma had just
agreed to Gambari's return prior to the November 18-21 ASEAN
Summit, as urged by Malaysia, the U.S. and others. Rahimi
saw this latest news, if confirmed, as another sign that
international pressure has had a positive effect. The
Burmese regime appeared "comfortable" and willing to work
with Gambari. In contrast, Rahimi recalled Burma's
unwillingness to engage with Foreign Minister Hamid in his
role as ASEAN special envoy in March 2006. The appointment
of other envoys or an ASEAN contact group would confuse the
Burmese generals and complicate Gambari's efforts, and
Malaysia did not support these ideas.


4. (C) ASEAN leaders certainly would address Burma in a
critical fashion during the upcoming ASEAN Summit but the
extent of Burma's positive cooperation with the Gambari
missions should be taken into account, Rahimi stated in
response to polchief's queries. Malaysia believed that Burma
should be represented at a senior level at the ASEAN Summit,
and should not be excluded from events. Malaysia expected
and supported Burma's signature of the ASEAN Charter, if
indeed ASEAN as a whole was ready for this step. (Note:
Rahimi added that several countries other than Burma may not
be ready to sign the Charter by the time of the Summit, and
he named Thailand in particular. End Note.) In addition,
Malaysia and other ASEAN members would continue their
bilateral technical assistance projects with Burma; ending
these would be counterproductive, Rahimi concluded.


5. (C) Polchief noted the risk that the Burmese generals
provide positive gestures in the run-up to the ASEAN Summit
to diffuse criticism in the region without taking meaningful
steps toward genuine dialogue on transition to civilian rule,
such as releasing political prisoners. Rahimi acknowledged
this possibility, and Polchief then offered that mechanisms
to continue or increase ASEAN pressure remained critical.
Polchief also asked Rahimi whether ASEAN's strong statements
had increased ASEAN's relevance or had made an impact on
China's position. Rahimi would not speculate on either point
other than noting that China is driven by its own interests
in Burma.


6. (C) Comment: Rahimi, who has accurately represented
Malaysia's Burma policy in the past, indicated no Malaysian
support for a high-pressured ASEAN approach to Burma at the
upcoming summit that would involve more than critical
statements by ASEAN leaders. The ideas of excluding or
downgrading Burma's summit participation, postponing Burma's
signature of the Charter, and appointing an ASEAN envoy had
no traction in our meeting. Malaysia will not be out in
front on such measures, particularly if the Burmese regime
continues to interact with Gambari, and we believe bilateral
approaches have little chance of strengthening Malaysia's

KUALA LUMP 00001563 002 OF 002


stance on Burma at this point. Instead, we would have a
better chance of bringing Malaysia along as part of a broader
approach using senior Washington engagement to foster a
realistic but meaningful ASEAN position at the November
Summit. We believe that such an ASEAN position -- at a
minimum -- could signal clearly that Burma's "normal"
participation in ASEAN is not possible without real progress
by the regime on political dialogue and human rights.
KEITH