MILF TALKS: OTHMAN USES IMT THREAT AND PREVIOUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 001506 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2027 TAGS: PREL PINR PTER MOPS EAID KISL RP MY SUBJECT: MILF TALKS: OTHMAN USES IMT THREAT AND PREVIOUS GRP NEGOTIATOR TO PUSH MANILA REF: KUALA LUMPUR 1234 - SEEKING RESTRAINT AFTER BASILAN Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reasons 1.4 (b an d d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Malaysian facilitator for the Philippines (GRP)/Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace talks Othman Abdul Razak employed previous GRP negotiator Silvestre Afable and the threat of Malaysia's pull-out from the International Monitoring Team (IMT) to push Manila during a September 25-26 executive session in Kuala Lumpur. The executive session reaffirmed the informal agreements reached prior to Afable's resignation in June 2007, reversing the GRP's "backtracking" over recent months. The Malaysian facilitator anticipated a Philippines cabinet response to the points of understanding as soon as October 9, which could lead to an informal negotiating round by late October and, ideally, a formal session in November to endorse the ancestral domain formula. Othman reiterated Malaysia's threat to withdraw its participants from the IMT should there be no progress in the talks by November. While Malaysia has upped the ante with its public ultimatum, a withdrawal from the monitoring group clearly would hurt Malaysia's own prestige in the region and its future influence in Mindanao. End Summary. Reaffirming Previous Understandings -------------- ¶2. (C) On October 8, Othman provided polchief with a summary read-out of the September 25-26 "executive session" he convened in Kuala Lumpur with lead GRP negotiator Rudy Garcia and his MILF counterpart Mohaqher Iqbal. Othman described the session as relatively successful. Originally scheduled for just one day as a "question and answer" event, all sides agreed to remain for a second day of discussions. Othman said he had used the meeting to reaffirm previous informal agreements on key points, including the critical ancestral domain (territorial) issue and methods to avoid constitutional challenges, which Othman believed would otherwise block an agreement. He explained this reaffirmation as necessary because the June 2007 resignation of GRP negotiator Silvestre Afable ("due to lack of cabinet support") had resulted in Manila "backtracking" on earlier understandings reached between Afable and the MILF. Othman invited Afable into the executive session in order to confirm the previous understandings to Garcia, who had not been privy to all of the prior discussions with the MILF. The late September session resulted in minor modifications (NFI) to the earlier understandings reached under Afable. Othman indicated that Malaysia's threat to withdraw from the IMT also played a role in pressuring Garcia during the September executive session (see below). Next Steps -------------- ¶3. (C) Othman stated that Garcia had undertaken to present the informal agreements to the Philippines cabinet. He expected to learn the results of the cabinet consultation as early as October 9. If the Philippines cabinet reacted positively, Othman intended to schedule another informal round of talks as early as October 23 (after Muslim celebrations of Aidul Fitri). Ideally, this would lead to a formal negotiating session in November that could feature a signing of a memorandum on ancestral domain. The two sides had not addressed in any detail maritime issues related to creation of a new Bangsa Moro entity, and this topic would require more attention, Othman added. Malaysia's IMT Ultimatum -------------- ¶4. (C) Polchief queried Othman regarding Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak's remarks to the press that Malaysian troops could not stay indefinitely in the IMT and reports that Malaysia had set a November deadline for progress in the negotiations. Othman confirmed that Malaysia had "informed, not threatened" Manila that it would pull out of the IMT unless the talks achieved some results by KUALA LUMP 00001506 002 OF 002 November. Whereas the GRP and MILF had agreed in August to extend the IMT's mandate by one year, Malaysia had set its own deadline of three months to achieve something that would justify its further commitment to the IMT. Manila and the MILF were nervous about the ultimatum because both sides valued the IMT's contribution to confidence-building and a notable reduction in armed clashes. Othman did not specify any particular condition that would satisfy Malaysia's definition of progress, stating only that, "I must have something to show my government." ¶5. (C) When polchief asked if Najib's statements indicated that the Deputy Prime Minister (who also serves as Defense Minister) was involving himself more closely in the MILF negotiations, Othman emphasized that the Prime Minister as well as the Deputy Prime Minister were focused on the talks. Otherwise, Najib had not taken up any particular role. Avoid Constitutional Amendments, Study Other Models -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Othman believed it essential for the GRP to avoid an approach that required constitutional amendments, as this likely would prove unworkable and rule out a peace agreement with the MILF. In order to educate the GRP side in particular on possible modalities, Othman thought it would be useful to stage a short workshop showcasing successful agreements between governments and rebel groups, including the 2004 south Sudan peace accord. MILF-MNLF Equation -------------- ¶7. (C) Othman said he understood that some Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) elements at the local level over time were joining MILF. In particular, MNLF members in the islands, including Palawan and Basilan, had switched over to MILF. This was due to MNLF's disarray, with some leaders (Misuari) in jail and others co-opted by the GRP, and the unsuccessful implementation of the GRP-MNLF Jakarta accord. OIC sponsored efforts to broker a renewed dialogue with the MNLF were going nowhere. Othman believed at some point it would be useful to bring MILF and MNLF leaders together for discussions, but he did not have plans to pursue such a meeting over the medium term. Meeting with Embassy Manila -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Polchief expressed appreciation for Othman's September 19 meeting in Manila with Embassy Manila DCM and USAID Director, and indicated a follow-up meeting would be useful. Othman said that he benefited from the discussion, including the briefing on U.S. assistance to Mindanao. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Othman appeared modestly optimistic regarding the possibility of progress, pending word on the Philippines cabinet's reaction to Garcia's brief. Malaysia has upped the ante with its public and private IMT ultimatum, but we do not take this wholly at face value. In early August (reftel), Othman used the renewal of the IMT's mandate as a pressure point against Manila, disingenuously ascribing this to the MILF. We have no hint that the November deadline signals any policy split within the Malaysian government. Instead, this move appears to reflect Othman's tactics. Malaysia would stand to lose a great deal of prestige in the region and future influence in Mindanao by giving up on the IMT. We presume a precipitous Malaysian withdrawal from the IMT would damage or jeopardize Kuala Lumpur's peace facilitation role. If a country like Indonesia stepped in to replace Malaysia as a monitor or peacemaker, this would constitute a major blow to Malaysia's regional position. Without the IMT members on the ground, Malaysia also would lose much of its Mindanao field intelligence and harm linkages with the MILF. For these reasons, we do not believe Malaysia would take lightly the decision to abandon the IMT. Nevertheless, given the ultimatum, Othman will want to point to something positive by November. SHEAR