CONCERNS ABOUT INSECURITY IN NORTH KIVU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000846 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2010 TAGS: PGOV MOPS KPKO KDEM CG RW SUBJECT: CONCERNS ABOUT INSECURITY IN NORTH KIVU REF: A. KINSHASA 792 ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 557 ¶C. THE HAGUE 1315 ¶D. KINSHASA 841 Classified By: PolCouns DBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary. Some MONUC civilian officials have expressed growing concerns about the possibility of a government offensive against renegade General Laurent Nkunda in North Kivu. Two of its key officials believe that the Kabila government has made a decision to mobilize for an attack on Nkunda's forces, and fear not only the humanitarian crisis that would result but the prospects of MONUC being drawn into the fighting. Meanwhile Nkunda's political organization is reportedly consolidating control of civilian institutions in areas under his control. Some of the MONUC information squares with other sources, as reported septels; however, a reported Kabila order to launch an offensive most certainly does not. Differing signals from different parts of MONUC is a familiar pattern, and in this case is indicative of the general level of concern focused on the Kivus. End summary. ¶2. (C) Two key MONUC civilian officials privately expressed to us their strong concerns about a renewal of fighting in North Kivu between the Congolese army (FARDC) and the forces of renegade General Laurent Nkunda. DSRSG Ross Mountain, echoing the conclusions ("it is not a question of if hostilities will break out, but when") of Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno in New York (ref B),expressed fears at a donors meeting July 9 of a FARDC attack on Nkunda in the coming weeks. MONUC's acting political adviser Christian Manahl (protect) told PolCouns July 11 that MONUC is receiving conflicting messages on the situation in North Kivu. On the one hand, it is clear that a military buildup is underway. Officially, the Congolese military is telling MONUC that its objective is to pressure, not attack, Nkunda and his forces. However, Manahl asserted that the commander of MONUC's North Kivu Brigade was told by FARDC Regional Military Commander Vainqueur Mayala that the government has decided for the military option. He indicated MONUC believes that this decision was made by President Kabila himself. ¶3. (C) Manahl said MONUC has received information indicating the 15th Integrated Brigade (IB) has been ordered from Kisangani to North Kivu's western Walikale territory, an FDLR stronghold, and the 2nd IB south from Beni in the north of the province. Other FARDC elements have been ordered south from Ituri. He said the deployment had been ordered to begin July 15, and that the FARDC was attempting to deploy 10 tanks and 10 armored personnel carriers to the province from Kisangani, although it was not clear how they might be transported. (Comment: These movements are not inconsistent with what the government claims they are, reinforcement of existing forces, or even with preparation for an offensive against the FDLR. End comment.) ¶4. (C) Manahl emphasized that, over and above the humanitarian concerns that would be raised by renewed combat, MONUC fears being drawn into urban fighting in the provincial capital of Goma, where forces loyal to Nkunda could threaten the civilian population. Manahl also said MONUC fears supporting FARDC anti-Nkunda operations which might include FDLR elements. ¶5. (C) Manahl portrayed both scenarios as no-win situations for MONUC. In the first, MONUC fears being drawn into urban combat. Manahl said only battalions made up of government loyalists had obeyed a recent order from Mayala to re-deploy outside Goma, while its Nkunda elements had remained. In the case of fighting in outlying areas between FARDC and Nkunda forces, Manahl said MONUC feared FDLR elements could join in. In that case, he said, "it's going to be a disaster." If MONUC decided to hold back from supporting the FARDC in that situation, Manahl said it would risk losing the support of the Congolese government and population. "We will be criticized whatever we do," Manahl said. ¶6. (C) As for Nkunda, Manahl said his political front, the CNDP, is continuing to establish a parallel administration in areas under his control. He said tax, police and intelligence officials were now reporting to Nkunda in certain areas of the province, and in at least one instance were issuing their own tax receipts. KINSHASA 00000846 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Manahl said there are reports of Nkunda agents recruiting fighters in North Kivu, as well as in Rwanda. Recruits reportedly included demobilized Rwandan army soldiers (Congolese as well as Rwandan),Congolese refugees in Rwanda, and teenagers. He said UNHCR has informed Rwanda of recruitment in its camps there, but received only denials of involvement. (Note: Manahl did not indicate whether the reports of recruitment were new. End note.) ¶8. (C) David Lewis (protect),a well-connected British journalist who recently returned to the DRC on assignment for The Economist, also raised the issue of a military option in a July 8 conversation with PolCouns following several days of interviews in North Kivu. He said Mayala told him in Goma that he was publicly denying any offensive was in the works. However Mayala said off the record that Kabila had given him an order for an attack on Nkunda. Similar to Manahl's account, Lewis told us Mayala had been present at a meeting of senior commanders chaired by Kabila July 3 in Kisangani at which the decision was made. Lewis also said he had interviewed Nkunda, whom he found determined and even fatalistic. "I have a cause," he told Lewis. Nkunda was convinced the FARDC was preparing an attack. ¶9. (C) Additional complications may be in the offing. Manahl reported that the International Criminal Court in The Hague had issued a warrant for the arrest for Nkunda's chief of operations Bosco Ntaganda for crimes committed while an Ituri militia leader (ref C). Lewis said he had also learned of the indictment, calling it "the worst-kept secret in Kinshasa." He said he had received a call from the ICC warning him off the story until the court officially announced it. ¶10. (C) Comment: No one we have spoken with believes the Congolese military has the capacity to sustain, let alone win, an offensive against Nkunda or FDLR forces. Whatever Kabila's inclinations regarding a military offensive, the greater near term danger is that the buildup will create an environment where an isolated incident could spark a larger confrontation. Some of the information conveyed by the MONUC officials is consistent with other information we have received, including Kabila's own read-out recently provided to P3-plus-2 Ambassadors (ref D),but some is not. Notably, the reported Kabila order to launch an offensive clashes with other reports, including Kabila's own statements. Differing signals from different parts of MONUC is a familiar pattern, and in this case most certainly reflects the widespread concern focused on current tensions in the Kivu provinces. End comment. MEECE