COAST GUARD FINDS DRC PORTS STILL NOT SECURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000339 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017 TAGS: EWWT ECON PTER ASEC CG SUBJECT: COAST GUARD FINDS DRC PORTS STILL NOT SECURE REF: A. 06 KINSHASA 796 ¶B. 05 KINSHASA 1039 Classified By: EconOff W. Brafman for reasons 1.4 b/d/e. ¶1. Summary. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has determined the DRC's international maritime ports do not comply with U.S. or international security requirements. The main causes are inadequate funding and political will, and upper-level mismanagement. The USG will re-introduce restrictions on ships coming from the DRC if the ports are not found to be secure when a USCG official returns in June. End summary. ¶2. (U) February 26 through March 2, three U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) officers met with DRC officials in Kinshasa and toured four international maritime ports in Bas-Congo: Banana, Boma, Ango-Ango (in Matadi city) and Matadi. ONATRA, the DRC's port authority, manages Banana, Boma and Matadi. The trip's purpose was to determine whether the GDRC has complied with the International Ship and Port Security code (ISPS),as the U.S. Maritime Transportation Safety Act requires. This trip was the USCG's third to the DRC, but the first for U.S.-based officers. The last visit was in May 2006. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (U) In May 2005 the USCG issued a Port Security Advisory (PSA) that set out restrictions on ships coming from the DRC, because the ports were not in compliance with ISPS. As the result of a September 2005 visit, the USCG removed the DRC from its PSA (often referred to as a "blacklist) in January 2006 and placed it in a probationary status. The USCG then checked on progress and offered additional advice (reftel A) during its May 2006 visit. The DRC remains on probation. BETTER, BUT STILL NOT SECURE -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Following its last visit, the USCG delegation concluded the GDRC is still not in compliance with the ISPS and will recommend to headquarters that the USG give the DRC 90 days to comply with its written recommendations. If the DRC fails to do so, the USCG said it will restore its previous restrictions and re-list the DRC on the PSA. A USCG officer plans to return to the DRC in early June to evaluate port conditions. ¶5. (C) The USCG determined the two major remaining problems are communication shortcomings and the Port of Banana's failure to create and implement a security plan. ISPS training for port managers and security officials is also needed. ONATRA and the Ministry of Transport lack equipment and established procedures to communicate with each other, incoming vessels or the International Maritime Organization in London, problems the USCG has repeatedly identified (reftel B). (Comment: The fact that both a ministry and a parastatal have a role in port security is a major cause of the communication problems. End comment.) To emphasize the lack of communication infrastructure, the Maritime Security Commissioner showed the delegation the office in Kinshasa to which he said he was recently moved; the space was dilapidated, with no computers or phones, and holes in the ceilings and floors. ¶6. (SBU) Banana's Deputy Port Manager said that port's security needs have received little attention because it is the DRC's least economically significant port. Despite its location at the mouth of the Congo River, Banana has only one berth and receives only about five ships per month. The perimeter wall remains incomplete, not all access points are monitored and no waterside patrols exist. Port officials claimed the port's location within a "military zone" (next to a naval base) affords some security. ¶7. (C) The Matadi and Boma ports, located inland on the Congo River, have made some progress implementing security measures and the USCG found they do meet "bare minimums" of the ISPS code. Managers and security officials at both ports displayed an improved understanding of the ISPS code's requirements and means of implementation. However, at both ports perimeter walls remain incomplete, cargo security is weak and access control is spotty, with the team observing several people without the required identification badges in the highest security areas. A positive finding was the decrease in the number of containers at these ports, each of which had long KINSHASA 00000339 002 OF 002 ago exceeded capacity. The Matadi and Boma Port Facility Security Officers (PFSOs) have taken some actions to reduce the number of containers, but both said the decrease is due primarily to a drop in imports in the second half of 2006. The Matadi PFSO said port traffic has picked up again since the beginning of 2007, but it is unclear whether trade with the DRC has increased or the 2006 shift in traffic from Matadi to Boma is simply reversing. ¶8. (U) Ango-Ango had few remaining security concerns. SEP-Congo (DRC's petroleum import and distribution parastatal) operates Ango-Ango, whose sole function is to import petroleum and transfer the bulk of it to the pipeline to Kinshasa. (Comment: This port is the source of most of the petroleum for western DRC, and hence the GDRC has clearly prioritized its security. End comment.) WHY THE PROBLEMS? -------------- ¶9. (C) Mismanagement, a lack of political will and insufficient funds continue to be the main reasons for the gaps in port security. Several officials also told EconOff the GDRC paid little attention to needs such as port security improvements during elections and the interim period prior to the selection of the new government, instead tending to personal and party political interests. Moreover, ONATRA's top management has been plagued with problems, including replacement of its senior management team in June 2006 and the arrest of the deputy CEO on allegations of embezzlement in 2006. A Belgian Technical Cooperation official who is detailed to the Ministry of Transport and also works with ONATRA said both the Ministry and ONATRA's top management are in complete disorder. As a result, the Ministry releases funds for security projects only haltingly, and generally only for Matadi. The Boma and Banana work has been largely funded by revenue these ports generate themselves. (Note: The Boma Port Manager claims he remits USD 800,000 to one million per month in receipts to the Ministry of Transport. End note.) EconOff contacts have also cited the Maritime Security Commissioner himself as an obstacle to progress. ¶10. (C) In addition, some of the available funding is not always used for priority needs. For example, the Maritime Security Commissioner said Banana Port is paying a consulting firm USD 35,000 to evaluate the port's security and draft a security plan, a project the USCG visitors said the port officials can probably do themselves. Matadi Port is creating a high-tech access system that uses micro-chipped identification cards. The USCG suggested the funds could be better used to cover lower-technology needs, such as training. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The DRC's failure to meet port security needs in the last year, particularly during the election period and prior to the installation of a new and accountable government, is not surprising. During that time, ministry and parastatal oversight was almost non-existent and most government projects halted. The recent USCG visit came at a good time, giving the GDRC the opportunity to implement a relatively low-cost project that has high visibility and potentially significant positive economic impact. However, the Ministry and the dysfunctional port authority will have to figure out how to work with each other to make meaningful progress. End comment. MEECE