THE NKUNDA VIEW ON "MIXAGE" AND NORTH KIVU'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000207

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV KPKO ASEC MOPS PTER CG
SUBJECT: THE NKUNDA VIEW ON "MIXAGE" AND NORTH KIVU'S
SECURITY


Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: While the GDRC has portrayed North Kivu's
military "mixage" as an interim solution to the region's
security problems, dissident General Laurent Nkunda and his
advisers view the process much differently. They see Nkunda's
December 2006 agreement with the GDRC as an opportunity to
address many long-standing complaints of the Tutsi community,
portraying "mixage" as the first step in a long-term process
to resolve North Kivu's persistent security problems and
reform of the Congolese military. End summary.

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THE NKUNDA PROBLEM: STILL THERE
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2. (C) The GDRC has presented the so-called military "mixage"
process as part of a short-term solution to end hostilities
that erupted in North Kivu province between soldiers loyal to
dissident General Laurent Nkunda and the Congolese military
(FARDC) in November and December of last year. The process
"mixes" Nkunda troops with soldiers from other
non-integrated, but "loyal," FARDC units in unified brigades,
which will not immediately be subject to the usual military
integration process. Government officials portrayed "mixage"
as a way to break up Nkunda's forces, bring dissident
elements under nominal FARDC control, and better secure the
province. When the ceasefire agreement between Nkunda and
Congolese Air Force Commander John Numbi was announced in
December, the GDRC maintained the accord would finally
resolve the area's "Nkunda problem" and claimed Nkunda
himself would go into exile.


3. (C) PolOff's meetings with Nkunda advisers in the province
during the week of February 4 indicate the Nkunda problem
still exists and is not disappearing via "mixage." In fact,
his advisers' ideas about "mixage" and its ultimate goals
differ from those of the government. Nkunda and his political
front, the National Congress for the Defense of the People
(CNDP),see "mixage" as a means to resolve many of the Tutsi
community's historical complaints against the GDRC.


4. (C) Nkunda said by phone during one of PolOff's meetings
with CNDP officials that he has no intention of leaving the
DRC and wants to remain in the Congolese military. He did not
address reports that he had been offered exile in South
Africa or another country, but CNDP officials said he had
rejected such offers outright and never seriously considered
them. Nkunda said he would be willing to accept any number of
FARDC positions, including regional military commander for
North Kivu, a brigade command, or some higher post.

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WHAT FOLLOWS "MIXAGE"
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5. (C) CNDP spokesman Rene Abandi claimed once the "mixage"
process is completed -- with the formation of five new
brigades -- the plan is to begin military operations against
the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).
Abandi said he believes the FDLR is the biggest security
threat in the entire province, and eliminating it would
immediately improve the region's stability. Lt. Col. Richard
Bisamaza, the deputy commander of the mixed Bravo Brigade and
a former commander of the pro-Nkunda 83rd Brigade, claimed he
has orders from FARDC commanders authorizing operations
against the FDLR in the coming weeks. FARDC 8th Military
Region Deputy Commander Col. Delphin Kahimbi denied such
orders exist, but reported that soldiers from Bravo have
initiated firefights with suspected FDLR elements since being
deployed to Rutshuru in early February.


6. (C) Abandi, who claimed he attended the discussions
between Nkunda and Numbi in Kigali that produced the
ceasefire, asserted the mixed brigades are being formed to
create a "zone of security" to facilitate the return of
Congolese Tutsi refugees in Rwanda and Burundi. Abandi
claimed there are some 16,000 Tutsis in Rwanda and another
1,500 in Burundi awaiting repatriation, but many are afraid
to return because of the FDLR threat. Once the FDLR is
neutralized and the refugees returned, Abandi said, Nkunda's
and the CNDP's main objective will have been achieved.

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FUTURE PARTICIPATION NOT GUARANTEED
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KINSHASA 00000207 002 OF 003




7. (C) The CNDP's security adviser, a lawyer named Muhare,
said Nkunda is, however, rethinking his participation in
"mixage." Muhare and Abandi claimed the GDRC has not
fulfilled promises made in Kigali, including the release of
Nkunda supporters being held prisoner around the country as
well as amnesty for Nkunda and his associates for past
actions, including the 2004 siege of Bukavu. Abandi said
Nkunda has honored his part of the deal by willingly sending
his troops to "mixage" and is looking for similar signs from
the GDRC. Nkunda does not believe the GDRC will honor its
part of the accord and is re-evaluating participation in
"mixage."


8. (C) Muhare and Abandi said the Kigali agreement also
envisioned that the "mixed" brigades will ultimately be
integrated into the FARDC. That step will not be taken, they
claimed, until North Kivu's security was "assured." However,
neither could specify what those assurances were or just how
"secure" the province needed to be to begin the integration
process.

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WHY "MIXAGE" ANYWAY?
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9. (C) Nkunda's advisers portrayed "mixage" as more than a
short-term solution to the region's security problems. Abandi
described it as an alternative to what he charged was a
failed military integration system. He complained that the
troops of the FARDC's Integrated Brigades are poorly-trained,
ill-disciplined, and the main source of insecurity in many
parts of the country. In contrast, he said, Nkunda's forces
are much better trained, and he claimed that mixing these
troops with other non-integrated FARDC units will enable them
to share their experience and thus create a better class of
soldier. Muhare added that in his view, "mixage" is a better
long-term solution to the question of forming a professional
Congolese army than integration. (Comment: The fact that this
so-called "training" will take place outside official
military channels, with little input from FARDC commanders,
raises a whole other series of troubling questions. End
comment.)


10. (C) Avoiding integration is also in the self-interest of
many in the Tutsi community. Abandi repeated charges that
when Tutsi soldiers have reported to integration centers they
have been targets of harassment and intimidation. Many, he
claimed, have been killed solely because their ethnicity.
Abandi pointed to the integration centers at Kitona and
Kamina where dozens of Tutsi soldiers were killed. He said
those examples "prove" military and government officials have
conspired to eliminate Tutsis from military ranks. In his
view, "mixage" allows Tutsi soldiers to serve in the FARDC
without fear by remaining close to home.

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COMMENT: THE PROBLEM IS NOT GOING AWAY
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11. (C) The "mixage" process is a rather unhappy result of
pressures on both sides. Nkunda suffered substantial
casualties and defections among his forces in clashes with
MONUC in November and December. He presumably was feeling
some pressure to negotiate, we further assume with Kigali
encouragement as well. Kinshasa lacks the military muscle to
move against Nkunda, and essentially has long lacked options
to later the unsatisfactory and unstable status quo ante of
Nkunda and his followers encamped not far from Goma. If
anything, elections may have exacerbated the problem, with a
new Nande-dominated provincial government heightening local
fears and tensions. Nkunda and his allies are communicating
what they want us to hear, and their interpretation of the
agreement in Kigali is just that. Nkunda, however, has never
acknowledged the authority of the DRC central government and
his insistence on remaining as a de facto military commander
in the area with this own troops would further bolster his
standing. Fed by memories of the 2004 takeover of Bukavu,
however, much of the non-Tutsi majority of both North and
South Kivu regard Nkunda with something approaching obsessive
fear. His continued presence, much less expanded influence,
seems a recipe for continued instability in the area.


12. (C) Comment, continued: Nkunda and his allies, including
former Vice President Ruberwa, are asserting that Nkunda's
involvement is a needed prerequisite to resolution by

KINSHASA 00000207 003 OF 003


military means of the FDLR problem in eastern DRC. It is
doubtful, however, that any combination of FARDC forces,
including those involved in the "mixage" process, are capable
of pulling that off any time soon. FARDC officers are denying
that reports of recent fighting in North Kivu arise from any
new FARDC offensive operations. It is certainly plausible,
however, that these results from "aggressive" patrols of new
"mixage" units, and/or FDLR actions in response to the
perceived new threat to them from these groups. The renewed
clashes may be a harbinger of the dynamic in the province for
the immediate future, with MONUC able to preserve control of
major population centers, but no one able to gain decisively
an upper hand militarily within the province. It is a
worrisome situation, however, with no obvious immediate
solutions. End comment.
MEECE