THE NKUNDA VIEW ON "MIXAGE" AND NORTH KIVU'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000207 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV KPKO ASEC MOPS PTER CG SUBJECT: THE NKUNDA VIEW ON "MIXAGE" AND NORTH KIVU'S SECURITY Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) Summary: While the GDRC has portrayed North Kivu's military "mixage" as an interim solution to the region's security problems, dissident General Laurent Nkunda and his advisers view the process much differently. They see Nkunda's December 2006 agreement with the GDRC as an opportunity to address many long-standing complaints of the Tutsi community, portraying "mixage" as the first step in a long-term process to resolve North Kivu's persistent security problems and reform of the Congolese military. End summary. -------------- THE NKUNDA PROBLEM: STILL THERE -------------- ¶2. (C) The GDRC has presented the so-called military "mixage" process as part of a short-term solution to end hostilities that erupted in North Kivu province between soldiers loyal to dissident General Laurent Nkunda and the Congolese military (FARDC) in November and December of last year. The process "mixes" Nkunda troops with soldiers from other non-integrated, but "loyal," FARDC units in unified brigades, which will not immediately be subject to the usual military integration process. Government officials portrayed "mixage" as a way to break up Nkunda's forces, bring dissident elements under nominal FARDC control, and better secure the province. When the ceasefire agreement between Nkunda and Congolese Air Force Commander John Numbi was announced in December, the GDRC maintained the accord would finally resolve the area's "Nkunda problem" and claimed Nkunda himself would go into exile. ¶3. (C) PolOff's meetings with Nkunda advisers in the province during the week of February 4 indicate the Nkunda problem still exists and is not disappearing via "mixage." In fact, his advisers' ideas about "mixage" and its ultimate goals differ from those of the government. Nkunda and his political front, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP),see "mixage" as a means to resolve many of the Tutsi community's historical complaints against the GDRC. ¶4. (C) Nkunda said by phone during one of PolOff's meetings with CNDP officials that he has no intention of leaving the DRC and wants to remain in the Congolese military. He did not address reports that he had been offered exile in South Africa or another country, but CNDP officials said he had rejected such offers outright and never seriously considered them. Nkunda said he would be willing to accept any number of FARDC positions, including regional military commander for North Kivu, a brigade command, or some higher post. -------------- WHAT FOLLOWS "MIXAGE" -------------- ¶5. (C) CNDP spokesman Rene Abandi claimed once the "mixage" process is completed -- with the formation of five new brigades -- the plan is to begin military operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Abandi said he believes the FDLR is the biggest security threat in the entire province, and eliminating it would immediately improve the region's stability. Lt. Col. Richard Bisamaza, the deputy commander of the mixed Bravo Brigade and a former commander of the pro-Nkunda 83rd Brigade, claimed he has orders from FARDC commanders authorizing operations against the FDLR in the coming weeks. FARDC 8th Military Region Deputy Commander Col. Delphin Kahimbi denied such orders exist, but reported that soldiers from Bravo have initiated firefights with suspected FDLR elements since being deployed to Rutshuru in early February. ¶6. (C) Abandi, who claimed he attended the discussions between Nkunda and Numbi in Kigali that produced the ceasefire, asserted the mixed brigades are being formed to create a "zone of security" to facilitate the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees in Rwanda and Burundi. Abandi claimed there are some 16,000 Tutsis in Rwanda and another 1,500 in Burundi awaiting repatriation, but many are afraid to return because of the FDLR threat. Once the FDLR is neutralized and the refugees returned, Abandi said, Nkunda's and the CNDP's main objective will have been achieved. -------------- FUTURE PARTICIPATION NOT GUARANTEED -------------- KINSHASA 00000207 002 OF 003 ¶7. (C) The CNDP's security adviser, a lawyer named Muhare, said Nkunda is, however, rethinking his participation in "mixage." Muhare and Abandi claimed the GDRC has not fulfilled promises made in Kigali, including the release of Nkunda supporters being held prisoner around the country as well as amnesty for Nkunda and his associates for past actions, including the 2004 siege of Bukavu. Abandi said Nkunda has honored his part of the deal by willingly sending his troops to "mixage" and is looking for similar signs from the GDRC. Nkunda does not believe the GDRC will honor its part of the accord and is re-evaluating participation in "mixage." ¶8. (C) Muhare and Abandi said the Kigali agreement also envisioned that the "mixed" brigades will ultimately be integrated into the FARDC. That step will not be taken, they claimed, until North Kivu's security was "assured." However, neither could specify what those assurances were or just how "secure" the province needed to be to begin the integration process. -------------- WHY "MIXAGE" ANYWAY? -------------- ¶9. (C) Nkunda's advisers portrayed "mixage" as more than a short-term solution to the region's security problems. Abandi described it as an alternative to what he charged was a failed military integration system. He complained that the troops of the FARDC's Integrated Brigades are poorly-trained, ill-disciplined, and the main source of insecurity in many parts of the country. In contrast, he said, Nkunda's forces are much better trained, and he claimed that mixing these troops with other non-integrated FARDC units will enable them to share their experience and thus create a better class of soldier. Muhare added that in his view, "mixage" is a better long-term solution to the question of forming a professional Congolese army than integration. (Comment: The fact that this so-called "training" will take place outside official military channels, with little input from FARDC commanders, raises a whole other series of troubling questions. End comment.) ¶10. (C) Avoiding integration is also in the self-interest of many in the Tutsi community. Abandi repeated charges that when Tutsi soldiers have reported to integration centers they have been targets of harassment and intimidation. Many, he claimed, have been killed solely because their ethnicity. Abandi pointed to the integration centers at Kitona and Kamina where dozens of Tutsi soldiers were killed. He said those examples "prove" military and government officials have conspired to eliminate Tutsis from military ranks. In his view, "mixage" allows Tutsi soldiers to serve in the FARDC without fear by remaining close to home. -------------- COMMENT: THE PROBLEM IS NOT GOING AWAY -------------- ¶11. (C) The "mixage" process is a rather unhappy result of pressures on both sides. Nkunda suffered substantial casualties and defections among his forces in clashes with MONUC in November and December. He presumably was feeling some pressure to negotiate, we further assume with Kigali encouragement as well. Kinshasa lacks the military muscle to move against Nkunda, and essentially has long lacked options to later the unsatisfactory and unstable status quo ante of Nkunda and his followers encamped not far from Goma. If anything, elections may have exacerbated the problem, with a new Nande-dominated provincial government heightening local fears and tensions. Nkunda and his allies are communicating what they want us to hear, and their interpretation of the agreement in Kigali is just that. Nkunda, however, has never acknowledged the authority of the DRC central government and his insistence on remaining as a de facto military commander in the area with this own troops would further bolster his standing. Fed by memories of the 2004 takeover of Bukavu, however, much of the non-Tutsi majority of both North and South Kivu regard Nkunda with something approaching obsessive fear. His continued presence, much less expanded influence, seems a recipe for continued instability in the area. ¶12. (C) Comment, continued: Nkunda and his allies, including former Vice President Ruberwa, are asserting that Nkunda's involvement is a needed prerequisite to resolution by KINSHASA 00000207 003 OF 003 military means of the FDLR problem in eastern DRC. It is doubtful, however, that any combination of FARDC forces, including those involved in the "mixage" process, are capable of pulling that off any time soon. FARDC officers are denying that reports of recent fighting in North Kivu arise from any new FARDC offensive operations. It is certainly plausible, however, that these results from "aggressive" patrols of new "mixage" units, and/or FDLR actions in response to the perceived new threat to them from these groups. The renewed clashes may be a harbinger of the dynamic in the province for the immediate future, with MONUC able to preserve control of major population centers, but no one able to gain decisively an upper hand militarily within the province. It is a worrisome situation, however, with no obvious immediate solutions. End comment. MEECE