NORTH KIVU'S SECURITY STILL TENUOUS TWO MONTHS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000180 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV ASEC KPKO CG SUBJECT: NORTH KIVU'S SECURITY STILL TENUOUS TWO MONTHS AFTER SAKE ATTACKS Classified By: POLOFF CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) Summary: The security situation in the DRC's volatile North Kivu province remains tenuous. Two months after fighting erupted between government forces and dissident troops loyal to renegade General Laurent Nkunda, North Kivu officials consider the province to be over-militarized and are pessimistic about finding a peaceful solution. The so-called "mixage" process has raised questions about Nkunda's real intentions. Many civilians fear it has enabled the renegade general to expand his zone of control. The continued presence of and harassment by FDLR forces, along with local Mayi-Mayi forces who sometimes cooperate with them, remains a constant source of insecurity. The Congolese military admits it is unable to contain or eliminate any of these threats due to its own weaknesses. End summary. ¶2. (C) Congolese and MONUC officials agree that North Kivu province remains generally calm after a December ceasefire ended fighting between Nkunda loyalists and Congolese military (FARDC) Integrated Brigades. However, PolOff's meetings with numerous military and security officials during the week of February 4 indicate Nkunda's forces still pose an internal security risk, as do other armed groups throughout the province, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and local Mayi-Mayi forces. -------------- THE NKUNDA QUESTION -------------- ¶3. (C) The current "mixage" process -- by which Nkunda forces are combined with non-integrated FARDC units to create new "mixed" brigades -- has allowed Nkunda to spread his loyalists, and thus his influence, over a wider area of North Kivu. Colonel Delphin Kahimbi, deputy commander of the 8th Military Region (North Kivu),said the province is now the "most insecure" of any in the DRC. Kahimbi added that while there has been no fighting between Nkunda's forces and other "loyal" FARDC troops since December, the possibility for renewed fighting remains high. (Note: An overall assessment of the "mixage" process and its results to date will be reported septel. End note.) ¶4. (C) While Nkunda's intentions are not yet clear, available evidence points to the creation, via the "mixage" process, of an Nkunda-controlled zone from the Uganda/Rwanda border to Masisi in the western part of the province. MONUC officials in North Kivu regard Nkunda as a lingering threat to the province's stability despite the ceasefire. They view they deployment of his troops in the mixed brigades not as a dilution of his power, but an expansion of it. ¶5. (C) Kahimbi said the deployment of these "mixed" brigades has caused fear in some communities, particularly in areas where Nkunda loyalists had recently been fighting against the FARDC. MONUC-Goma Head of Office Ulli Mwambulutuku reported that Nkunda loyalists deployed in the Rutshuru area have been accused of harassing the local population and "targeting" those who sided with government forces during the November-December fighting in the Runyoni and Bunagana areas. Mwambulutuku said Nkunda elements in some mixed brigades have also initiated small attacks against suspected FDLR forces without orders from FARDC commanders. -------------- FDLR STILL A THREAT -------------- ¶6. (C) The FDLR is another source of insecurity in the province. Nearly all Congolese and MONUC officials we spoke with said the FDLR's presence contributes to North Kivu's security problems. The estimated number of active armed members of this groups varies widely -- anywhere from 5,000 to 12,00 spread throughout North and South Kivu; its members commit act of banditry, isolated looting and theft, poaching, and illegal taxation along trade routes. Crispin Atana, the provincial direction of the DRC's National Intelligence Agency (ANR),said the FDLR problem was his biggest worry and most significant security threat. ¶7. (C) The chief intelligence officer of MONUC's North Kivu Brigade, Colonel Mallik, said the FDLR is split between two main factions. The first group is led by a Major Mushare, spread through an area south of Lubero towards the border town of Nyamilima east of Rutshuru. Mallik said this group is KINSHASA 00000180 002 OF 003 often the primary cause of local disturbances, looting and other vandalism. The second group, led by a General Mudachumura, is located further south from the village of Luamambo towards Walikale in the western part of the province. The Mudachumura group often clashes with Mushare's, but is not regularly involved in looting. Mallik said this second group is generally integrated into the local population and runs businesses, but often engages in illegal trading across the border. ¶8. (C) The FARDC is unprepared to take on the FDLR and eliminate the threat it poses. Colonel Kahimbi of the 8th Military Region admitted the FARDC does not have the logistics or capacity required to attack the group. He said the FDLR also has better mobility -- attacking in small groups of six to eight people -- and knows the terrain far better than the FARDC brigades. Any fighting against the FDLR, he added, would also result in civilian displacement and deaths. -------------- MAYI-MAYI: FRIEND OR FOE? -------------- ¶9. (C) The local Mayi-Mayi ("self-defense") forces are also a threat to stability. Most Mayi-Mayi are based in the northern part of the province just south of Butembo, but other groups operate as far south as Rwindi, in the southern edge of Lake Edward. The most virulent Mayi-Mayi have been those of the so-called Baraka group in the Vurundo area south of Butembo. The Baraka Mayi-Mayi, estimated between 700-800 members, had initially turned themselves in for demobilization and military integration in 2005. The group eventually became dissatisfied with delays in the process and returned in mid-2006 to the bush where they now fight FARDC forces and pillage local villages and merchants. ¶10. (C) A second Mayi-Mayi group, the so-called Baliene group, has often fought on the side of the FARDC in recent months, according to MONUC officials. The Baliene group, led by Lt. Col. Ndelemba, had as of early February nearly completed the registration process to begin demobilization and integrating its approximately 800 elements into the FARDC. Ndelemba had recently conditioned his participation in further disarmament because he opposed the "mixage" process with Nkunda's forces, but was killed February 6 by soldiers loyal to a rival Mayi-Mayi leader, Colonel La Fontaine, who was arrested in September 2006 on charges of recruiting new Mayi-Mayi forces. Ndelemba's killing has created fears of a possible fight for control of the Baliene group that could spread, ending the group's participation in demobilization. ¶11. (C) A third Mayi-Mayi faction, the Jackson Mayi-Mayi, is based south of Lake Edward and in the Nyamilima area. The group's leader, Colonel Jackson, turned himself in for demobilization in 2006 and is currently with FARDC officials in Goma. The groups is now led by Colonel Musabao, Jackson's former deputy, and engages in regular acts of looting and poaching in Virunga National Park. Colonel Mallik of MONUC estimated the Jackson Mayi-Mayi are about 400-500 in strength, but only about 30 percent possess weapons. Mallik and Kahimbi of the FARDC both claimed the remaining Jackson Mayi-Mayi also collaborate with the FDLR against the FARDC and suspected Nkunda "loyalists." -------------- REMAINING DANGER: DISCONTENT SOLDIERS -------------- ¶12. (C) Kahimbi of the 8th Military region said FARDC soldiers also pose a risk to the province's security. He said there are currently more than 700 "officers without function" in the province's military integration centers awaiting assignments but without any daily jobs or responsibilities. Kahimbi said the group is growing increasingly disaffected and is a prime target for recruitment by armed groups, particularly Nkunda. About half of this group has been deployed to training centers in Katanga province; Atana of the ANR said the remaining officers have taken to theft and banditry and have hidden themselves among the civilian population. ¶13. (C) The FARDC's lack of professionalism is a major obstacle in bringing the region under control. Kahimbi said he did not see the creation of a truly professional army until the year 2020 due to the high illiteracy rate among the KINSHASA 00000180 003 OF 003 rank and file (about 86 percent) and the large number of older, corrupt officers who will not leave until forced to retire. Soldiers of the FARDC's 9th and 14th Integrated Brigades, which have received at least some nominal training, are frequently accused of harassing civilians. Elements of the 14th Integrated Brigade were also accused of pillaging civilians' homes after the military re-took control of Sake in December. -------------- COMMENT: NORTH KIVU AS TINDERBOX -------------- ¶14. (C) North Kivu's security is still tenuous, and any future provocation, real or imagined, could ignite a tinderbox. The Congolese military will be unable, or in some cases unwilling, to prevent the outbreak of conflict. Most officials in the region are pessimistic that a political solution can be found, but fear the consequences of military action against any of the armed groups. These basic elements are of course not new, and the possibility of violent armed conflict in North Kivu has a long, well-documented history. Kahimbi's characterization of the province as the "most insecure" may be true, but also has often been true in the past. What is new is the "mixage" of Nkunda's forces and the immediate and longer-term effects this will have. ¶15. (C) Comment, continued: The deployment of Nkunda loyalists throughout the province has caused fear and anxiety and could spark violent reactions from any number of corners -- the local population, the Mayi-Mayi, or the FDLR. It does seem clear that Nkunda's continued physical presence in the province will likely serve as a nexus for confrontation by supporters and opponents. The capable MONUC Indian Brigade continues to serve as the security force to keep things together in North Kivu, but fundamental political solutions will have to be found to establish longer-term stability, and will be among the new DRC government's major challenges. End comment. MEECE