DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000153

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV KPKO MARR CG
SUBJECT: DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION
LANGUISHING IN THE DRC

Classified By: Poloff KRBel for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (SBU) Summary: Disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR) of armed groups in the DRC remains a
significant challenge. CONADER, the Congolese agency
responsible for DDR efforts, remains ineffective and mired in
inertia. While it has made progress in disarming and
demobilizing former combatants, thousands of whom wish to
demobilize remain in limbo. The weakest link is
reintegration; to date, very little has been done to help
ex-combatants return to civilian life. World Bank oversight
has been weak, exacerbating CONADER's problems. End summary.


2. (C) The National Commission for Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reinsertion (CONADER) is the agency
charged with administering the formal Congolese DDR program.
The World Bank and the MDRP (Multi-Country Disarmament and
Reintegration Program) Trust Fund each provided $100 million
to the GDRC to fund the agency. Preliminary figures
estimated that approximately 150,000 ex-fighters would need
reintegration at a cost of $1,200 apiece. Although CONADER
claims that it has demobilized almost 100,000 ex-combatants
since 2003, Post estimates that the number is closer to
90,000, with at least another 30,000 still waiting to be
demobilized. Of the demobilized, only a fraction have
received reintegration assistance, which constitutes the
bulk of the program costs. Nevertheless, CONADER claims that
all of its funding has already been spent or obligated to
support DDR for those already in the program.


3. (C) CONADER was originally set up as a four-year program,
but it has been plagued by such mismanagement that the World
Bank planned to shut it down at the end of 2006, one full
year ahead of schedule. Many observers described CONADER as
a "business," and allegations of fraud, graft, and outright
theft circle around the organization. The Bank has demanded
the removal of five political appointees, reportedly the most
corrupt in the organization, at CONADER'S senior level.
Although the Bank refuses to pay any additional salaries for
these appointees, they are technically employed by the GDRC,
and the new government will actually have to remove them.
While the GDRC could refuse to remove the appointees, and
instead offer to pay their salaries itself, such a decision
would risk an open break with the Bank.


4. (C) The Bank has played its own part in the dysfunction
at CONADER as a result of very weak oversight. While the
Bank has threatened to pull its funding from CONADER, this
has failed to motivate the organization, and there have been
no real penalties for CONADER's poor performance. The Bank
insisted that CONADER reduce its operation from 400 employees
to fewer than 100 but the operation still has more than 200
employees.


5. (SBU) Although thousands of ex-fighters still wish to
return to civilian life, CONADER and the World Bank/Trust
Fund will no longer assist with DDR for members of
non-signatory militias. This means that aside from those
combatants already identified, no additional militia members
(including Mai Mai and Ituri fighters) will be processed.
However, even for those already demobilized, CONADER has done
little toward reintegration, which remains the weakest aspect
of its program.


6. (SBU) CONADER initially provided an immediate payment to
each beneficiary of $110 for urgent needs, plus a monthly
stipend and entry/exit "kits" consisting of food, shelter
materials, and some livelihood training. Due to management
failures, however, many ex-combatants have yet to receive the
promised benefits. Many of the "kits" were never purchased
and never delivered to claimants. Social reinsertion efforts
and livelihood training have been minimal, and have
reportedly only reached a fraction of ex-combatants.


7. (C) The director of the MDRP told USAID officer on
February 1 that it was likely $30 million in additional
funding would be available for follow-on Bank-supported DDR
efforts in FY 2007, and that another $10-$20 million in donor
contributions "are firming up." She also indicated that the
Bank is interesting in having the USG join this new
mechanism. She was not specific about timing and
particularly not on what the Bank would be doing with respect
to the future of CONADER as an institution.


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8. (C) Comment. The Congolese government must take
responsibility for the success of the DDR process --
particularly reintegration -- in order to remove the implicit
threat of thousands of armed men with no jobs, no
livelihoods, and no options. The World Bank must acknowledge
its own fiduciary responsibilities and commit to adequate
fiscal oversight. As for CONADER, there are only two
choices: rebuilding the organization and addressing key
deficiencies, or abandoning it completely and re-starting DDR
from scratch. The first will be difficult, but the second is
little more than wishful thinking since creating a new
program would cause lengthy delays in assistance that
neither the ex-combatants nor the GDRC can afford. End
comment.
MEECE