HIGHLIGHTS OF JOINT MONITORING GROUP

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001377 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL PREF KPKO CG RW SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF JOINT MONITORING GROUP (JMG) DECEMBER 14 MEETING IN GOMA SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) established by the Congo-Rwanda Nairobi communique got off to a rocky start at its first meeting December 15, but succeeded in reaffirming support for the process and establishing follow-up mechanisms. A UN emphasis on North Kivu and repeated off-agenda detours by Congolese delegates prevented a focused discussion of the full agenda, but judicious interventions by UN, U.S. and EU envoys helped resolve questions on the scope of the communique and obligations of both parties. Most significant: follow-up to Nairobi should focus on eliminating the threat to the region posed by all armed groups, and decisions on how and when to address groups based in Congolese territory. The JMG agreed to meet again in January in New York prior to the scheduled January 16-19 Contact Group meeting, and established an expert-level task force to consider more detailed questions each week in Goma. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The first meeting of the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) for the Congo-Rwanda Nairobi communique was held on December 15 in Goma. The meeting was marred by several off-agenda detours, but established common understandings on key points and reaffirmed both parties' commitment to the process. UN Assistant Secretary General Haile Menkerios chaired the meeting, with SRSG William Swing also participating. Foreign Minister Mbusa Nyamwisi and Special Envoy Richard Sezibera headed the Congolese and Rwandan delegations respectively. Envoys from the U.S., EU, South Africa, AU and SADC, as well as the secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR),participated as JMG members, with other P3+2 representatives (France, UK, Belgium) invited as observers. U.S. representatives were Ambassador Garvelink and Tim Shortley, AF Assistant Secretary Frazer's senior advisor for conflict resolution. ¶3. The UN's decision to lead off the meeting with extensive MONUC and UN/OCHA presentations designed to spotlight its support of Congolese military operations in North Kivu against the forces of renegade FARDC General Laurent Nkunda and its support for some 800,000 North Kivu IDP's skewed the meeting from its stated focus on implementation of the Nairobi communique. However, interventions by Menkerios, Swing, AF Senior Adviser Tim Shortley and EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer succeeded in achieving consensus that the follow-up to Nairobi should focus on eliminating the threat to the region posed by all armed groups, and that decisions on how and when to address groups based in Congolese territory are the exclusive right of the Congolese government. The group also agreed that the revived bilateral Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) should address reports by both parties of breaches in the agreements. ¶4. (SBU) Addressing actions taken by the Congolese government to implement the communique, Mbusa noted in a prepared statement that it had submitted its FDLR plan by the December 1 target date, and was working out a media campaign to gain public support. He stressed, however, that Nkunda's recent actions had pushed back eventual implementation of the FDLR plan. He said planning was going forward on a regional conference on peace and development to be held later in December. Mbusa acknowledged that presidential adviser Seraphin Ngwej was properly the Congolese representative to the JMG, but cited his own and Defense Minister Chikez Diemu's presence as an indication of the importance of the issue. He spoke little during the rest of the meeting, with Chikez and Ngwej, neither of whom appeared to have prepared to address specific agenda items, repeatedly hijacking the discussion on petty matters. ¶5. (SBU) Sezibera prefaced his summary of Rwandan follow-up actions by emphasizing that "bilateral relations are getting better," and praising the recent visit of 50 Congolese students to Rwanda and the "positive role" of North Kivu Governor Julien Paluku, also in attendance. He said the Rwandan government had stepped up efforts to monitor and control its border and taken internal measures as well to prevent Rwandan-based support to armed groups based in Congo. He confirmed it was preparing a list of "genocidaires" for submission before January 1 and had for some time had structures in place, financed by the World Bank, to receive and to facilitate re-integration of ex-FAR/Interahamwe fighters and their families into Rwandan society. He also cited many public statements by Foreign Minister Murighande in support of the Nairobi process. (Comment: By contrast, similar public statements by senior Congolese officials have been conspicuously lacking. End comment.) ¶6. (SBU) Several points of contention emerged during the meeting. Attempts by Chikez and Ngwej to maneuver the group into a public statement citing Nkunda as the sole reason for the province's humanitarian crisis were met by a characterization by Sezibera that ex-FAR/Interahamwe "is the object of the communique of Nairobi." KINSHASA 00001377 002 OF 002 The issue was eventually - and deftly - resolved by Mbusa who turned his own delegation's argument against itself by citing Sezibera's (erroneous) contention of an exclusive focus for the agreement. He said this focus - and by implication a similar one on Nkunda -- would harm the credibility of the process, arguing that Nairobi did in fact aim to eliminate the threat from all armed groups. ¶7. (SBU) No delegates disagreed that timing of actions against armed groups present on Congolese territory is up to the Congolese government, nor argued against its recent military offensive against Nkunda's forces. However, Menkerios stressed that it should take steps to ensure no other groups move into areas that may be vacated by Nkunda's forces. Sezibera noted that moving against Nkunda first would not have been Rwanda's decision, but agreed that it was Congo's right to do so. He said the ex-FAR/Interahamwe had been a problem for 10 years, and will continue to be a problem if it is not dealt with. Chikez disagreed that the group was in fact a threat. "No one has been killed by the FDLR in the last four years," he had claimed earlier in the meeting. ¶8. (SBU) Ngwej, in repeated interventions, complained that the Congolese government was unable to go forward with its FDLR plan by January 1 without the list of "genocidaires" promised in the communique by the Rwandan government. Sezibera noted difficulties in identifying true "genocidaires" from a list of some 700,000 suspects, and cautioned that, for legal reasons, its list could not be regarded as definitive, since evidence may later emerge implicating others not initially listed. Menkerios eventually closed discussion by noting that the Congolese obligation to begin the program January 1 should not be affected by the list, although it could affect completion. ¶9. (SBU) The Congolese delegation accused Rwanda of infiltrations into Congo by the Rwandan Republican Guard or by Rwandan nationals. Mbusa noted in his opening statement that Congolese security services had picked up several Rwandans in the Bunagana theatre of operations, discovered Rwandans among pro-Nkunda troops reporting for brassage, and arrested two members, with ID, of Rwandan President Paul Kagame's Republic Guard in Bukavu. Sezibera expressed surprise at hearing this information for the first time during this meeting. He also noted that the Congolese government had taken no action on detailed lists the Rwandan government had provided of ex-FAR/Interahamwe members who had gone through brassage and joined the Congolese military. Menkerios said the JVM was the proper forum for addressing these complaints, and urged both parties to make their cases there. ¶10. (SBU) To conclude the meeting, the JMG confirmed it would meet monthly under a rotating chairmanship, with the next to take place in New York prior to the January 16-19 Contact Group meeting in Brussels. It agreed to form an expert-level task force which will meet weekly in Goma; the first meeting should take place later this week. Due to time constraints it was unable to discuss additional resources needed to implement the communique, but invited Congo and Rwanda to present lists in writing of their non-humanitarian requirements for review by donors. ¶11. (SBU) Comment: Although a rocky start for the JMG, the meeting succeeded in establishing buy-in by both parties to the process and specific follow-up mechanisms. Third-party participants clearly want to remain involved, and pitches for their support by both Congolese and Rwandan delegates indicate both parties' awareness that they can not resolve the issues on their own. End comment.