PRESIDENT KABILA'S DECEMBER 11 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001361 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR BLEO E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREF PREL KPKO CG SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KABILA'S DECEMBER 11 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR AND AF SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY Classified By: DCM SAMUEL Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary. At President Kabila's request, Ambassador William Garvelink and Tim Shortley, Senior Adviser for Assistant Secretary Frazer for Conflict Resolution met with Kabila in his residence on December 11, 2007. Kabila agreed to stick to his agreement with President Museveni and to keep the pressure on the LRA to leave Garamba or finalize a peace agreement. Kabila noted that the Congolese now have a plan to address the ex-FAR and Interhamwe and that the plan could begin anytime. He acknowledged, however, that he required U.S. assistance. Ambassador Garvelink stated that he will be talking to General Ward on Thursday to discuss the arrival of the U.S. military assessment team in January. Kabila stressed that he needed a final answer on Nkunda,s willingness to go into exile and asked for U.S. assistance to obtain it. Kabila stressed that MONUC,s performance has been lackluster in North Kivu and that promises of support have not materialized. Kabila asked that the U.S. help him answer the question: "what can MONUC do without going beyond the red lines of their mandate, and how can they make sure that the atrocities stop? Shortley stressed that alternative military and political strategies must be urgently considered and that the U.S. is prepared to facilitate a second meeting with MONUC to purse new ideas. Kabila agreed that alternative avenues should be considered and supported U.S. efforts to reach out to Nkunda once they are identified and agreed in principle between himself and Assistant Secretary Frazer. End Summary. Kabila Agrees to Press the LRA -------------- ¶2. (C) President Kabila asked Shortley about his trip to Juba and the current status of the LRA peace talks. Shortley explained that recent information from LRA defectors indicated that Kony had plans to break his troops into four task forces to abduct up to 500 Congolese girls from the Garamba area, begin new attacks in West Nile, Uganda, send an advance team to the Central African Republic (CAR) to take up a new base of operation and to pick-up arms buried in a cache in southern Sudan. Shortley also noted that Kony has moved 70 miles west of Garamba with a small group. Kabila confirmed that he has asked the LRA to leave Garamba by the end of the month. Shortley explained that the current Cessation of Hostilities agreement allows the LRA to remain in Garamba through January 31, 2008 and that we agreed with his efforts to pressure the LRA to leave Garamba or finalize an agreement through the Juba peace process. Shortley said that the U.S. acknowledged his willingness to allow LRA defectors to transit through Dungu and Beni and appreciated his help. Kabila agreed that if Kony is moving deeper into Congo that he posed a more significant threat to Congolese security and needed to be addressed. Kabila agreed to stick to his current plan with Museveni, to keep the pressure on the LRA publicly and ask that they leave before the end of December. Kabila asked what Kony,s options were? Shortley stated that Kony had no options and that he must agree to peace through Juba and return to Uganda top face justice. Kabila stated that he "wanted to see Kony,s back by the end of the year." Kabila said that Congo and Uganda will hold a bilateral meeting to review progress on the Arusha agreement on December 14-15, 2007 to include discussing next steps on the LRA. Post Addis Ababa: Dealing with Ex-FAR, Interhamwe -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Kabila asked Shortley for a read-out of the Heads of State Summit of the Tri-Partite in Addis Ababa. Shortley briefly stated that the meetings were successful and that Congo benefited greatly from the conclusions. Shortley stressed that both President Kagame and President Museveni vented about continued delay in dealing with the ex-FAR/Interhamwe and the LRA behind closed doors. Kabila noted that the Congolese now have a plan to address the ex-FAR and Interhamwe and that the plan could begin any time. Kabila stated that sensitization and mobilization could begin immediately, with the military component coming online in March. Shortley noted that the U.S. was coordinating with the Rwandans on their comments to the plan. He stressed that the Congolese should offer to brief the Rwandans on the details of the military plan as a way to keep them in the loop. Shortley suggested that one option for meeting the KINSHASA 00001361 002 OF 003 initial demands of Addis is to hold a side-bar meeting in Goma to brief the Rwandan delegate on next steps to deal with FDLR. Shortley also highlighted that the Congolese need to urgently move on the inter-communal dialogue. U.S. Commitment to Train FARDC Troops -------------- ¶4. (C) Kabila asked when the U.S. would begin fulfilling its commitment to provide military training to the FARDC. Shortley explained that Assistant Secretary Frazer was in the process of issuing a letter to Present Kabila reaffirming U.S. commitment to provide the military training and that we expected to have the letter shortly. Shortley said the assessment team would arrive in January and that training would be in March. Ambassador Garvelink noted that he would be talking to General Ward on Thursday to discuss the arrival of the assessment team. Kabila was pleased to hear that the U.S. was moving quickly on U.S. military assistance. Shortley mentioned that the U.S. was also looking into the possibility of supporting the deployment of a Military Information Support Team (MIST) to eastern DRC to support the development of a communication strategy, sensitization programs and psychological operations against ex-FAR/Interhamwe as well as NKunda. Kabila enthusiastically agreed that the MIST was a good idea and looked forward to more specific planning for the teams, arrival. Nkunda: What Happens Between Now and Christmas? -------------- -- ¶5. (C) On Nkunda, Kabila stated that their efforts have always been just and flexible. Kabila stressed that the current round of fighting began when Nkunda attacked DRC positions in Nyanzale. Kabila said that the DRC retaliated and there have been wins and losses since the new fighting began, noting that Nkunda had reversed previous FARDC gains. Kabila rhetorically asked what,s next? Kabila claimed since the DRC now has a plan to deal with the FDLR, what else does Nkunda need? Kabila mentioned that the inter-communal dialogue had been delayed but that it would begin soon. He asked Chief of Staff Tshibanda to follow up on the start of the inter-communal dialogue process. Kabila stressed that we need a final answer on Nkunda,s willingness to go into exile. Shortley asked Kabila if the U.S. channel of communication with Nkunda was still helpful? Kabila stated emphatically that "you had a green light before and you have a green light now to continue communication with Nkunda" to help find a solution to the current crisis. MONUC ) You let me down -------------- ¶6. (C) Kabila groused about the poor performance of MONUC in the fighting in the last few days saying that MONUC has not done what it said it was going to do. He stressed that MONUC,s promises of "logistics support to FARDC are just bullshit". He continued and said that MONUC has also not fully participated in the operations against Nkunda and that MONUC is not living up to the mandate provided by the UNSC. He emphatically stated that the "meetings with MONUC have turned out to be just lip service." Kabila did not hide his frustration stating that "Nkunda could have been addressed by now with MONUC assistance and that MONUC has not been helpful." Kabila stated that previous promises by MONUC for air support have not been kept. Shortley stressed that it is hard to blame MONUC for the losses in Mushake when FARDC troops left the battlefield. Shortley also noted that MONUC must be careful where it engages or it could be further restrained by DPKO/New York. Kabila stated that MONUC must be clear on what it will and what it won,t do. Kabila then asked "what can MONUC do that will not take them beyond the red lines of their mandate, and how can they make sure that the atrocities stop? Shortley and Ambassador Garvelink offered to sit with the President,s Chief of Staff and MONUC SRSG and Force Commander to review its redlines and boundaries. Kabila agreed that would be a good idea. ¶7. (C) Kabila mused that UN peacekeepers did not respond in Rwanda and did not respond in Bosnia and asked if the UN would stop the atrocities in the Congo. He noted that MONUC has a much stronger mandate than the UN forces did during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and asked what is preventing them from stopping the killing. Shortley mentioned that there are KINSHASA 00001361 003 OF 003 significant rumors about Angolan, Zimbawean and Zambian support for FARDC and asked if these were true. Kabila indicated that these rumors are false, but, as a member of SADC, he is pursuing their assistance in a number of critical areas, including peace and security. (C) Note: It appears that Kabila believes that MONUC should be participating in the FARDC offensives against Nkunda. Post speculates that there may be a misunderstanding of Chapter VII engagement rules and will seek to help clarify those rules of engagement with the President. MONUC has worked hard to support the FARDC to include supplying and transporting ammunition, MRE's and evacuating the wounded. We are bemused by Kabila,s insistence that MONUC has not provided logistics support knowing that without MONUC support FARDC would not even be in North Kivu. End Note. Alternative Proposal ) Any Good Ideas Out There? -------------- --- (C) 8. Shortley stressed that we are constantly navigating between a military approach to Nkunda or attempting to have meaningful dialogue without the ability to have meaningful negotiations with the capacity to compromise on key issues. Shortley asked Kabila if he was now willing to consider a more comprehensive approach. Then Shortley proposed that MONUC increase its presence in North Kivu and redeploy its forces to occupy territory inside Nkunda,s positions. This would meet Nkunda's request to provide protection to the Tutsi population and allow him to disengage and send his men to brassage. Kabila enthusiastically agreed with this idea and stated that the Congolese themselves had proposed this idea before and could not understand why MONUC had not pursued it as a viable alternative to a protracted military confrontation. Recap -------------- ¶9. (C) Shortley and Kabila recapped the meeting by agreeing on the following list of follow up items: -- Washington will issue immediately the letter on U.S. military assistance from Assistant Secretary Frazer. -- Embassy Kinshasa will pass on a copy of the December 8 press release by the LRA spokesman. -- Ambassador Garvelink and Shortley will hold two meetings with MONUC to discuss (1) its mandate and redlines; and (2) review potential alternatives to address the Nkunda situation. Note: Garvelink and Shortley have already discussed these two meetings with SRSG Swing who is supportive. End Note. -- Shortley would contact Nkunda after discussing the alternative concept with Assistant Secretary Frazer, then seeking the buy-in of the GDRC. -- The U.S. will continue to work closely with the Rwandans to ensure they were fully apprised of new developments. ¶10. (C) Kabila agreed that Shortley and Ambassador Garvelink would meet with him again on Monday, December 17 to discuss Shortley,s talks with Nkunda and the results of the Join Monitoring Group in Goma, DRC. GARVELINK