Special Advisor Shortley's November 13 conversation with

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001278 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KWMN PINS PREF MOPS CG SUBJECT: Special Advisor Shortley's November 13 conversation with Presidential Chief of Staff Tshibanda REF: Kinshasa 1267 ¶1. (SBU) Tim Shortley, in Kampala, spoke at length with Raymond Tshibanda, DRC President Joseph Kabila's chief of staff on November SIPDIS ¶13. Shortley urged Tshibanda to press Congolese officials to move quickly on implementation of the recent DRC-Rwanda communique (reftel) on negative forces. Shortley also pressed the COS to develop plans to win the "hearts and minds" of the population of North Kivu to deprive Nkunda of his raison d'etre. Tshibanda expressed concern over a recent attack on an IDP camp, allegedly by dissident General Laurent Nkunda, and asked Shortley to call Nkunda to pressure him to end his insurgency; Shortley agreed to call Nkunda. Tshibanda also praised Shortley and USG efforts to end the conflict in the Kivus, asking emphatically that the U.S. remain in the driver's seat through the coming months as the Nairobi agreement is implemented. Shortley agreed to update Tshibanda on latest developments on Saturday, after the contact group meeting and meeting with Assistant Secretary Frazer. End summary. Nairobi agreement: a great success -------------- ¶2. (SBU) AF Special Advisor Tim Shortley and Raymond Tshibanda spoke by phone for 45 minutes on November 13. Also participating was Kinshasa charge Sam Brock. Tshibanda had requested the call to get Shortley's observations on the Nairobi meeting at which a ground-breaking communique on a joint approach to fighting negative forces in the east of the DRC was issued on November 10 by representatives of the DRC and Rwanda. Shortley called the meeting a great success with great conclusions, and which met all sides' requirements. The U.S., he said, looks forward to a rapid implementation of the agreement and in that connection urged Tshibanda to complete the plan on the FDLR, due on December 1 as SIPDIS agreed in the communique, as soon as possible. Tshibanda also agreed that rapid implementation is necessary. ¶3. (SBU) Tshibanda registered the GDRC's "strong concern" over an incident earlier in the day in which Nkunda's men allegedly attacked a camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) in Mugunga. Tshibanda noted that Nairobi had not sent the right message if SIPDIS Nkunda goes out and attacks innocent people in an IDP camp. He added: "We need to be harder with Nkunda." Shortley promised to look into reports on Mugunga and expressed uncertainty as to whether Nkunda had actually carried out the attack as he, Shortley, had heard that Nkunda might be away from the area. If so, Shortley stated, Bosco was in charge and would have attacked the IDP camp. (Note: MONUC has not confirmed Nkunda's involvement; some reports state that the FARDC attacked the camp. End note.) ¶4. (SBU) Tshibanda asked Shortley to call Nkunda to warn him, with "very strong words," to stop. Tshibanda repeated this request later in the conversation. He also reiterated several lines about the possibility of hundreds of innocent people getting killed if Nkunda is not removed quickly and the possibility of all the progress made in Nairobi being undone because of one man. Shortley promised to talk with Nkunda. Depriving Nkunda of his raison d'etre -------------- ¶5. (SBU Shortley then stressed need to start moving on a parallel track designed to undermine Nkunda's grievances and arguments, i.e., the issue of protection, meeting needs of vulnerable groups, etc. Undermining Nkunda's arguments and winning hearts and minds program for North Kivu, Shortley stressed, could help to meet needs of vulnerable groups, provide protection, government services and goods to the people of North Kivu. He added that based on this approach Kabila could also win hearts and minds for the coming local elections in May 2008. ¶6. (SBU) Shortley then referred to UN efforts to better protect people and provide services and asked Tshibanda if he would like hear about this from the UN. Tshibanda expressed interest; Brock was tasked with setting up a briefing in the coming days. Shortley continued that a three-track approach was needed for North Kivu: (1) dealing politically, diplomatically and militarily with Nkunda; (2) winning hearts and minds through a UN/DRC plan to provide services and protection; and (3) quick action against the FDLR. Tshibanda agreed that a quick attack on FDLR positions was needed to SIPDIS show that the GDCR was serious when it said it wanted to remove the FDLR as a negative force. ¶7. (SBU) Tshibanda ended the conversation with unqualified praise for Shortley and the U.S., saying that "never has such progress been made in ending the conflict in the east as had been achieved in the last three months when the GDCR began to work closely with the U.S." KINSHASA 00001278 002 OF 002 Without saying so explicitly, he was clearly referring to the many recent signs of U.S. engagement (meetings with the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in New York, the White House visit, intensified engagement between his staff and the U.S. Embassy, frequent calls between the Assistant Secretary, the Tripartite Plus process, etc.). Tshibanda welcomed continued involvement from the UN and other international partners but made clear that the U.S. must provide leadership and be completely involved. ¶8. (SBU) Tshibanda ended the call asking Shortley to update him by phone shortly after his return to the U.S. later in the week. Shortly agreed to call him Saturday after the contact group meeting, and after meeting with A/S Frazer. ¶9. (U) Special Advisor Shortley has/has cleared this message. Brock