MONUC'S INDIAN BATTALION BRIEFS SHORTLEY ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001270 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR BLEO E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2017 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PINS PREL KPKO CG SUBJECT: MONUC'S INDIAN BATTALION BRIEFS SHORTLEY ON FARDC-FDLR COLLABORATION Classified By: CDA Samuel Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During his October 30-November 3 tour of North Kivu, an Indian Battalion from MONUC provided security for the AF Senior Adviser Shortley. Upon arrival in Goma on 30 October, Shortley was briefed by the commander of North Kivu Brigade who transmitted what was mostly MONUC,s party line. In the ensuing three days with subordinate commanders, however, Shortley was briefed on the "close relationship" between the FARDC and the FDLR, Mai Mai and PARECO Congolese militias. End Summary. The Commander briefs Senior Advisor Shortley -------------- ¶2. (C) The Indian Brigade Commander claimed there has been a radical improvement in FARDC,s command & control and the troops, welfare in the past 20-25 days, and that the 8th Military Region Commander "is coming up to our expectations." He characterized renegade General Nkunda,s CNDP militia as his brigade,s preeminent threat, despite the fact that he estimates 5,000-6,000 FDLR are active in his area of operations. Later, however, he mentioned that the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) was the "biggest cause of instability and human rights violations" and that "brassage" has been a failure. ¶3. (C) The Indian Colonel said Nkunda,s failed operations against the FDLR in April led to a massive FDLR retaliation which caused the current humanitarian crisis. He also mentioned it was Nkunda who was responsible for the 2002 massacre of 160 people in Kisangani. The report omitted the fact that Nkunda was with RCD-Goma at the time and under the command of the current commander of FARDC ground forces, General Gabriel Amisi. When asked, the Indian commander stated that he has no proof of FARDC complicity with the extremist Hutu group, but said that the two groups "coexist." ¶4. (C) The brigade commander briefed that MONUC is giving the 22,000 FARDC troops in North Kivu non-lethal, logistical assistance including the airlift of Congolese troops, rations and ammunition. He stated that MONUC is also flying aerial reconnaissance missions for FARDC commanders, providing leadership and tactics training to Congolese officers, and has fixed one of the Congolese Mi-24 attack helicopters based in Goma. The Indian Commander assessed the CNDP (Nkunda) force to be demoralized, cut off, low on ammo, and eager to negotiate. Government sanctions illegal mining -------------- ¶5. (C) On the Mai-Mai troops operating in his area, the Indian Brigade Commander said that the 85th Brigade is recognized by the FARDC despite being comprised entirely of non-integrated Mai-Mai troops. While the 85th non-integrated Brigade is arrayed to the west of Nkunda,s enclave in the vicinity of Walikali, the Indian Commander stated that its main interest is mining, with the complicity of high level GDRC officials. He mentioned nothing about elements of the 85th Brigade moving eastward towards Masisi to encircle Nkunda. ¶6. (C) At the Mobile Operating Base in Kilolirwe, a subordinate commander unofficially acknowledged the mounting evidence of FARDC complicity with FDLR, Mai-Mai, and PARECO militia in its operations against Nkunda,s Tutsi-dominated force. He accused the government forces in North Kivu of working "in harmony, if not hand-in-glove." ¶7. (C) In Rutshuru, another subordinate Indian commander reported that a Mai-Mai leader named Kasereka created the Armed Forces for the Liberation (FAPL) of North Kivu on August 28, 2007. The militia comprises both Mai-Mai and FDLR fighters, and MONUC estimates its strength at approximately 1,000 personnel. Kasereka precipitated the latest round of fighting in North Kivu when he attacked CNDP troops under Makenga,s command at Bunagana on 19 October, and announced publicly that he had launched the attack on behalf of FARDC. In a bloodless engagement on 27 October in which only a few shots were fired, Kasereka surrendered to FARDC with 60-70 of his men. One Indian interlocutor at Rutshuru opined that Kasereka might have been forced to surrender because the FARDC had been embarrassed by his public claim that he KINSHASA 00001270 002 OF 002 attacked Nkunda at the request of and with the support of the Government. ¶8. (C) In Nyabiondo, an Indian company commander briefed that Mai-Mai fighters in his area of operation have thinned out recently and moved eastward to the vicinity of Kichanga-Masisi as part of the troop build-up around Nkunda,s stronghold. He also claimed he had personally witnessed about forty FDLR troops wearing FARDC uniforms moving on the axis between Loashi and Bukombo, also in the direction of Masisi. FARDC-FDLR collaboration -------------- ¶9. (C) At a meeting with Nyabiondo local authorities and civil society organized by the Indian Company, the Congolese spokesman claimed that the FDLR was all around their community and that it is only through their "local diplomacy" that they were able to survive in an area dominated by the Hutu extremists. ¶10. (C) The Indian company commander reported that the FDLR/FOCA "Montana" Battalion is headquartered in the vicinity of Kashebere and is commanded by Colonel Sadiq. He said that FDLR,s "Concorde" Brigade is located at Pinga. The commander estimated each battalion to be about 200-strong, and reported that the FDLR is collecting taxes and actively recruiting in his area. He stated that there are indications that the FDLR in his operational area are coordinating with Mai-Mai fighters against the CNDP. ¶11. (U) Mr. Shortley has/has cleared this message. BROCK