SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY'S NOVEMBER 3 MEETINGS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001260 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR BLEO E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL KPKO CG SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY'S NOVEMBER 3 MEETINGS IN KINSHASA REF: A. KINSHASA 1251 ¶B. KINSHASA 1252 Classified By: CDA Samuel Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior Advisor Tim Shortley met with close advisors to the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDC) on November 3 to discuss Shortley's just-ended trip to the eastern Congo, which included meetings with senior officers of the Congolese Armed forces (FARDC),the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC),and Tutsi insurgent leader Laurent Nkunda. Shortley and Kabila's chief of staff Raymond Tshibanda discussed a draft unified U.S.-Congolese plan for SIPDIS dealing with Nkunda and the FDLR. They also formulated talking points for Shortley's meetings over the following days with Rwandan officials. We believe that Kabila did not choose to receive Shortley because of the possible appearance of Shortley "negotiating" with Nkunda with Kabila's approval; this could damage Kabila's declining political support in the east. Shortley also met with MONUC officials in Kinshasa, including SRSG William Swing, Force Commander Babakar Gaye, and UN SYG Special Envoy for eastern DRC Haile Menkerios. Menkerios met earlier in the day with Kabila and Mbusa; Menkerios plans to facilitate a GOR-GDRC meeting in Nairobi later in the week to discuss President Kabila,s FDLR plan. End summary. ¶2. (C) AF Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley and Embassy Kinshasa Charge d'Affaires Sam Brock met with Raymond Tshibanda, President Joseph Kabila,s Chief of Staff, Marcellin Chissambo and Serafin Ngwej, presidential advisors on November 3 in Tshibanda's private residence. Shortley gives trip report -------------- ¶3. (C) Tshibanda opened by asking Shortley to provide the main findings from his visit to North Kivu. Shortley did so (per reftels). Tshibanda replied that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) appreciates U.S. help and would like to see the U.S. do more to solve the problem of negative forces and Nkunda "once and for all." He stressed that the FDLR and Nkunda are interlinked and the GDRC had stated it wanted to address both at the Tri-Partite. He said President Kabila knew where he wanted the country to go and had a plan to get it there, stressing the President,s outstanding leadership. Kabila also understood the need for compromise and had shown he was willing to make sacrifices. ¶4. (C) Tshibanda stressed that President Kabila must manage public opinion -- which is quickly turning against him in the east -- and was looking for a speedy end to the Nkunda and FDLR situation. He asked Shortley to go over highlights of A/S Frazer,s draft plan to end Nkunda's insurgency as discussed with President Kabila in Washington. Shortley, Brock, Tshibanda, Chissambo, and Ngwej edited the document to reflect the changing situation on the ground. Tshibanda asked that elements of the Government's FDLR plan not included in the U.S. plan be added to ensure that the plan is comprehensive. (Note: Brock is updating the plan and will forward it separately. End note). Tshibanda again reiterated the importance of moving quickly. Taking the message to the Rwandans -------------- ¶5. (C) Shortley and Tshibanda then reviewed talking points for his visit to Kigali to demonstrate active U.S. partnership with the RDC to address the FDLR and Nkunda situation. The following points were agreed on: -- The U.S. is actively supporting a Congo plan to deal with the FDLR and Nkunda; -- The GDRC has agreed to take simultaneous actions against Nkunda and FDLR; and -- The GDRC is compiling a map of FDLR locations and will take out FDLR positions when opportunities permit. ¶6. (C) Tshibanda and Shortley also agreed on additional points to press the Rwandans on their responsibilities vis-a-vis the FDLR and Nkunda. The following points were agreed on: -- Ask Rwanda to press Nkunda to send his men to "brassage" KINSHASA 00001260 002 OF 003 and to go into exile; -- Stress that Rwanda must increase is support for the return of non-ex FAR and non interhamwe to Rwanda; and -- Press Rwanda to take all necessary measures to prevent the re-supply of Nkunda. ¶7. (C) After more than two hours, Tshibanda ended the meeting. He asked Shortley to return in a few weeks to discuss his contacts in Rwanda and to assess progress. Shortley was non-committal but did not rule out a return visit. ¶8. (C) Comment: Despite indications earlier in the day that President Kabila would receive Shortley, the meeting never materialized. After waiting several hours for the call to go the president's office, Shortley and Brock were summoned instead to Tshibanda's home. We conclude that Kabila was wary of meeting with Shortley because the meeting might be leaked to the press. As Shortley had met earlier in the week with Nkunda, a meeting with Kabila would suggest that Shortley was negotiating between them. Such a perception could have political consequences for Kabila, whose support in the east of the DRC is declining precipitously. End comment. Discussions with Haile Menkerios -------------- ¶9. (C) Following the meeting with the President,s staff, Shortley and Brock went to MONUC Headquarters Kinshasa where they briefed SRSG William Swing and UN SYG Special Envoy for eastern DRC Haile Menkerios. Haile also briefed on his meeting earlier in the day with Foreign Mbusa and President Kabila. Haile stressed to the President that the DRC requires both a political and a military strategy to deal with Nkunda, and the FDLR, and a common strategy with Rwanda to be successful. When Kabila stressed that Rwanda was likely supporting Nkunda, Haile retorted "we have to assume Rwanda is supporting Nkunda and that your people are supporting FDLR -- and move on to solutions." ¶10. (C) The President asked Haile to play a useful role in ensuring the UN prioritizes resources to successfully end the reign of the FDLR in eastern DRC. President Kabila also asked Haile to facilitate a GDRC and GOR bilateral meeting in Nairobi on the margins of the Great Lakes Conference to allow Mbusa and Murigande to agree on the final outline of the FDLR plan. (Note: The President,s Chief of Staff, Advisors and Menkerios asked Shortley to attend as well to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the Congo,s FDLR plan. End note.) ¶11. (C) Shortley briefed Swing and Special Envoy Menkerios on his visit to North Kivu and stressed that getting progress on Nkunda depended on having a simultaneous strategy. Special Envoy Menkerios agreed but SRSG Swing pushed back and said that for the moment MONUC would stick to the sequential strategy and only use a simultaneous strategy when opportunities exist. Haile)Shortley conversations continue -------------- ¶12. (C) Shortley and Special Envoy Menkerios departed together on November 4 from Kinshasa to Goma. En route Menkerios explained he will act as the SYG,s special envoy on political issues dealing with the eastern DRC and that he wanted to coordinate closely with the U.S. Menkerios said that he was pleased to have company in such a difficult task. He said that Special Envoy Chissano had been considered for this post, but that the situation is too volatile and requires immediate and intensive attention. He said a coordinated UN-U.S. 60-90 day action plan was required urgently. ¶13. (C) Menkerios believes that Kabila,s request for abrupt U.S. and UN assistance has come after a reassessment of the present military strategy (to include the impact of the 23,000 soldiers on the local population and the cost of war) and continued low public opinion. Haile outlined four scenarios driving Kabila,s fear: (1) Exposure of FARDC-FDLR cooperation and loss of support from regional neighbors, the U.S. and European nations; (2) Rwanda takes measures to protect Nkunda in response to FARDC)FDLR cooperation and extends Nkunda,s reach and reign; (3) Rwanda enters the DRC KINSHASA 00001260 003 OF 003 to protect its interests; and (4) a popular revolt (or a coup) in response to the elected government's failure to bring peace and stability to eastern DRC and Congo. ¶14. (U) Senior Advisor Shortley has/has cleared this message. BROCK