TRIPARTITE FUSION CELL -- WHAT NEXT?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001247 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017 TAGS: PINR MOPS KPKO UG RW BY CG SUBJECT: TRIPARTITE FUSION CELL -- WHAT NEXT? REF: A. KINSHASA 1175 ¶B. E-MAIL FROM SIMON IVERSON TO EMBASSY OCTOBER 24 2007 Classified By: CDA S. Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (S) Summary. The Tripartite Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell (TFC) has significant assets at its disposal, but they are currently underutilized. Member states should be encouraged to participate fully, or else be suspended from the project. Additionally, the TFC should be brought into alignment with other Department initiatives in order to enhance the efforts of the Embassy to further US policy. Only when member states follow their rhetoric with concrete action, and real operational progress is made in providing and analyzing raw intelligence, should the mandate of this intelligence operation be expanded to include a Joint Planning Cell. End summary. ¶2. (S) Charge d'Affaires and GPRO chief visited the Tripartite-Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell (TFC) in Kisangani on October 10. The visit offered the opportunity to assess the TFC's operations and discuss the co-location of a new Joint Planning Cell (JPC) as proposed at the Tripartite Chiefs of Defense meeting in Lubumbashi in October 2007. They also visited senior MONUC Eastern Division headquarters officers (British and South Africans) in Kisangani, who provided comments on the TFC. Background -------------- ¶3. (S) The Tripartite-Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell (TFC) based in Kisangani was meant to bring intelligence officers from the DRC, Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian governments together to exchange raw intelligence and prepare analytical fusion products pertaining to armed groups ("negative forces") in Eastern DRC. The TFC is an outgrowth of the DoS's ongoing Tripartite diplomatic initiatives and is the only portion of this effort that is represented by a permanent, standing body. AF/RSA is funding the TFC contract, held by MPRI, at approximately USD 650,000 for FY08. ¶4. (S) As of late 2006, Embassy had been told that the permanent TFC in Kisangani would disband in March 2007. TFC members would go back to work in the TFC Focal Point Offices (FPOs) in their respective capitals, with secure communications linking them together and occasional meetings to reinforce their efforts and abilities. This did not occur, and the cell continues to operate in Kisangani in relative isolation from the member states' home intelligence services. ¶5. (S) A proposal was recently floated to significantly expand the scope of the TFC by co-locating a Joint Operations Planning Cell (JPC) (ref A) with the TFC in Kisangani, to draw up military plans based on TFC products. Observations From the Visit -------------- ¶6. (S) The permanent on-site American TFC "mentor" is a retired U.S. Army intel officer, secret-cleared, fluent French and Arabic speaker, with extensive war-zone and CI experience as well as several defense attache tours. The mentor sees his role as intelligence trainer, advisor, and referee. He has clearly earned the respect of the Ugandan, Rwandan and DRC participants, who are low-ranking but seemed capable. The Burundians have not been present for several months. There is also a Nigerian officer on-site from MONUC, who acts as an observer; MONUC rules specifically ban TFC personnel from entering MONUC property and forbid MONUC from passing any information to the TFC. ¶7. (S) The FPOs in each regional capital were established in March 2006, and simultaneously receive copies of all TFC products, which most frequently come in the form of brief spot reports, for relay to their own national intel agencies. The TFC makes requests for information to the FPOs, keeps track of the responses, and periodically sits down to compile comprehensive analytical products (primarily order of battle information). ¶8. (S) The TFC receives few formal submissions of raw intelligence from any source. Most of what the TFC does pick up is based on an ad hoc collection by the officers posted to KINSHASA 00001247 002 OF 003 Kisangani, who informally canvass their own contacts and colleagues. The TFC officers' DRC/Ugandan/Rwandan parent services make almost no inputs to the FPOs, express little interest in their work, and have never come to visit Kisangani to address TFC matters. The FPOs themselves are largely inactive. For example, the Kigali FPO has not communicated anything substantive to the TFC in months and the Kinshasa FPO only exists on paper. (Note: There is an equipped computer room at the DRC National Security Council's offices, but it appears to be opened and the computers turned on only when American visitors request a visit to the site. End note.) ¶9. (S) The TFC mentor told Charge and GPRO chief he has no insight into what is happening with other aspects of the overall Tripartite process and therefore cannot tailor its work to meet the member states' needs. The TFC delegates agreed that all participating states should send J2/Intel officers from their militaries to be stationed at the TFC to encourage a more operational focus. ¶10. (S) TFC delegates unanimously said the JPC (for military operational planning) idea sounded good in theory, but expanding the TFC to incorporate this new mission would never work under current circumstances. MONUC officers agreed with this assessment, noting there is no existing force to execute these potential JPC plans, and no competent military commander would agree to launch a military operation with someone else's (TFC) intelligence. ¶11. (S) That said, MONUC officers complimented the TFC's analytical products and the mentor noted that much of MONUC's own powerpoint presentation summarizing the status of armed groups in the region was based on the TFC's work. Local MONUC personnel want to engage the TFC and share with it, but are forbidden to do so due to UN concerns about getting involved in "intelligence" issues. None of the TFC's information makes its way into official USG reporting channels, and the mentor is not contractually permitted to report directly to the Embassy. Recommendations -------------- ¶12. (S) Embassy recommends the following: ¶A. Department should assign supervision of this contract to the Chief of Mission. This would include having the mentor report directly to the Embassy. ¶B. Given this particular mentor's experience and talents, he is at present being under-utilized. The scope of the mentor's duties should be adjusted to involve him in other activities of equal or greater value to the Mission, such as attending other Tripartite gatherings at which the Embassy is often not represented. ¶C. All foreign nationals having any involvement in the TFC should be vetted in advance, to include GRPO traces. All TFC activities involving intelligence officer skills training, provision of equipment to foreign intelligence services, or other permanent transfer of USG resources to foreign intelligence entities should be coordinated in advance with relevant in-country DNI representatives. ¶D. TFC analytical products (and raw information when appropriate) should be provided directly to the Embassy and disseminated via front channel USG communications. ¶E. The Department should engage with appropriate elements in USUN New York to seek their help in breaking MONUC's resistance to the TFC. ¶F. TFC member states who do not maintain steady attendance at the Kisangani site should be suspended from the process. TFC member states whose FPOs do not reply to requests for information over an extended period of time should be suspended from the process. Comment -------------- ¶13. (S) Although it falls under the framework of the Tripartite diplomatic initiative, by any reasonable definition the TFC should be called a U.S. Intelligence KINSHASA 00001247 003 OF 003 activity. For example, the mentor recently noted that he was "teaching an intel class to ten new DRC intel officers" (ref B). We have no idea who these people are or what they are being taught. TFC activities have significant CI implications and there are grave concerns regarding some of these intelligence agency's human rights records. We have also heard the TFC praised for at least offering a place where intel officers from the four Tripartite-Plus countries can sit together and talk. From our perspective, far greater things could be achieved in this region with USD 650,000 and a French-speaking retired U.S. military officer who possesses some of the U.S. government's most highly sought professional intelligence qualifications. ¶14. (S) Comment, continued. In light of the issues raised here, Post believes that a robust discussion of the next phase of TFC operations, to include representatives from the Embassy, the Department, the military and the intel communities, is essential. Post would also welcome the views of the Embassies in Kigali, Kampala, and Bujumbura. All elements relevant to the continued operation of the TFC -- including funding, location, mission, and increased participation of all Tripartite member states -- should be included. We have heard recently that additional funds may have been located to continue the TFC through September 08, possibly in connection with the calls for an expanded mandate. Again, we firmly believe that a comprehensive internal discussion on the issues raised here should be held before approving an extension of the TFC project. End comment. BROCK